The Plan
Germany's position in the centre of Europe in connection with long borders which were not protected by natural barriers made its defence more difficult than those of its neighbours. Therefore any commander considering a war against one of Germanys neighbours had to be aware of the danger of either getting drawn into a war of attrition or a two-front-war, both cases being very unfavourable for the Germans, whose geo strategic weakness would usually allow its enemies to cut off the flow of resources from overseas. Thus any plan for a campaign had to seek for a decision within some months otherwise Germany would face the danger of a long war that it was likely to loose.
After the foundation of the German Empire or "Second Reich" in 1871, the most likely enemies were France and Russia. To escape the disaster of a two-front war the Prussian General Staff decided to attack France with all troops available, leaving only a few divisions guarding the East against a Russian advance. As the French border with Germany was only 200 miles long and had been heavily fortified by the French, and as the French armies grew stronger, both factors ruled out a frontal assault as in 1870. Thus the chief of the General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, developed the plan to use only a part of the German army to guard the French border and to deliver the main thrust through Belgium. The German troops were to wheel around Verdun and, after encircling Paris and partly bypassing it in the West, to press the French armies against the German border from behind. This manoeuvre would create a sort of "Super-Cannae" and enable the Germans to achieve a quick total victory, which would free troops for the eastern theatre. To fulfil this task detailed plans were created when and at which day of mobilisation what corps had to take which city, and a gigantic plan of railroad transports to secure the accurate development was pinned down. The Schlieffen Plan has much been criticised for its detailed orders, which pre planned the moves of virtually all corps right to the decision of the battle, thus leaving virtually no time for Clausewitz "friction" or even contrary orders by the Commander in Chief. Every variation from the original layout concealed the danger of failure.
This plan was finished in 1905 and only slightly modified by Schlieffens successor Moltke the Younger, the nephew of the older Moltke who defeated Austria and France. But these modifications proved to be crucial. Schlieffen had stripped the left wing, which was to engage and pin down the mass of the French army, down to 7 Divisions, whereas the right wing was to consist out of 54 Divisions. Moltke used the additional Divisions he gained in the period from 1905-14 to strengthen the left wing and to assemble a reserve of six new Divisions. This alone did not much to hamper with Schlieffen's plan, but the addition of failures in leadership in the early stages of the war led to a disaster.
At 08.00 hours of August 4, 1914 the spearheads of the German armies crossed the Belgian border. The initial aim of von Buelow´s Second Army, which comprised 320,000 men, was to seize the city and fortress of Liege. The Fortress of Liège, with a pre-war population of 164,000, is located 25 to 30 kilometres from the German border. The river Meuse runs through the city centre, from North to Southeast, towards the city of Namur and France beyond. To the south, along its banks, lay massive steel and iron works, coal mines, and arms factories. Above all, Liège and its fortifications were poised like a dagger at the vital railroad line which ran from Germany to Brussels, and finally to Paris.
However Liege was defended by a ring of twelve heavily armed forts built on high ground in the 1880s, six on each side of the river Meuse. The forts contained a total of 400 retractable guns, up to 210mm in size. The designer of these fortifications was one of Europe's most respected military engineers, Henri Alexis Brialmont (1821-1903). He was the son of General Laurent Brialmont (1789-1885), who served under Napoleon and later became aide-de-camp to King Leopold I and Belgium's Minister of War. After working on the Antwerp forts, Brialmont was hired by the Rumanian government to build a ring of fortresses around Bucharest. This project took 12 years to complete and gave him many ideas to use on what would be his final project, the construction of forts around Liege and Namur.
A total of 12 forts were constructed. The average distance between the forts was 1900 meters. The largest gap was 7000 metres. The perimeter of the fortress ring was 52 kilometres and the average distance from the city centre was 6.5 kilometres. Six forts were located on each bank of the River Meuse. On the right bank, situated from north to south, were Fort Barchon, Fort Evegnee, Fort Fleron, Fort Chaudfontaine, Fort Embourg and Fort Boncelles. On the left bank, from north to south, were Fort Pontisse, Fort Liers, Fort Lantin, Fort Loncin, Fort Hollogne and Fort Flemalle.
Six of the fortresses were built as primary forts, and were given a pentagonal shape with a surrounding ditch and barb-wire entanglements. They were concrete structures armed with two 6-inch and four 4.7-inch guns, two 8-inch mortars and four machine-guns. The guns were mounted in a cupola that could be elevated to fire then retracted. The forts were linked by underground tunnels, and contained magazines for ammunition, crew quarters for up to eighty men, and ventilation systems. Between each pair of major forts was a triangular secondary fort, named a fortin. These were armed with two 6-inch and two 4-inch guns, a single 8-inch mortar and three machine-guns.
In total the forts had 400 pieces of artillery, although the guns were considered of obsolete design. The other weaknesses of the forts were a lack of field artillery pieces to cover the openings between the gaps, and a shortage of men needed to guard the city. General Gérard Mathieu Leman had been picked as Military Governor of Liège and commander of the 3rd Division and the Fortress Troops. He was under orders from the King to hold the fortress system to the end. Liège was defended by the 3rd Division with four mixed brigades; each with two infantry regiments, one artillery group (three batteries, four pieces each), one company of machine gunners, and one platoon of gendarmes. Leman had a force of about 25,000 soldiers, including members of the civic guard, to man the defences.
The German Army that was about to attack Liege was called the "Army of the Meuse", a special task force of 30,000 troops under the command of General Otto von Emmich, accompanied by the staff officer Erich Ludendorff. And these were their units:
34th Infantry Brigade of IX Corps, from Schwerin (Major-General Von Kraewel), 27th Infantry Brigade of VII Corps, from Cologne (Colonel Von Massow), 14th Infantry Brigade of IV Corps, from Halberstadt (Major-General Von Wussow), 11th Infantry Brigade of III Corps, from Brandenburg (Major-General Von Wachter), 38th Infantry Brigade of X Corps, from Hanover (Colonel Von Oertzen), 43rd Brigade of XI Corps, from Cassel (Major-General Von Hulsen). The Army of the Meuse also included the 2nd Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant-General von der Marwitz), two batteries of four 21cm mortars; one squadron of aircraft and one zeppelin (Z 6 Köln) for aerial bombing.
On the eve of the First World War, the question of Belgian neutrality again arose. Incredibly, on the morning of the day in which he was to present the German ultimatum to Belgium, von Below, the German ambassador in Brussels, stated:
"The troops will not cross Belgian territory. Grave events are about to happen. It may be that you will see the roof of your neighbour's house in flames, but the fire will spare your home."
That evening, Albert I, King of Belgium, received an ultimatum from Germany. Belgium was to permit the passage of German troops to the French frontier because on its own it would be unable to resist a French and an English invasion. Germany would guarantee Belgium's sovereignty and integrity, pay cash for all requisitions, and make good any damage done by German troops. If Belgium refused, future relations between the two nations would be governed by "the decision of arms." Brussels had 12 hours to reply. The Belgian cabinet adamantly refused the ultimatum and chose to fight.
On August 4, 1914, the King addressed the following communication to the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Russia: "The Belgian Government regrets to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements. The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory. There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium. Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places”.
Immediately, General Leman began with preparations to delay the expected German onslaught. On August 4, the bridges of Hermalle-sous-Huy, Engis, and Ombris, on 6 August, the bridges of Maghin and Pont des Arches in Liège were destroyed. Also the Hombourg tunnel was blown. At Trois Ponts and Stavelot railway installations were destroyed and the tunnels of Coo, Roanne-Coo, Remouchamps, and Verviers-Est blocked by derailed locomotives.
General Leman also ordered to set up three lines of defence. A first line of redoubts and trenches were set up just behind the fortress perimeter line. A second line, 2 km to the rear of the forts and third line above the city limits, consisting of trenches and fortified strong points.
At 08.00 hours, August 4, a telegram was sent from the Belgian frontier post at Gemmenich (6 km from Aix-La-Chapelle) to the command at Liege, announcing that German troops had crossed into Belgium. This news was followed by reports from 2nd Lancers that, at 08.00 hours, two divisions of Von Marwitz's cavalry had violated the frontier north of Liege, heading in the direction of the river Meuse.
The German High Command planned to encircle Liege from the North, East, and South, and to penetrate the city rapidly between the intervals of the forts during the night of 4 to 5 August. Von der Marwitz's cavalry would complete the investment by circling to the west of Liege to cut supply lines from Namur and Brussels.
Von Emmichs units advanced to the Meuse, but found the bridge crossings had been destroyed. By the 5th, however, German forces had crossed the Meuse to the north at Visé.
The same day the Belgian 3. Division successfully repulsed attacks by German infantry passing between the forts. An attack against Fort Barchon was beaten back with heavy losses due to machine-gun and artillery fire. After this failed attack, the Germans performed the first air raid in history by using a Zeppelin to drop bombs on Liège. Meanwhile cavalry moved south from Visé to encircle the town. With the town likely to be invested soon, Leman now ordered the 3rd division to withdraw from the town and rejoin the mobilizing Belgian army to the west.
By the evening of 5 August, German forces were within 1 to 2 kilometres of the forts, which were pounded by German artillery throughout the night. During the night, the fighting continued in a surreal atmosphere. Soldiers clashed under the powerful beams of the fortress searchlights; grotesque images of death were illuminated by the constant flashes of exploding shells. Men fought in every sector, and in every sector the valiant Belgian defenders began to feel the weight of the German attack, and in some areas, began to break. At 2330, the Germans advanced on the trench of Surfosse and were set back with murderous fire from the thinly manned trench. Fighting for the trench continued until 0230. The Germans finally silenced the position by 0400.
Ludendorff now took command of the 14. Brigade that was able to infiltrate between Barchon and Meuse, and the Evegnee-Fleron gap. Once established in the hills overlooking the city, German forces began to bombard the Citadel and the city. At 14.00 hours, white flags flew from the Citadel where a handful of Civil Defense troops remained. Von Emmich sent a representative to the Citadel to accept the surrender of the city but General Leman, who had moved to Fort Loncin, refused to surrender. The bombardment would continue throughout the night. Meanwhile, General Ludendorffs forces occupied key locations in the city, including the bridges. However, by this time, General Leman had withdrawn 3rd Division from Liege. The ground battle was over.
The communique of August 7 to the German High Command announced that the Fortress of Liège had fallen. Germany rejoiced. Von Emmich's troops marched into the city, flags furled, bands playing. But the announcement was exaggerated and premature because the linchpin of the position, the forts, especially those of the left bank, remained in Belgian hands. Until they fell and the roads and railroads west of Liege were opened, the huge German Army was going nowhere.
The outer ring of forts continued to hold out. The forts endured steady bombardment and attack by the German forces, but most of the forts continued to repulse enemy attacks. Only Fort Fleron was put out of action, its cupola-hoisting mechanism being destroyed by shell fire.
Many citizens fled west along with the retreating army. Many were surprised to find that a regular train schedule still existed at the station of Ans, still under the guns of Fort Loncin, and that one could calmly catch a train to Brussels and Antwerp. This reveals the importance of the forts and how their continued resistance significantly slowed the German advance. The occupation of the city gave them no advantage. Liege was a vital link to their lines of communication and supply, because of the railway lines. As long as the forts held out and kept watch over the rail lines, the Germans would not advance.
J. Byron Dolphin, British Vice-Consul at Liège, on his return to London after the fall of the town, said about the shelling:
"The forts were subdued by the heavy siege guns of the Germans, two of the largest of which were of 42 cm calibre. Some of these guns were placed about one and a half miles from my house, and others were six or seven miles away. You could not see the effect of the firing; we only knew of the results from the statements of the soldiers who had been defending the forts”.
"The forts were subdued by the heavy siege guns of the Germans, two of the largest of which were of 42 cm calibre. Some of these guns were placed about one and a half miles from my house, and others were six or seven miles away. You could not see the effect of the firing; we only knew of the results from the statements of the soldiers who had been defending the forts”.
Forts Pontisse and Barchon guarded the Meuse crossings north of Liege; Felmalle and Boncelles did the same at the opposite end of the city. Fort Embourg dominated the Ourthe valley, Fleron and Chaudfontaine guarded the Aix-La-Chapelle railway line. Finally, to get to Brussels, the Germans would have to get past the guns of Loncin. Thus, the forts would have to be eliminated.
To reduce these fortifications, the Germans would have to employ their massive siege artillery. These would include the Krupp "Big Bertha" 420mm mortar and some Austrian 305mm Skoda guns.
Designed in 1904 and produced by the Krupp factories in Essen, Germany, in 1914, the “Big Bertha” were built in two variants: the rail bound Gamma Gun, also known as “Kurze Marine-Kanone 14 L/16” (short naval gun) and the M-Version (tool) (M for Mine). Of these guns five and two respectively were available by 1914. The M-Version did weigh 42.6 t, and was transported by four trailers towed by tractors. The Gamma Gun did weigh 150 t and was moved by ten railroad wagons. Till the end of WW I, 10 Gamma Guns and 12 M-Geräte were built. The mortars fired variable sorts of shells. The Gamma Gun fired a light shell weighing 800 kg each and a maximum range of 14.1 km with a maximum elevation grade of 80 degrees, a heavy shell weighing 1.160 kg with a maximum range of 12,5 km. The M-Version fired a heavy shell weighing 810 kg with a maximum range of 9.3 km and a light shell weighing 400 kg with a maximum range of 12,2 km. This shell was introduced in 1917.They were also used during the German assault upon Namur and Verdun The mortar was named after Gustav Krupp's wife.
The big guns arrived on August 11, although the 420's were not set up and ready to fire until the afternoon of the 12th. 280 mm's of the 9th and 4th Artillery Regiments were set up and concentrated fire on Evegnée. For the first time, guns of a larger calibre than Brialmont counted on were being used against the forts. Yet considerable damage had already been done by repeated bombardment from guns of smaller calibre. The 28's opened up on Evegnée at 0900 and continued all day long, finally letting up on the 11th at 0450. Shells fell at the rate of 250-275 projectiles per hour. By noon, all of Evegnée's guns were out of service. The bombardment of Loncin, Lantin, Liers, Pontisse, Fleron, and Chaudfontaine continued on the morning of the 12th. At Pontisse, unrelenting fire was directed mainly at the gorge front. The superstructure was crumbling. The garrison was visibly disturbed but maintained their courage. At 1745 a huge explosion was heard and felt in the fort. Many thought that the powder magazine had gone up. Instead it was a shell from the 420 - Big Bertha was in action at Mortier. It fired 2-3 shots then retired for the night, leaving the already rattled defenders to wonder what was coming the next day.
Pontisse had been under fire since the 11th. Shelling picked up again on August 12 at 07.00 hours. At 08.00 hours it reached a peak. Then the 420's stepped in, turning the surface into rubble. The concrete and steel was destroyed. Munitions exploded in the central gallery, spreading gas throughout the structure. the garrison held out until 1130. Captain Speesen declared that "resistance is illusory and the end would come in a matter of minutes." He raised the white flag. Four hours of bombardment by the 420's had turned Pontisse into a ruin. With the capitulation, the 36. Brigade crossed the Meuse at Wandre to attack Fort Liers from the rear.
The bombardment of Fort Chaudfontaine began at 12.30 hours on the 12th, slowed overnight, and picked up at 04.00 hours on the 13th. Shelling had the same effects here as at the other forts. The electricity went out and could not be repaired. Despite the total darkness, the fort continued to function. At 0730, an enormous explosion occurred in the magazine, 97 men were killed and 30 mortally wounded. The fort could offer no further resistance and surrendered.
The same pattern was repeated at Embourg, with slow shelling overnight, picking up at dawn. The 120 mm´s were out of action and the scarp and counterscarp were badly damaged. At 12.30 hours shelling intensified after the destruction of Chaudfontaine. A 21 cm battalion fired 144 shots in a 40-minute time span against the central massif. The commander of 14. Brigade decided to launch an attack from the woods adjacent to the fort. At 19.30 hours, however, the white flag flew over Embourg.
In the morning of August 14, at 01.30 hours the Big Bertha opened fire on fort Fleron from the plateau of Belleflame. Commandant Mozin described the effects of the 420: "After each shot, the entire fort shook, the shock lifted us off the ground, displacing everything which was not fixed. The asphyxiating [gas] and the flames menaced the artillerymen. The men were burned. All lighting was gone." At 0900 more than 4000 projectiles were launched at the fort. The surface of the fort was a lunar landscape, all guns silenced. The garrison could barely breathe, and were at the complete mercy of the 420's. Mozin met with his Council of Defence and decided that it was futile to go on. At 09.45 hours the fort capitulated. The fall of Fleron opened the road to Aix-La-Chapelle.
One after another the forts surrendered or were shot to pieces. By 12.30 hours, the 450 men of the garrison of Fort Lantin surrendered. Now the guns no longer needed at Lantin were trained on Loncin. The bombardment kept up overnight and picked up intensity at dawn. Shells came from every direction - Loncin, Ans, Liege, Alleur, Liers, Xhendremael, and Hognoul. At times, up to 15 shells landed on the fort at the same time. The corps de garde was destroyed, armored plating on the barracks battered in. All services - kitchen, bakery, electrical power - out. Numerous breaches in the escarp and counterscarp; the infantry sortie was caved in; and of course, poison gas filled the galleries. However, all the guns worked and kept up a reply throughout the terrible ordeal.
At 16.00 hours, a delegate approached the fort but was shot at by the sentinel. In actuality, his visit was deceptive. The shells of the 420's were not hitting their target and this man was sent to signal the position so the guns could be aimed. At 17.20 hours, the twenty third 420 mm shell fell on the central massif and there was a tremendous explosion that shook the entire fort. The shell had penetrated to the powder magazine, which had blown up. To the eyes of the German witnesses it appeared that the entire fort had been destroyed.
A German officer wrote in his battle report about General Leman: General Leman's defence of Liége combined all that is noble, all that is tragic. The commander of one fort, at the moment when the bombardment was heaviest, went mad, and shot his own men. He was disarmed and bound. The cupola of another fort was destroyed by a bomb from a Zeppelin. Other forts were swept away like sand castles on the seashore before the relentless waves of the oncoming tide.
As long as possible General Leman inspected the forts daily to see that everything was in order. By a piece of falling masonry, dislodged by our guns, both General Leman's legs were crushed. Undaunted, he visited the forts in an automobile. Fort Chaudefontein was destroyed by a German shell dropping in the magazine. In the strong Fort Loncin General Leman decided to hold his ground or die.
When the end was inevitable the Belgians disabled the last three guns and exploded the supply of shells kept by the guns in readiness. Before this, General Leman destroyed all plans, maps and papers relating to the defences. The food supplies were also destroyed. With about 100 men, General Leman attempted to retire to another fort, but we had cut off their retreat. By this time our heaviest guns were in position, and a well-placed shell tore through the cracked and battered masonry and exploded in the main magazine. With a thunderous crash the mighty walls of the fort fell. Pieces of stone and concrete twenty-five cubic metres in size were hurled into the air. When the dust and fumes passed away, we stormed the fort across ground literally strewn with the bodies of the troops who had gone out to storm the fort and never returned. All the men in the fort were wounded, and most were unconscious. A corporal with one arm shattered valiantly tried to drive us back by firing his rifle. Buried in the debris and pinned beneath a massive beam was General Leman.
With gentleness and care, which showed they respected the man who had resisted them so valiantly and stubbornly, our infantry released the general's wounded form and carried him away. We thought him dead, but he recovered consciousness, and, looking round said, “It is as it is. The men fought valiantly”, and then, turning to us, added, “put in your despatches that I was unconscious”.
We brought him to our commander, General von Emmich, and the two generals saluted. We tried to speak words of comfort, but he was silent-he is known as the silent general. “I was unconscious. Be sure and put that in your despatches”. More he would not say. Extending his hand, our commander said, “General, you have gallantly and nobly held your forts”. General Leman replied, “I thank you. Our troops have lived up to their reputations”. With a smile he added, 'War is not like manoeuvres” - a reference to the fact that General von Emmich was recently with General Leman during the Belgian manoeuvres. Then, unbuckling his sword, General Leman tendered it to General von Emmich. “No”, replied the German commander, with a bow, “keep your sword. To have crossed swords with you has been an honour”, and the fire in General Leman's eye was dimmed by a tear.
On the following day, August 17, the German Second Army, together with First and Third Armies, began to implement the next stage of the Schlieffen Plan, embarking upon a wide sweeping wheel movement through Belgium, forcing the Belgian army back to Antwerp. Brussels itself was captured without resistance by General von Kluck of the First Army on 20 August.
