On September 16, 1944 after the briefing at the Führerhauptquartier Wolfsschanze (führers headquarters wolfs lair) in Rastenburg (East Prussia) Hitler summons the generals he trusts most into the conference room. Feldmarschall Keitel (field marshal), Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (armed forces), Senior General Alfred Jodl, Heinz Guderian as Chief of the General Staff of the Army as well as General Kreipe as a representative Görings.
When Hitler enters the room, Jodl starts with a stock-taking. The political situation is hopeless. The Reich is completely isolated. More and more Allies turn away from Germany. Romania and Bulgaria had preferred to change sides and to fight Germany on the side of the Soviets. Finland had likewise turned away from Germany. Japan had recommended armistice negotiations with the Russians.
The Americans are at the western frontier of the Reich and the summer offensive of the Russian army seemed to have petered out. Jodl who led the word mentioned a break in the Ardennes. At this word Hitler stopped the lecture and announced to the surprised generals that he wished a major offensive exactly here in the Ardennes. Target: Antwerp.
Jodl got the order on September 25 to draw up a comprehensive plan. He presented his framework code-named "Christrose" to Hitler on October 11. The Fuehrer expressed his delight about the concept. Three armies with twelve Panzer Divisions and eighteen Infantry Divisions should take the enemy by surprise and take Antwerp on the seventh day. Hitler himself fixed the definite code name: "Wacht am Rhein".
Feldmarschall von Rundstedt Commander-in-chief of all German ground forces in the west and Feldmarschall Walter Model whom Hitler had appointed explicitly as the executive for the offensive, were anything but enthusiastic about the plan. Both started to work on counterproposals. Von Rundstedt in charge of "Unternehmen Martin", Model in charge of "Herbstnebel". Both presented their proposals on October 27. Von Rundstedts plan assigned a 35 km broad strip of attack with 17 divisions. Model offered a 65 km broad strip of attack with 20 divisions. Hitler turned down both ideas by referring his Generals to Frederick The Great, who set everything on a card at the battle of Rossbach and Leuthen and did defeat a double superior strength.
Until December 11, the German Reichsbahn (National Railways) succeeded in a small miracle in which they managed to transport three armies despite non-stop air raids, into their initial positions. General Ernst Brandenberger was to command the 7. Infantry Army against Vianden and Echternach and obtain position at the Semois to protect the operation against possible reactions from Patton. Hasso von Manteuffels 5. Panzer Army had the task to take St. Vith and to push forward through by the southern Schnee Eifel (Snow Eifel) as quickly as possible.
The strongest and best troops were under the command of SS Obergruppenführer (general) Sepp Dietrich. The 6. Panzer Army consisted of four powerful tank and five infantry divisions. The tank units were the 1. SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (LAH), the 12. SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend", the 2. SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" as well as the 9. SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen”. The mission: Crossing the river Meuse on both sides of Liège, crossing of the Albert Canal and the re conquest of Antwerp.
Altogether, about 250 000 man, 1 900 guns, 970 tanks and 1 900 aeroplanes stood on the German side in the night from December 15 to 16. Nothing was to be seen by the 100 jet fighters which Göring had promised arrogantly. Virtually grotesque was the initial fuel supply. Lieutenant-Colonel Peiper, commander of the 1.Panzer Regiment of the 1. SS Panzer Division should accomplish goals which were 150 km far from his initial position.. He had fuel for just 100 km! He should fetch the difference from the American petrol depots which were located close to the frontline.
Altogether, about 250 000 man, 1 900 guns, 970 tanks and 1 900 aeroplanes stood on the German side in the night from December 15 to 16. Nothing was to be seen by the 100 jet fighters which Göring had promised arrogantly. Virtually grotesque was the initial fuel supply. Lieutenant-Colonel Peiper, commander of the 1.Panzer Regiment of the 1. SS Panzer Division should accomplish goals which were 150 km far from his initial position.. He had fuel for just 100 km! He should fetch the difference from the American petrol depots which were located close to the frontline.
The American lines, a 130 km long front from Monschau in the Eifel to Echternach in Luxembourg, were defended by the 2., the 99., the 106., the 28. and 4. U.S. Division. The 9. Armoured Division held positions both in the front area and in reserve. It must be said that the frontline was not a continous one. U.S. units only operated out of bases like Houffalize, Bastogne or Clerveaux. Others, like the 106 Infantry Division were located in the remote mountain scenery of the Snow Eifel and enjoyed winter sports.