
Built for eternity
The Allies, particularly the English, had sworn themselves after the end of the World War I to let the German submarine weapon never get more to such a threat as it developed during the first months of the unrestricted submarine war: As an existential threat of Great Britain. The construction of new boats was therefore forbidden strictly.
But this did not stop the Reichswehr (German 100 000 men army between the two wars) from letting already 1922 Dutch engineers develop secretly new techniques. Hitler signed a new agreement with England in March 1935 in which the submarine weapon in the size of 45% of the British was entitled to the Reich. The1.U-Flotilla was built under the command of Karl Dönitz already in September. In 1916 Dönitz gained practical submarine experience as a 1.officer on U 39 later than as Lieutenant-Commander of UC 25. In October 1918 the British HMS Snapdragon covered his new boat UC-68b with depth charges and sunk it. Dönitz survived the sinking and was taken prisoner. Even then he started to develop his theory of the "pack of wolves".
Dönitz managed to convince the navy leadership under Admiral Erich Raeder and at long last Hitler that a strong submarine weapon should be useful for the Reich. In the planning for the construction of the weapon 300 boats should be built by the middle of 1942. But when war broke out only 57 boats were ready for use, of those only 26 ocean-going types VII C and IX C. All further developments the World War I types.
Although within the first weeks and months the frustration was deep among the German submarine drivers primarily because of faulty torpedoes, the reports of success increased also because the British had not recognized the signs of the time and did enter the naval warfare without preparation yet. One of the most remarkable operations was the journey of Lieutenant-Commander Prien to the cave of the British lion: Scapa Flow. What nobody considered possible Prien succeeded in October 14, 1939. He broke through the British cordon and sank the pride of Britannia, the "Royal Oak". The Nazi propaganda promoted Prien and his crew to the first "superstars" of the naval warfare.
With the beginning of the campaign in France and the capture of the Atlantic ports the naval war situation changed fundamentally for the Germans. Until now the boats had to make the long detour via the Denmark Street or the dangerous way around the north head of England to break out into the Atlantic. Now efficient ports were available only threatened by British bombers. But the gain in time for the submarines was considerable. Now the boats could operate 10 days longer in the "killing grounds" of the North Atlantic to interrupt England's lifelines, the convoy routes.
Dönitz, promoted by Hitler to Rear-Admiral in October, was conscious of the threat from the air and put heaven and hell into convincing Raeder, the navy leadership and Hitler of his plan, to protect the main ports by solid bunkers. Hitler, always susceptible to gigantic constructions, supported the request. The German navy building and construction industry had already gained experience in the construction of such buildings. It all started on the island of Heligoland with the construction of North Sea III (six basins) already in 1940. Now they were capable to plan and build even larger installations.
Head of government department Eckhardt, boss of the navy building and construction industry, was responsible for the design studies. The organisation Todt (OT), represented by the OT- Group-West, was now responsible as a project manager. OT-West located in Paris under management of Oberbaudirektor Karl Weis was responsible for the areas of France, Benelux and Channel Islands. They built bunkers, V-weapon launching facilities, factories, storehouses and much more. But whatever they had built till now should be put in the shade by the enormous submarine bunkers. The operating companies were without exception the cream of the German construction firms. Brand, Siemens Bau-Union and Holzmann AG were responsible for the concrete works. Cranes and entry gates were delivered by the Gute-Hoffnungs-Hütte, Siemens-Schuckert designed all electrical installations and M.A.N. was responsible for pumps, steel doors, the slip ramp and crossheads in Lorient.
So enormous were the mass of people and material which had to be gathered it blew every known measure out of proportion. Here some numbers and facts which document the dimension of this operation to be compared with the pyramid making. The building started in spring 1941. For the concrete operations alone 2 369 500 cubic metres were scheduled. These were 60% of the entire amount of the Atlantic wall. Hundreds of German engineers were busy at the site, supported by thousands of French, Dutch, Belgiums, Poles and Portugueses. Even Vietnamese workers were busy to finish the buildings in record time. At the largest site at the Atlantic in Lorient, 15 000 men worked like a navvy and 2 000 lorries transported the material. To be able to carry all the required material to the construction sites, new railway tracks had to be built, existing ones to be enlarged. Hundreds of concrete-mixers were busy day and night and had to be fed. As sand was scarce in Lorient, a railway line to the neighbouring Pouldu area was specifically built where gigantic suction dredges fetched the raw material from the seabed.
Three different constructions were set up which had to be adapted to the conditions of the five ports. Tide-independent-bunkers In Brest and Lorient, Keroman III and Scorff, tide-dependent bunkers and therefore equipped with locks in La Pallice (La Rochelle), St. Nazaire and Bordeaux. Later with the increase of bombing raids the locks in St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeux were also covered by concrete roofs. In summer 1944 La Pallice went fully operational and St. Nazaire went into business, only Bordeaux was still far from completion.












