The attack
When the German artillery attack started at 05.30, the surprise effect was achieved. Still, the Americans had prepared drawbacks. At the right flank of the German attack Monschau, Losheimergraben and the Elsenborn ridge were to be taken in order to make a breach for the 1.and 2. SS Panzer Divisions. This, however, turned out a failure because of the forceful resistance of the 78. U.S. Division. Grenadiers of the 1st SS Panzer division threw back the 99. U.S.Division indeed but valuable time was lost.
Supporting actions, such as use of the paratroopers under Colonel von the Heydte at Baraque Michel and the use of Otto Skorzeny`s group "Greif" (griffin) were in vain for most of the part. Von the Heydte took off from their airfields a day later than planned because of non available transport aircraft. And almost half of his troops were lost in fog. The "Greif" commando, dressed as GIs and equipped with US vehicles was ordered to cause havoc and confusion in the rear of the American front also was in trouble. Skorzeny got stuck with the mass in the mega-jam behind the German front. His mission nevertheless was successful. Four of its people were snatched up by the Americans and confessed the sabotage action. The Americans then spread the word that thousands Germans were disguised as U.S. troops behind their lines. They simply mixed up the paratroopers of von der Heydte with group "Greif". But the result was inevitable. The GIs were uncertain and intimidated.
Two regiments of the 106. U.S. Infantry Division lay in the Snow Eifel, a godforsaken area in which the GIs were more into winter sports than conscious of the danger which built up in the east. It did not last long and both regiments were encircled by von Manteuffels units. Amongst the 6000 soldiers was the son of General Jones, the Commander of the 106. Infantry Division.
On December 17, panic spread under the Americans around St. Vith. A 30 km long line of vehicles between Vielsalm and St. Vith, on a wild flight in front of the German units, slowed down the advance of the 7.U.S. Armoured Division. Only few units, among those sappers, engaged the enemy. General Clarke, commander of the 7 Armoured Division, happened to arrive in St. Vith first and took over command from General Jones in the command post of the 106. Infantry Division.
Hasso von Manteuffel was under pressure. The advance was substantially too slow for him. St. Vith had to be taken at once. This city was the only major pocket of resistance that had to be conquered not by-passed. St. Vith was next to Bastogne the most important road junction elementarily important to the reinforcements. In the evening of December17, von Manteuffel and Model met by chance at night at a crossroads near Schönberg. Model was not delighted about the slow advance and offered the elite Panzer Unit "Führerbegleitbrigade" to von Manteuffel. It should tip the scale at the conquest of St. Vith.
On the same day, however, the decisive day battle of the day took place in Clervaux. This beautiful and romantic little town in represented an important obstacle on the way to
At 09.30 thirty German tanks broke through the ruins of Marnach, located by the eastern ridge and took the valley heading towards Clervaux. Sixteen tanks sent by Cota arrived at 10.20 and were immediately brought in position against the enemy. Five of them near Heiderscheid, the other eleven were to strengthen the eastern side. At about 11.30 Fuller's situation got dramatic. Several German tanks and hundreds of infantrymen had used a side-street via Urspelt to surround Clervaux from the north. A little later eleven of the tanks which were used at the eastern side of the city were destroyed..
Eleven kilometres south of Clerveaux approximately around the same time, The Panzer-Lehr Division led by the charismatic Major General Fritz Bayerlein, crossed the river Ur near Gmünd. The division was to take Bastogne the next day. Bayerlein had hammered the importance of the mission into his officers. He himself set an example. When he set out on top of the vanguard he said: "It is unimportant whether I fall".
In Clervaux the battle went on non-stop . Fuller lost one base after the other. German grenadiers and tanks approached the town from all sides and sweeped the Americans before them. A detachment of assault tanks sent from Cota to the aid of Fuller were ordered to relieve Munshausen. Fuller was shocked to see his tanks leave town in a wild flight. Cota himself came under enormous pressure of the units of von Manteuffel which further advanced on Wiltz. Cotas regiments were torn out of each other and partly already worn out. His 28. Division, the one with the blood bucket emblem, had been smashed by the Germans in the battle of the Hürtgenwald last October. Now these Germans prepared him another bitter defeat.
In the morning of December 18 Clervaux fell into German hands definitely. Fuller managed to break out with few survivors of his command post. Brandenbergers infantry units stood already in front of Wiltz and Diekirch at the same time. Von Manteuffels 5. Panzer Army also gained ground. The 2. Panzer Division had left Clervaux behind, the 116. PanzerDivision was on the way to Houffalize
