Napoleon´s decline begins
The defeat of Napoleon in the Russian campaign of 1812 marked the beginning of the struggles for liberation (War of the Sixth Coalition) which Prussia finally followed according to the Convention of Tauroggen on 30th of December 1812, too. Two months later on 27th/28th February 1813, Prussia and Russia entered into an alliance which the declaration of war to France followed a short time later on March 16th. Napoleon succeeded numerical (230,000 man) in building a superior army. He managed to beat the allied Prussians and Russians (124,000 men) at Großgörschen on May 2nd and on May 22nd at Bautzen and forced them to retreat to Silesia.
With the joining of Austria the Prussian/Russian alliance and the declaration of war following on this to France on August 11th the front grew against Napoleon. Later, Sweden and Bavaria still followed. The autumn of the year 1813 was labelled by numerous battles. After changing battle luck Blücher forced a crossing over the river Elbe on October 3rd near Wartenberg whose consequence was an encirclement of Napoleon's army by the Allies. The Battle of the Nations of Leipzig (16th -19th October) developing after that meant a crushing defeat of Napoleon and the collapse of the French power in Germany.
The analysis of the events by Karl Marx and Friedrich of Engel who wrote a biographical treatise on Blücher in the „The New American Cyclopædia“ and went in detail into the events at Craonne in October 1875 starts here now:
"The allies were in disagreement over the operation plan to be followed now; the one suggested to remain and to take a defensive position there at the Rhine; the other ones wanted to go over the Rhine and march to Paris. After much to and fo on the part of the monarchs Blücher and his friends gained acceptance and it was decided on to march in a concentric movement to Paris; the main army should move forward from Switzerland, Bülow from Holland and Blücher with the Silesian army of the Middle Rhine. For the new campaign Blücher got three additional corps, namely this of Kleist, that one of the Kurfürst (Elector) of Hesse and that one of the Duke of Saxony Coburg. After he had left and arranged for a part of the corps of Langeron to the confinement of Mainz and that the new reinforcements as a second division followed, Blücher crossed the Rhine at three places on January 1st, 1814 : at Mannheim, Caub and Coblenz. Then he drove Marmont behind the Vosges and the Saar to the Moselle valley, put York's corps between the Moselle fortresses and moved with a force of 28,000 which consisted of the corps of Sacken and a division of the corps Langerons via Vaucouleurs and Joinville to Brienne to unite himself with the main army to his left hand.
He was attacked by Napoleon at Brienne on January 29th whose strengths contained 40,000 men; York's corps was still separated from the Silesian army and the main army, 110.000 strong, had reached only Chaumont. Blücher therefore was facing the far superior forces of Napoleon but neither, however, did he attack him with the usual energy nor did he prevent Blücher from the retreat to Trannes, except for some cavalry skirmishes. After Napoleon had taken Brienne, had let a part of his troops in the surroundings and had taken Dienville, La Rothière and Chaumênil with three different corps, he would have been able on January 30th to pounce with a numerical superiority upon Blücher since he still waited for his reinforcements.
"We must go to Paris"
Napoleon remained, however, passive while the main army concentrated at Bar sur-Aube and some detachements strenghtened Blüchers right flank. The inactivity of the emperor explains itself from his hopes for the negotiations of the peace convention of Châtillon which he had managed and by which he hoped to win time. After he had united the Silesian army with the main army, the supporters of diplomatic negotiations actually insisted that during the negotiations of the peace conference the war only should be led pro forma. Prince Schwarzenberg sent an officer to obtain Blücher´s consent; but Blücher dismissed him with the answer: "We must go to Paris. Napoleon has paid his visit to all capitals of Europe; should we be less polite? To sum up, he must renounce the throne and until he is not thrown down, we will have no peace with him".
He pointed firmly to the great advantages of an attack of the allies on Napoleon at Brienne before he could carry up the rest of his troops could do and offered even himself for this attack if he could only receive reinforcements during the absence of York. The consideration that the army could not fight in the abandoned valley of the Aube and, if he did not attack, must retreat, did have the consequence that his advice got accepted. One made up one's mind for the battle but Prince Schwarzenberg only made available to Blücher the corps of the Crown Prince of Württemberg (40,000 men) this of Gyulay (12,000 men) and this of Wrede (12,000 men), instead of throwing the available united forces on the enemy. Napoleon for his part knew nothing about the arrival of the main army, nor did he still suspect something.
When it was reported to him on February 1st toward 1 o'clock at noon that Blücher moved forward, he did not want to believe it. After he had made sure of it, he got on his horse with the thought of evading a battle and gave corresponding orders to Berthier. As he, however, got to the young guard between the old Brienne and La Rothière which when the fight noise approached had reached for the weapons, he was greeted with such enthusiasm that he believed himself in the situation to take the opportunity and exclaimed: "L´artillery en avant" (artillery forwards). So started to develop the clash of La Rothière 00.40 hours. After the first setback Napoleon took, however, personally no more interest in the battle. Since his infantry had settled in the village of La Rothière, the fight was long and obstinate and Blücher even had to lead up his reserves.
The French were not driven from the village before 23.00 hours when Napoleon ordered the retreat of his army which had suffered a loss of 4,000 to 5,000 casualties. If the allies - at that time only a six stage march far from Paris - would have advanced strongly, Napoleon would have had to succumb to their tremendous numerical superiority but the monarchs, still avoiding everything anxiously which could stop Napoleon from a peace agreement at the Convention of Châtillon, allowed that Prince Schwarzenberg, the Commander-in-chief of the main army, used every pretext to avoid a decisive fight.
The art of using a victory
While Napoleon ordered Marmont to go back to Ramerupt on the right shore of the Aube , and he by a flank march to Troyes retired, the army of the allies were divided in two armies. The main army moved forward slowly to Troyes an the Silesian army marched to the Marne where Blücher was sure to meet York and a part of the corps being under the order of Langeron and Kleist and so that his total force would rise up to 50,000 men. His plan consisted in following Marshal Macdonald, who had appeared at the lower Marne by then, to Paris while Schwarzenberg should keep the main part of the French army in bay at the river Seine. But Napoleon saw that the allies did not know how to use their victory and who was sure to reach the Seine before the main army could have come far in the direction of the Paris, decided to pounce upon the weaker Silesian army. He therefore left behind 20,000 men under Victor and Oudinot opposite to the 100,000 soldiers of the main army, moved toward the Marne with 40,000 men, the corps of Mortier and Ney, picked up Marmonts corps at Nogent and arrived with these united forces in Sézanne on the 9th.
In the meantime, Blücher had advanced via St. Ouen and Sommepuis on the small road which leads to Paris and pitched his headquarters at the small town of Vertus on February 9th. The deployment of his forces was the following: approximately 10,000 men near his headquarters; 18,000 men under York, positioned between Dormans and Château-Thierry to pursue Macdonald who already was on the large pot road from Épernay toParis, 30 000 men under Sacken between Montmirail and La Ferté sou Jouarre which should prevent the planned union of Sébastianis cavalry with Macdonald and cut the way off for the latter at La Ferté sou Jouarre. The Russian general Olssufjew with 5,000 men was quartered in Champaubert . This faulty deployment by which the Silesian army was very far en échelon pulled out, resulted from the conflicting motives which influenced Blücher. He on the one hand wanted to block Macdonald´s way and prevent the union with Sébastianis cavalry; on the other hand he wanted to pick the corps of Kleist and Kapzewitsch which moved forward from Châlons and were expected to unite with him on 9th or 10th. This motive held him back, the other drove him forward.
On February 9th Napoleon pounced upon Olsufjew at Champaubert and beat him. Blücher moved with Kleist and Kapzewitsch, however without the larger portion of his cavalry, who had arrived by then against Marmont who had been seperated from Napoleon and followed him on his retreat to La Fère-Champenoise. But when Blücher learned of the defeat Olsufjews he returned with two corps to Bergères in the same night to cover the road to Châlons. Sacken had pushed Macdonald after a successful fight over the river Marne near Trilport on 11th but when he heard from Napoleons march to Champaubert in the evening of the same day, he hurried back to Montmirail on the 11th. Before he had reached it, he had to engage Emperor Napoleon at Vieux Maisons who advanced from Montmirail against ihim. Sacken was beaten with heavy losses before York could unite with him; only after that the two generals performed their merger at Viffort and retired to Château-Thierry on February 12th. York had to pass a very heavily loss-making rearguard action there and then went back to Oulchy La Ville.
Napoleon had ordered Mortier to follow York and Sacken on the road to Fismes and stayed in Château-Thierry on 13th. Uncertain about this, where York and Sacken were and which success they had achieved, Blücher observed quietly from Bergères on 11th and 12th how Marmont regrouped his troops opposite to him at Etoges . On 13th he was made aware of the defeat of his generals and in the assumption that Napoleon had made himself on the search for the main army gave way to the temptation he to lead a death trick against Marmont whom he regarded as Napoleon's rearguard. Moving forward to Champaubert he pressed Marmont to Montmirail where he united with Napoleon on 14th who for his part opposed Blücher now. Napoleon came with 20,000 men but without cavalry up against Blücher, at noon at Vauchamps, almost attacked him, went round the columns with the cavalry and threw him back with heavy losses to Champaubert.
On its retreat from this place the Silesian army could have reached Etoges without considerable losses before setting in of the darkness if Blücher had not found favours at the careful slowness of the retreat movement. He therefore was permanently attacked on his march and a detachement of his troops, the division of the Prince August of Prussia, was put under pressure on their march through Etoges from the side streets of this town once more. Blücher reached his headquarters at Bergères approximately around midnight, set out to Châlons after some hours rest, arrived there on February 15th at noon and united on 16th and 17th with the troops of York and Sacken. The various battles near Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Vauchamps and Etoges had cost Blücher 15,000 man and 27 guns in which Gneisenau and Müffling were alone responsible for the strategic faults which led to these defeats.
Napoleon and Ney left to Marmont and Mortier to engage Blücher and returned in fast marches to the Seine where Schwarzenberg had driven back Victor and Oudinot who had retired about the Yères and taken up 12,000 taken men under Macdonald as well as some reinforcements from Spain. They were surprised by the sudden arrival of Napoleon on the 16th followed by his troops on 17th. After his union with the marshals Napoleon hurried to meet Schwarzenberg whom he found on an extensive triangle built between Nogent, Montereau and Sens.
When the generals Wittgenstein, Wrede and the Crown Prince of Württemberg, under Schwarzennerg´s command, were attacked and beaten one after each other by Napoleon, Prince Schwarzenberg showed a clean pair of heels, withdrew himself to Troyes and notified Blücher to join up with him so that they could deliver a battle together at the Seine. Blücher who had received new reinforcements by then immediately followed this summons, arrived in Méry on February 21st and wasted a whole day there on 22nd on the arrangements for the promised battle. In the evening it learned that Napoleon had been offered an armistice by by the Prince Liechtenstein and Napoleon had answered with a smooth rejection. Blücher immediately sent an officer confidentially to Troyes and implored Prince Schwarzenberg to deliver the battle and offered even to do this alone, the main army should act only as reserve. But Schwarzenberg was still more frightened by the message that Augereau had driven back General Bubna till to Switzerland and had ordered the retreat to Langres.
Blücher´s battle plan
Blücher immediately understood that a retreat to Langres would lead to a retreat behind the Rhine and to restrain Napoleon from the pursuit of the discouraged main army, he decided to march in straight direction to Paris against the Marne once more. He could now rely to bring together an army of 100,000 men. Wintzingerode had reached the area of Rheims with approximately 25,000 and Bülow with 16,000 men Laon, the rest of Kleist's corps from Erfurt and the rest of Langeron´s corps under Saint-Priest from Mainz were still to be expected.
This second separation Blücher´s from the main army was the factor which turned the tide against Napoleon. The campaign then would have been lost for the allies if he would have followed the retreating main army instead of the advamcing Silesian. The only difficult point at Blücher´s advance, to cross the Aube before Napoleon had him followed, he exceeded by a pontoon bridge at Anglure on February 24th. Napoleon ordered Oudinot and Macdonald to follow the main army with approximately 25,000 men and left Herbisse together with Ney and Victor on 26th for the chase of the Silesian army. Because of Blüchers notification that the main army was only facing two marshals Schwarzenberg ended his retreat, took courage, opposed Oudinot and Macdonald and beat them on February 27th and 28th. Blücher intended to concentrate his army at a point near Paris if possible. Marmont still stood with his troops at Sézanne, Mortier near Château-Thierry. During Blüchers advance Marmont retired and united on 26th with Mortier at La Ferté sou Jouarre to go back from there with Mortier to Meaux.
Since Blücher´s attempt to cross the Ourcq within two days and to force the two marshals to the battle with a front moved forward strongly had failed, he now had to march on the right shore of the Ourcq. He reached Oulchy-Le chateau on March 2nd, heard of the surrender of Seissons in the morning of 3rd achieved by Bülow and Wintzingerode, crossed the Aisne in the course of the same day and concentrated his entire army at Soissons. Napoleon, who had crossed the Marne two forced marches behind Blücher at La-Fert´-sous-Jouarre, advanced in direction of Château-Thierry and Fismes. Once he passed the Vesle he crossed the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac on March 6th after the re-conquest of Rheims by a detachment of his army.
Originally Blücher had intended to attack Napoleon at his crossing of the Aisne and had contracted his troops for this purpose behind the river. When he noticed that Napoleon took the direction to Fismes and Berry-au Bac to pass by the Silesian army on the left he decided to attack Napoleon from Craonne in the flank Had he come out of Berry-au Bac Napoleon would have been forced to fight with a defile in the back. When Blücher had positioned his troops, the right wing on the Aisne, the left one on the river Lette, half a way between Soissons and Craonne, he gave up this excellent plan again because he had learned that Wintzingerode had tolerated that Napoleon could pass Berry-au-Bac unmolestedly on the 6th and move even a detachment forward on the road to Laon. Blücher did not regard to accept a decisive battle in any other place than with Laon, now.
To hold back Napoleon who, on the high road of Rheims to Laon, could reach about Corbeny just as fast as the Silesian army from Craonne Blücher put the corps Woronzows between the Aisne and the Lette on the strong plateau from Craonne while he was sending out 10,000 riders under Wintzingerode who were to advance to Corbeny via Festieux and should fall Napoleon into the flank and back as soon as Napoleon would attack Woronzow. Since Wintzingerode did not execute the manoeuvre as ordered, Napoleon expelled Woronzow from the plateau on 7th, however, lost 8,000 men himself while Woronzow, with a loss of 4,700 men could escape and was able to retire organized.
Blücher had concentrated his troops at Laon on 8th where the battle had to decide the destiny of both armies. Except for Blücher of numerical superiority, the 20,000 riders of the Silesian army could open at the wide plain of Laon particularly well. Laon itself is located on the plateau of a single mountain which has a slope of 12.16, 20 to 30 degrees on every side and four villages are located at its foot and offered great advantages both for the defence and for the attack. At this day the left French wing, commanded by Napeoleon, was repelled, while the right wing under Marmont was raided at night in the bivouacs and annihilated to a degree that the marshal could only stop his troops near Fismes.
Napoleon, now with his wing of 35.000 men completely isolated and was cooped up in a bad position. Under normal circumstances his troops would have retreated in front of the far larger number of soldiers, confident of victory. But in the following morning Blücher fell ill with an attack of fever and an inflammation of the eyes and Napoleon had left in provocative attitude in the same position furthermore. The men who were conducting the operations now were intimidated so that they stopped not only the advance of their own troops but also made it possible for Napoleon could retire at night quietly to Soissons.
The battle near Laon had, however, broken his strengths physically and morally. He tried in vain to restore his reputation by the sudden conquest of Rheims on March 13th which had fallen into the hands of Saint-Priest. His situation was so clear now that even Schwarzenberg dared to withstand him when Napoleon moved forward on Arcis-sur Aube against the main army on 17th and 18th although he could put against Napoleons 25 000 men only 80,000 and accepted the battle which lasted from 20th up to 21st. When Napoleon broke off the battle the main army followed him to Vitry and united with the Silesian army in his back. In his despair Napoleon took refuge with a retreat to Dizier. He thought to be able to endanger the powerful army of the allies with his handful people by wanting to cut their main connecting line off and block their retreat between Langres and Chaumont. This movement was answered by the allies with their advance to Paris. The battle in which the Silesian army stormed the Montmartre took place on March 30th in front of Paris.
Although Blücher was not restored by Laon since the battle yet, he turned up on horseback with an umbrella over the eyes on the battlefield for short time. But he laid its command down on the pretext of his illness after the surrender of Paris; the actual reason was, however, his openly definite French hate which contradicted with the diplomatic attitude which the allied rulers thought to have to put to the day. So he entered Paris as a private individual on March 31st. During the complete campaign of 181 4 het represented alone the principle of the offensive in the army of the allies. By the battle of La Rothière he shamed the Châtillon peacemakers; he saved the allies by his determination at Méry before a pernicious retreat and by the battle of Laon he decided the first surrender of Paris.
After the first peace of Paris he accompanied Zar Alexander and King Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia at the visit to England where he was celebrated as the hero of the day. He was covered with all military medals of Europe; the King of Prussia founded the medal of the iron cross for him, the Prince Regent of England gave him his portrait and the Oxford university awarded the academic degree of a doctor of laws to him.
In turn he decided the last campaign against Napoleon in 1815. Although now 73 years old, he insisted after the unhappy battle at Ligny to regroup his army put to flight and to have the winner left on the heels on June 16th; through this Blücher was able to appear on the battlefield of Waterloo in the evening of June 18th, a heroic deed, how it had not been in the war history here yet. His following of the receding French after this battle from Waterloo to Paris has a parallel only in Napoleons more extreme following of the Prussians from Jena to Szczecin . Blücher entered Paris at the head of his army now and did not miss his top quartermaster, Müffling, either but to employ a military general governor of Paris. He insisted that Napoleon was shot and the Jena bridge blown up as well as the treasures which had been stolen by the French in the different capitals were given back to the original owners. His first demand was wrecked by Wellington and the second of the allied monarchs, merely the last one was realized. For three months Blücher stayed in Paris where he very substantially went to the games tables for rouge et-noir. On the anniversary of the battle at the Katzbach he paid Rostock, his native town, a visit where the inhabitants go together to set up a monument in honor to him. At his death the entire Prussian army had 8 days mourning.
"Le vieux diable" ("the old devil") as he was called by Napoleon, "Marshal Vorwärts" (Marshal Forwards!) as he was called by the Russians in the Silesian Army was a cavalry general primarily. He stood out in this field since he made only tactical demands but required no strategic knowledge. He shared the general hate for Napoleon and for the French in the highest degree and was with the people because of his plebeian passions because of his natural common sense because of his rough manners and rough talk way which received a trace of glowing eloquence on a suitable occasion, though wishes. He was the sample of a soldier.
He was an example of bravery in battle and of unflagging efforts he had a fascinating influence on his soldiers. He combined dare-devil bravado with acuteness on terrain, brisk decision making in difficult situations, doggedness in defence which was equal to his energy in attack. He was also smart enough to find himself the best way in easy combination and to rely on more difficult ones on Gneisenau. He was the appropriate general for military operations in 1813 – 1815 which showed signs of regular and irregular warfare (insurrection)”.