Hitler Germany´s Ignorance
By the end of July 1941, despite their remarkable victories, German commanders and even Hitler himself were beginning to realize that their intelligence had grossly underestimated Soviet strength. Although the Germans had taken hundreds of thousands of prisoners, the Red Army seemed to have an endless supply of replacements. Even when surrounded, Soviet troops often fought on when they knew their situation was completely hopeless, and some Soviet fighter pilots, knowing they were outclassed, took to ramming German bombers -- and remarkably sometimes even survived. Stories made the rounds among German troops that the Soviets actually trained dogs carrying explosive charges to run under German tanks and blow them up. It is still argued whether this was actually done, but given the determination if not the skill of Soviet resistance, German troops found it easy to believe.
The Germans had lost hundreds of thousands of men, with a good fraction of them killed. These were severe casualties by any standards, and the only compensation was the Red Army had suffered far worse. Even ignoring combat losses and damage, maintaining such a huge operation, particularly in the primitive field conditions in the Soviet Union, meant a lot of wear and tear, and an increasing degree of simple exhaustion. Furthermore, although the original German plan had suggested that supply problems could be reduced by "living off the land", the Soviets were becoming increasingly efficient at ensuring that all that was left on the land were cinders and ashes, increasing German logistical requirements and effort.
On 4 August, Hitler flew to Army Group Centre's headquarters in Borisov, east of Minsk. The offensive seemed to be dragging on, and so Hitler decided that the focus needed to be shifted on the USSR's economic assets. This meant increasing the pressure to the south, to seize the oil fields of the Caucasus, and to the north, to take Leningrad. This would undermine the Soviet ability to make war and provide resources for the German war machine. In addition, Hitler had a perfectly sensible concern that his offensive spearheads were too far out on a limb logistically and vulnerable to attack on the flanks.
A Campaign for Oil
The ability to gain access to and maintain control of major sources of crude oil was a paramount feature of Hitler's war plans. The Crimea became a pivotal point in those plans, especially to protect the oil for the Wehrmacht. Russian bombers, staging from the Crimea, would be capable of duplicating their one-time strike in early July 1941 on the Romanian oil fields at Ploesti. On the Eastern end of the Black Sea, the capture of the Russian oil in the Caucasus near Grozny and Baku would become, in Hitler's view, a major strategic prize. Without sufficient naval power in the Black Sea, the Wehrmacht was forced to depend on the ground and air forces of Army Group South to sieze those fields. From Stalin's perspective, Admiral Gorshkov described the military-political significance of the Crimea as "... relating to the possible entry of Turkey
(who was then biding her time) on the side of Hitler Germany. Seizing and holding the Crimea as early as possible in the war thus would assist Germany in gaining this strategic objective. The headquarters of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol had to be taken first, to neutralize the Soviet naval dominance. Afterwards, the German army would secure the Black Sea ports to the east, especially Kerch, Novorossiisk, and Tuapse, on its seaward march to the Caucasus, adding to the pressure by another offensive farther north, past Rostov-na-Donu.
In the pre-war plans of Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg (Minister of Eastern Occupied Territory), once the Crimea became firmly established under German control, it would become administratively merged with the Ukraine. The Crimea would be renamed either Taurida, the ancient Greek name for the area, or Gutenland, because it was claimed that the Goths had settled the Crimea in the 16th Century.
On arrival, Hitler informed Field Marshall von Bock that he was to halt his drive towards Moscow, and that the panzers of Army Group Center were to be used to support a drive by Army Group South to capture the Ukraine, with smaller forces diverted to support Army Groups North's push on Leningrad. Panzer Generals Guderian and Hoth protested loudly. Moscow was only 320 kilometers (200 miles) away, and most of the Red Army was defending the city. Once the Red Army was destroyed, the rest of the USSR might well fall with the city. Guderian flew to Berlin on 23 August to argue for a continued drive on Moscow. The Fuehrer heard him out then went on at length about the economic need to seize the Ukraine and the Caucasus region. Senior staff officers present said nothing to contradict Hitler, and Guderian left the meeting empty-handed.
The Pocket of Uman
By mid-July, Army Group South had advanced deep into the Ukraine, performing an encirclement of three Soviet armies around Uman, south of Kiev, in the process. The Germans wiped out the pocket in early August, taking more than 100,000 prisoners. While lacking mobility and armour, because most of his armoured forces were lost at Uman, Semyon Budenny's remaining forces nonetheless posed a significant threat to the German advance and were the largest single concentration of Soviet troops on the Eastern Front at that time.
Guderian's panzer group was then shifted south to assist in the capture of Kiev itself. By the end of August, the Red Army had moved to a line west of the Dnieper, though the Soviets held on to Kiev on the east shore of the river and to Odessa, on the northwest corner of the Black Sea, which could in principle be supported by sea. By this time, the Luftwaffe was range of Moscow and was hammering the city. Citizens hid in the subway.
Although Stalin was no military strategist, he was arrogant and ignored the advice of his generals, many of whom were very competent. Following Stalin's misguided orders, the Red Army continued to suffer reverses. With German Army Group South moving to trap Red Army forces in Kiev, Zhukov suggested to Stalin that Red Army forces there were threatened with encirclement and suggested they withdraw to a more defensible line. Stalin replied that the suggestion was "rubbish". He did not want to give up Kiev and still thought he had a choice in the matter. Zhukov submitted his resignation as chief of staff; Stalin accepted it.
Similarly, on 11 September Marshal Budyenny, commander of the Soviet Southwestern Front, requested permission to withdraw from Kiev and escape the trap. Stalin refused, but he did order Budyenny to return to Moscow. Budyenny was a an old crony of Stalin, one of Voroshilov's lieutenants from Civil War days, a fun-loving, virile man with a huge mustache who looked like a romantic bandit and had something of the personality of one. Stalin was particularly fond of him; Stalin may have also begun to wonder, with good reason, if his old buddies were particularly effective generals. In any case, Stalin ordered Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos to take Budyenny's place.
Kiev encricled
At the end of August and the first two weeks of September, the Germans encircled Kiev, linking up at Lokhvitsa well behind the city on 16 September. Stalin granted permission to withdraw on 17 September, but the trap had snapped shut, and though the Red Army troops inside the trap fought desperately to break out, few succeeded. Kirponos was killed in action, which was just as well considering the alternatives.
Four Soviet armies were completely destroyed. Kiev itself fell on 26 September 1941. The Kiev disaster was an unprecedented defeat for the Red Army exceeding even the Minsk tragedy of June-July 1941. On 1st September the South Western Front numbered 752-760,000 men (850,000 including reserves & rear service organs), 3,923 guns & mortars, 114 tanks, & 167 combat aircraft. The ensuing encirclement contained 452,700 men, 2642 guns & mortars, & 64 tanks, of which scarcely 15,000 escaped from the encirclement by 2nd October. Overall the South Western Front suffered 700, 544 casualties, including 616,304 killed, captured, or missing during the Battle for Kiev. As a result four Soviet field armies (5th, 37th, 26th, & 21st), consisting of 43 divisions, virtually ceased to exist. With such losses, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and there were no more reserves.
With the victory at Kiev, the last significant resistance in the Southern theatre removed, Army Group South could continue its march on the Donetsk basin. A complete breakthrough was achieved in the southern sector. However the advance on Moscow was delayed for 4 weeks, a fact that eventually proved detrimental in the subsequent Battle of Moscow. While tactically very successful, the Battle of Kiev did not enhance the Germans' strategic position, because the main objective, achieving a decisive victory that would conclude the war, was not achieved
The Battle of Kiev 1943
In the wake of the failed German offensive at Kursk, the Soviets launched their first summer offensive of the war, pushing Manstein's battered Army Group South back towards the Dniepr River. There Manstein intended to rest and refit his troops, but that was not to be: STAVKA (Shtab verkhovnogo komandovanya, or General Headquarters) ordered the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts to force crossings of the Dniepr before the Germans could catch their breaths. The First Ukrainian Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, was able to secure bridgeheads north and south of Kiev. His opponent would be the veteran 4th Panzer Army, commanded by Hermann Hoth.
The Bukrin Bend
In October 1943 several of Vatutin's armies were having serious trouble trying to break out of the rugged terrain of the Bukrin bend, the southern bridgehead. The 24th Panzer Corps of Walther Nehring, in an excellent defensive position, had the opposing Soviet forces squeezed in. As a result, Vatutin decided to concentrate his strength at the northern bridgehead, at Lyutesh.
The powerful 3rd Guards Tank Army, commanded by Pavel Rybalko, moved northwards towards the Lyutesh bridgehead under cover of darkness and diversionary attacks out of the Bukrin bend. Masses of artillery were shifted northwards, unnoticed by the Germans.
On the morning of 3 November 1943, the 4th Panzer Army awoke to a massive Soviet bombardment. The German forces screening the bridgehead were smashed, and Kiev was liberated in short order. First Ukrainian Front's objectives were to drive quickly westwards to take the towns of Zhitomir, Korosten, Berdichev, and Fastov. This would cut the rail link to Army Group Centre and would be the first step towards the encirclement of Army Group South.
The plan was ambitious, but nonetheless was proceeding very well for Vatutin. Manstein, normally calm and collected, was worried. As Rybalko's tanks marched through the streets of Kiev on 5 November, Manstein pleaded Hitler to release the 48th and 40th Panzer Corps in order to have sufficient force to retake Kiev. The 48th Panzer Corps was committed, but Hitler refused to divert the 40th Panzer Corps. In addition, he relieved Hoth of his command and replaced him with Erhard Raus. The new commander was ordered to blunt the Soviet attack and secure Army Group South's northern flank and communications with Army Group North.
It was a tall order, even with the new Panzer Corps attached. But 4th Panzer Army was soon reinforced, especially with artillery and rockets. Despite heavy casualties in the initial stages of the Vatutin's offensive, the German divisions were brought up to reasonable strength. The first unit to arrive from 48th Panzer Corps was the newly formed 25th Panzer Division, on 7 November. Its drive on Fastov was halted by the 7th Guards Tank Corps. Rybalko was soon merely 40 miles from Berdichev. Zhitomir was taken by the 38th Army. The 60th Army was at the gates of Korosten. 40th Army was moving south from Kiev. The only break that the Germans caught was that 27th Army burned itself out and went over to the defensive in the Bukrin bend.
4th Panzer Army was in deep water. But the situation changed with the arrival of the elite 1st SS Division, 1st and 7th Panzer Divisions, under the command of 48th Panzer Corps. These new forces drove north to Brusilov and then west to retake Zhitomir. Rybalko sent his armor to counter the German assault, and a huge tank battle ensued, although not quite on the scale seen at Kursk. This continued for the latter part of November, until the autumn mud halted all operations.
Though the Soviets had failed to break the rail link with Army Group Center or envelop Army Group South, they had liberated Kiev, broken the Dniepr line, and inflicted massive casualties on the 4th Panzer Army. The Germans, for their part, had destroyed several sizable Soviet formations and kept the vital rail link open. But there was to be no rest. A few days after 48th Panzer Corps was pulled out to rest and refit, the Soviets launched their winter offensive on Christmas eve.
