The Bridge at Remagen
Within the years before the beginning of the World War I General Erich Ludendorff demanded forcefully the construction of a new railway bridge over the river Rhine. This was needed to guarantee quick transfer of troops and supply from the Rhine-Ruhr district to the western frontier. Only in 1916 the construction was started in view of the consumption units getting bigger and bigger at stream kilometre 632.8.Almost in a historical place because Cesar already built the first Rhine crossing in the year 53 only 25 km further upstream.
Within two years a double-tracked, 4642 tons heavy building which showed several unusual features was created by the Cologne based company Grün & Bilfinger. The east shore was dominated by the rock Erpeler Ley which forced the railway tracks to run into a tunnel. This tunnel described a curve which led the way parallel to the river course down the Rhine again. Two towers each were the other unusual feature at the two ends of the bridge which protected the construction like a castle. Firing slits and platforms opened good options to the defender, spiral staircases led to supply bases and rest rooms. In the end the double-track installation was fitted with "pavements" calculated generously for troop traffic in the two directions and taken measures to cover the thresholds with boards to ensure a road for motor vehicles and trucks, a perfect war bridge.
Turn of the year 1944/45. The coldest winter for 20 years accompanied Hitler's last great dangerous game in the Ardennes. It sacrificed the last great tank reserves, needed so badly at the East Front, to the illusion to be able to smash the Allies in a great pincer movement. This last hope vanished at the latest on January 23.
Until February 1945 Americans, French and British increased their efforts and put into position 3,725000 men from the Swiss border to the North Sea. 6,000 tanks subdivided into 23 armoured divisions supported these men. Even further tank units operating independently arrived. Facing this mighty enemy stood the Germans with just 500 Panzers and 1 million men, divided into 55 divisions.
Three contemporaneous great operations of Eisenhower should cause the fast collapse of the German armies west of the Rhine. "Veritable" and "Grenade" were the code names for Montgomery's 21. Army Group, which should conquer the lower Rhineland from Düsseldorf up to the Dutch border at Nijmegen. „Lumberjack" intended to march off the 12. Army Group under Bradley, together with the 1. Army of Hodges, in direction of Cologne, Bonn, Remagen and the 3. Army, under Patton in the direction of Coblenz. “Undertone” is aimed at the conquest of the Saar region and resulting from it the security of the Rhine plain from Mainz to Karlsruhe, to this parts of Patton's 3.Army and Alexander M. Patch`s 7. Army were mustered.
The operation "Lumberjack" started on February 28. Patton pushed from Luxembourg toward the city of Trier, the river Moselle and the Hunsrück region and only had one target in front of his eyes: The crossing of the Rhine before Montgomery and Courtney Hodges (1. Army). To the north of Patton, Hodges 1. Army started his push to the Rhine and got on speedily. Eisenhower has chosen the 1. Army as a kind of reserve to either help out Patton or support Montgomery in the north, when required. A primary task of the army is the occupation of the bank of the Rhine sector.
Already on March 6 advance parties of the 9. U.S. Armoured Division under the leadership of General William Hoge arrived in Meckenheim near Bonn. At this time, Major Rolf Pauls of the 363. Volksgrenadier Division (people grenadier division) gave his units order, contrary to the orders of the Heeresgruppe (army group), to retreat behind the Rhine. The holder of the Ritterkreuz (Knight's Cross) who had lost an arm in Russia, was accused of cowardice and threatened with drumhead court martial. By chance he escaped further persecutions. After the war, in August 1965, Rolf Pauls was appointed first ambassador of the Federal Republic in Tel Aviv. He managed with dexterity and great empathy to convert the hostile atmosphere which he faced upon his arrival, into sympathy and respect.
On March 7, bad weather prevented normal air traffic but a “Piper Cub” is nevertheless in the air. Lieutenant Harold Larsen, artillery observer of the 9. U.S. Armoured Division, was on the look out for rewarding targets for his guns and flew towards the river Rhine. He approached Remagen at 10.30 and remarked to his astonishment that the bridge still stood contrary to the U.S. general staff belief. Larsen informed by return General Hoge who then alerted his unit in Meckenheim.
Immediately, a task force consisting of the 27. Armoured Infantry Battalion (Major Deevers) as well as the 14. Tank Battalion was drawn up under the command of Colonel Leonard Engeman. After slight resistance along the route Meckenheim, Fritzdorf and Oeverich, Lieutenant Emmet "Jim" Burrows and his advance group raced through Birresdorf and reached at noon a point where they could overlook the entire Rhine valley at Remagen. The Ludendorff Bridge was not destroyed and actually, German units used it as a road of withdrawal.
Burrows ordered the chief of his A Company, Lieutenant Karl Timmermann, to clarify the city of Remagen with an assault detachment. Timmermann, a son of a U.S. garrison soldier and a German born in Frankfurt am Main, fought his way slowly through Remagen and approached the bridge. At 15.00 he met his battalion commander, Major Murray Deevers, who transmitted General Hoges order to take the bridge.
The situation on the other side of the bridge was extremely tense. The commander of the Ludendorff Bridge was Captain Bratge, in charge of 36 soldiers. These men were mostly convalescents of the Linz hospital. Responsible for the blowing-up was Captain Karl Friesenhahn who commanded a sapper detachment of 120 soldiers. Moreover, the defence plan of the Germans intended to employ in case of emergency 500 men of the Volkssturm (people army) 180 members of the Hitler Youth as well as 120 Russian Hiwis (auxiliary forces)
Since September 1944 the Ludendorff Bridge was, like all other bridges, bombarded permanently. One attack with 33 aircraft on October 19, flown by 36th U.S. Bomber Group, made the US General Staff believe in the destruction of the bridge. But already on November 9 German repair engineers had restored the construction so far that reinforcements could roll normally again.. In the course of the next weeks and months the bridge was attacked, hit and repaired again repeatedly.
There was chaos these days in Remagen in early March. The battery of quadruplet anti-aircraft guns on the Erpeler Ley was misplaced to Coblenz in the afternoon of March 6 without advising the bridge commanding officer about it. Bratke learned of it the next morning and ordered an anti-aircraft gun battery which returned over the bridge from the western shore,to take up position by the Erpeler Ley. That order was ignored by the battery commander.
In case of a hostile attack a powerful blowing-up should destroy the ramp on the west shore, to prevent access to hostile tanks, however, still keep a flight possibility for German troops open. The real blowing-up of the bridge should only then be carried out if the major force of the attacker would appear eight kilometres in front of the bridge. This was an order initiated by Hitler personally which applied to all Rhine bridges. General Hitzfeld who had taken on the sector only in the morning sent his adjutant, Major Scheller, to Bratke to get an exact picture of the situation. Scheller had to give up the radio car on the way to the bridge because of lack of fuel, however, and therefore was not able to inform the general quickly. When Captain Friesenhahn sawTimmermann and his men approach he gave order to the blowing-up of the ramp. General Hitzfeld had chosen by accident exactly at this moment to replace Bratke by Major Scheller as the bridge commanding officer. Due to the following information chaos further precious time to arrange the real bridge blow-up passed. Meanwhile, the bridge was under intense infantry and tank fire. Finally, Scheller on impulse from Bratke, gave the final order at 15.20. Bratke had his blow-up order noted down in writing in the wording. Later, it should not use him much.
That is the situation at the time when Timmermann with his A-Company experienced the first explosion near the ramp. After they have inspected the situation, a smaller explosion happened at 15.40, followed a bit later by a much bigger explosion. When the gun smoke had faded, Timmermann could see that the bridge had lifted only easily and then put back again on its abutments. The commercial explosives that were used, as the 600 kg of sapper-TNT had not arrived in time, were too weak. Heavy machine gun and 2 cm flak anti-aircraft gun fire started. Immediately he gave order to attack but all sat tight. Major Deevers who still accompanied Timmermann shouted:" I will see you over there and we will have chicken for the dinner". One of the GIs who overheard this replied to Deevers:" I do not come out to kick the bucket they can rather drag and shoot me in front of a court martial". But when Timmermann first ran off on the bridge, the entire company followed him on the spot.
A U.S. tank gave covering fire while Timmermann rushed over the bridge. Next to him ran Sergeant Joe DeLisio, who was leading the first group and Sgts. Alex Drabik as well as Sgts Joe Petrencsik with the second department Directly behind them followed Lieutenant Mott with some sappers: Chinchar, Samele, Massie, Wegener and Jensen. They were Italians, Czeches, Norwegians, Germans and Russians, children of European immigrants who had returned to free their compatriots. Explosive charges were cut and thrown into the river if possible. While they were running around their life, they saw a German sapper at the end of the bridge as he desperately turned the blowing up box without triggering an explosion. They found four 15 kg of TNT charges which were immediately disposed.
Meanwhile DeLisio stormed toward the right tower where most fire came from, ran up the spiral stairs of four stories and bumped into a MG 42 crew who was promptly disarmed. He threw the machine gun down on the bridge which of course was welcomed by his comrades with cheers. Drabik is the first GI to reach the east shore, followed by others who immediately captivated the German sappers in the tunnel. The Erpeler Ley was stormed by Lieutenant Burrows and his company with losses and defended against a large number of Germans and a 2 cm anti-aircraft gun. That is why the 170 m high rock was called " Flak Hill".
16-year-old German soldier Heinz Schwarz from a village just miles away was curious and he believed to have a seat in a box in one of the towers, when they blew up. He saw how the bridge lifted and saw Timmermann and his men attack toward him. He decided to cut and run through the tunnel straight home.15 years later he was a representative of the German Bundestag (Lower House of the German Federal Republic.
The tunnel was not only HQ for Bratke and his men but also refuge for approx. 400 civilians and foreign workers. They stood or lied next to ammunition depots and rail road tankers with petrol of which one strongly leaked. For Captain Bratke the question whether it made sense to fight for the exit against the interests of the civilians became an issue. Nothing more was to be seen of Major Scheller at this time. He must have left the tunnel already unnoticed. At 17.30 Bratke did not see any other alternative then surrender.
In the meantime U.S. sappers had vacated the ramp, filled up the crater and cleared the way for heavy equipment. The first Sherman Panzer was steered over the Rhine by Sgt. William Goodson. Behind this a further eight followed in the distance. The tank directly behind Goodson got stuck in a bridge link however, and could only be be refloated by 17.30 again. After 24 hours already 8 000 U.S. Soldiers had crossed the river.
Americans like Germans immediately realized that the Ludendorff Bridge had become the focus of the entire Allied campaign and made all efforts to stabilize or to destabilize the bridgehead. Both sides threw all available reinforcements into the sector Remagen. For the Americans it was an easy task to direct divisions from the area of Cologne to Remagen in a flash. They have the absolute air sovereignty. The Germans had to manage this at night and under an inconceivable chaos on the roads. One of the first units which arrived on the German side opposite Remagen in the night from March 7 to 8, is Rolf Pauls. Instead of being shot he is praised afterwards for his considered behaviour at the returning action of his guns and Panzers and was ordered to fight the American bridgehead
But not only Model and his Heeresgruppe B (army group B) did react quickly. The Luftwaffe also kicked on the plan and attacked the bridge with utter disgust as of the morning of March 8, at first eight Stukas (JU 87) and another two aircraft. Eight were shot down. Non-commissioned officer Waldemar Führing, one of Pauls men, remembered: "I was located in bushes approx. 800 m away from the bridge and saw the attack. The pilots were extremely brave but they did not destroy it although they put their bombs close to the bridge". Within the next nine days Stukas, Jabos and jet fighters should attack the bridge constantly. But 106 of the 367 attackers were shot down.
The Americans reacted immediately .The by far biggest, heaviest anti-aircraft gun concentration of the entire war was set up around the bridge and the valley within shortest time. An American AP war correspondent talked about one of the attacks:" The fire of the anti-aircraft gun batteries was so strong that the floor shook. Within three minutes the complete Remagen valley was wrapped up by dust and smoke into one cloud. It was monstrous". But all anti-aircraft guns of this world were useless against the V 2 attacks. It is the first and only time that V 2, launched at Hellendoom in Holland, had been directed against the homeland. But the desperate situation of the Germans also had no other option. But only one of these rockets stroke 300 metres off the bridge. All other 12 projectiles were extreme misses. Another "Wunderwaffe" (wonder weapon) operation was the one of the Me 262. The worlds first jet fighter was re-equipped as a Jabo. But their action also was in vain.
Artillery also was used on both sides. The U.S. army assembled every available gun to Remagen to paralyze German assembly areas. In turn the Germans used their heaviest calibres to hit the bridge devastatingly. As a highlight of the German efforts the use of the mortar "Karl" must be seen. This 132 tons monster on a tank chassis fired off two tons of heavy 60 cm grenades. But after 14 shots this gun was already finished and removed.
After U.S. sappers had started to set up pontoon bridges upper and below the bridge, the Germans decided to put frogmen into action. Six frogmen under leadership of Leutnant (second lieutenant) Schreiber are flown in from Berlin and jumped into the water near Linz on March 15. The Americans however, had taken such an operation into account and had organized countermeasures. Marksmen were positioned on the bridge, torpedo nets were installed upstream and new British searchlight tanks with carbon reflectors. They were Leutnant Schreibers doom for disaster. They were already recognized shortly near Linz and forced to surrender.
The end of the Ludendorff Bridge just happened, March 17.The enormous burden from previous bomb raids of the U.S. Air Force, the German blowing-ups and the innumerable close impactions and last but not least the endless stream of tanks and trucks were too much for the static of the bridge. At 15.00 the steel construction generated a sudden loud bang, followed by an immediate rumbling and crunching. Seven GIs drowned, 18 were reported missing and 66 were hurt of whom another three die later.
The collapse could not change the success of the Americans anymore. The three pontoon bridges that were built meanwhile replaced the capacity of the Ludendorff bridge totally and guaranteed the supply for the 9. U.S. Armoured Division.
There is an epilogue however, to the officers involved in the defence of the bridge and the Commander-in-Chief Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt. He was replaced by Genneralfeldmarschall Kesselring. Five officers, one of them in absence, were sentenced to death by a court martial. Major Scheller`s death sentence referred to absence without leave and because as senior officer he had not provided the blow-up in time. After the war his widow brought an action against the suspension of this disgrace verdict and won it, a not everyday procedure at the process of coming to terms with the past of military judgement.
The Majors Strobel and Kraft were sentenced to death because of refrained counter-attacks and for not having informed themselves about the situation properly. The captivity protected them from the shooting command. Also sentenced to death in absence as primarily responsible, was Captain Bratke. The fifth one sentenced to death for the loss of the bridge, Oberstleutnant (lieutenant-colonel) Peters had to die because he left behind a secret weapon, the Flak-R-Werfer (anti aircraft rocket) code-named "Föhn"(hair dryer) with ammunition. Scheller and Peters were shot in Rimbach, March 13, the two others in Oberirsen.
