Direction Caucasus
At 04:45 on 22 June 1941, three million German soldiers, to be joined by their Italian, Romanian and other allies over the next weeks, burst over the borders and stormed into the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa, the conquest of Russia had started. Erich von Erich von Manstein, commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, advanced more than 100 miles in only two days and was able to seize two vital bridges over the Dvina River at Dvinsk. The following month he captured Demyansk and Torzhok. In September 1941, Manstein was appointed commander of 11th Army. Its former commander, Colonel-General Ritter von Schobert, had been killed when his plane landed in a Russian minefield.
Initially, the Army was tasked with invading the Crimea, and then pursue to Rostov, as the threat against the flank of Army Group South would threaten the flanks of further German advancement into Russia. Hitler also intended to use the Kerch peninsula to land forces in the Caucasus. This, however, would turn out to be a tougher job than anticipated and would go down in history of a text-book example of military commanding.
The Army order of battle included two Corps; 30 Corps, compromised of the 22nd, 72nd, and 170th Infantry Divisions; and 54 Corps, compromised of 46th, 73rd, and 50th Infantry Divisions. The latter Corps had been in charge of cracking open an advance into the Crimean peninsula earlier in September. Along with the two corps, 11th army was reinforced with 42nd Corps HQ along with the 132nd and 24th Infantry Divisions. Also, elements of the Rumanian 3rd Army was under von Manstein's command.
The assault began on October 18th, 1941, going through the narrow and desolate Isthmus area. A furious ten day conflict followed, with the Russians displaying determined resistance. Only due to the aggressive fighting spirit of the German fighting troops (73rd, 46th and 22nd Infantry Division) was the disadvantages of the terrain and the enemy numerical superiority overcome. By October 28th the Soviet defence collapsed and the Crimea looked ripe for the plucking.
Eleventh Army now entered the Crimea with all available forces. Though heavy losses had been suffered both Corps were in full pursuit of the enemy. Half the Russian force (a total of 200.00. men) were captured along with 700 guns and 160 tanks. By November 16 almost the entire Crimea was in German hands - only the fortress of Sevastopol remained under Russian control. Difficulties with supply meant that the attack on Sevastopol itself was postponed until December 17. In the meantime, Sevastopol was reinforced from the sea. The Russians' fierce resistance and numerical superiority repelled the November 17th attack. Also, the “Stalin Offensive” had been initiated.
Just over a week later, on the 26th, the Russians made landings of substantial forces on the Kerch peninsula. These landings were an attempt to regain the initiative in the Crimea, which could not be attained from Sevastopol. This was also meant to wipe out 11th army, which was tied up around Sevastopol.
The only Axis reserves were an infantry division under Hans Graf von Sponeck's command, and a Rumanian mountain regiment. Conducting a fighting retreat, the German division lost most of its heavy equipment, and the Red Army advanced all the way to the Fediosa line before a front could be established. A series of attacks and counterattacks followed, with the last Soviet attack on April 9th, 1942. Six divisions and 160 tanks engaged trying to push back the Germans, failing at it completely after two days.
Stalin's fumbled offensives of winter and spring of 1942 suggested that the Soviets only had the advantage when the weather was in their favour. The Red Army had proven its leadership still left much to be desired and that its troops, though tough, were raw and lacked fighting skills. On the other hand, the German Army had consolidated their positions and supply lines during the winter. New equipment -- such as Panzer IV tanks with long-barrelled guns that could deal more effectively with Soviet armour and the formidable Focke-Wulf 190 fighter -- was being delivered in numbers. With the weather warming and the roads drying out, both Hitler and his soldiers had good reason to believe they could turn the tables back on the Soviets, even give them a final knockout.
The operation was already in advanced stages of preparation when the Germans cleaned out the Izyum salient. The main objectives of the new offensive, codenamed “Plan Blau” (Blue), were to extend German control over the Ukraine beyond the Volga, seize the mineral resources of the Don Basin, and particular grab the oil wealth of the Caucasus, particularly the oil production centres at Grozny and Baku. Hitler saw “Blue” as part of a grand campaign, in which Army Group South under Bock would drive through the southern USSR into the Middle East, while Rommel's Afrika Corps would crush the British in Egypt and then sweep north to meet the other prong of the huge pincer moving down through the Caucasus. The Third Reich would obtain all the oil it needed to stay in business indefinitely, while the Soviet Union would be rendered helpless.
Some of Hitler's generals warned him that the German Army was weaker now than it had been a year before. There had been substantial losses of men and equipment during the winter fighting, and there had been particular losses of horses, which the infantry divisions relied upon for supply. The German Army's transport capability had been inadequate a year earlier, at the beginning of Barbarossa, and it was in worse shape now. German industry had not been able to make good losses in equipment.
Hitler acknowledged these criticisms to an extent, weakening other sectors to build up his forces in the south and squeezing his allies for all the troops he could get. By June, dozens of divisions from Hungary, Rumania, and Italy were flowing into the region. Even volunteers from Spain joined up. Most of these foreign units were not particularly useful for offensive operations, but they could be used to hold the line in quiet sectors while German troops moved forward. However, by looting other fronts to obtain such offensive forces, Hitler was left with few reserves if “Blau” failed.
_regiment_sharing_jokes_and_cigarettes..jpg)
Germany's lack of manufacturing capacity was proving troublesome. In the summer of 1941, Hitler had been so confident of beating the USSR that he had emphasized construction of U-boats and planes to defeat Britain. Shifting production back to building tanks and other weapons for the army took time. Surprisingly, German factories were still turning out large quantities of consumer goods, a Nazi concession to the public to buy political support. The USSR, Britain, and even the United States had gone much farther in mobilizing their factories for war, and their administration of industry was far more effective than that of the clumsy, backbiting Nazi bureaucracy.
While the German Army was preparing to begin “Blau”, it was winding up of the most brutal sieges of the war. Since the fall of 1941, the German 11th Army and the Rumanian Third Army had been hammering at the Soviets surrounded in Sevastopol. The terrain was rocky and rugged, favouring the defence, the Soviets had set up three lines of fortifications, and they had also heavily reinforced the garrison. The Axis forces had performed their initial attack on the Sevastopol lines on 30 October 1941, capturing the Balaklava Hills in the southeast against fierce Soviet resistance. A second push began in mid-December and made progress, but had to be called off because of the pressure of Soviet counteroffensive efforts elsewhere.
The Germans wanted to finish off Sevastopol before putting “Blau” into motion. The task was assigned to General Erich von Manstein and his 11th Army. The first thing he had to do was clean out the Red Army presence on the Kerch peninsula, which would then allow him to deal with Sevastopol without interference.
Manstein called the first phase Operation Bustard Hunt, a "bustard" being a well-known European game bird. The peninsula was linked to the rest of the Crimea by a isthmus 18 km (11 miles) wide, and the Red Army had heavily fortified the line, with a wide water-filled antitank ditch backed up by minefields, barbed wire, and pillboxes. Operation Bustard Hunt went forward on the morning of 8 May 1942, with German artillery and Luftwaffe Stuka dive-bombers trying to soften up the Soviet defences while sappers cut paths through the obstacles.
The initial German attacks were driven back, but von Manstein was undisturbed, since they were only meant as diversions anyway and were not being pressed hard. While the Soviets were distracted, German assault teams in boats landed behind Red Army lines on the south shore and promptly unhinged the defence. Soviet troops took panic and fled eastward, pursued by German panzers. Many managed to escape over the straits to the mainland, but by 17 May von Manstein could report the capture of 170,000 prisoners and large amounts of equipment. All that was left was mopping up.
It was yet another disaster for the Red Army. The commander of the Soviet forces in the region, General D.T. Kozlov, had proven inept, as had Deputy Defence Minister Lev Mekhlis, who had fired off continuous unhelpful orders that did much to make matters worse. Kruschev later said in his usual colourful way that Mikhlis managed to reduce the People's Commissariat of Defence to "a kennel of mad dogs". Stalin sacked both of them as well as a number of other senior officers associated with the fiasco, but apparently none were shot.
Now Manstein could begin the second phase of his campaign, Operation Sturgeon, the actual capture of Sevastopol. The citizens and soldiers in Sevastopol had spent the winter hunkered down in underground installations and caves to protect themselves from German artillery and bombers. They created an underground society, manufacturing weapons to carry on the fight. A Pravda correspondent reported how little girls dressed up potato-masher grenades and played with them as dolls.
The defenders had been feeling optimistic, believing they would be relieved, but the humiliating rout of Soviet forces on the Kerch Peninsula crushed their hopes. The Luftwaffe had been effective in sinking shipping on the Black Sea and there was little hope of re-supply or evacuation.
Von Manstein knew Sevastopol would be a very tough nut to crack, and so he ordered the attack to be supported by 30 Corps artillery commanded by General Martinek, and 8th Air Corps commanded by General von Richthofen. 1,300 pieces of artillery to crush Soviet defences. Large numbers of field guns, prominently the excellent 8,8 cm antiaircraft gun that the Germans had learned also excelled as a heavy antitank gun and as general-purpose artillery, would smash the Soviets when they made a stand, and heavy siege artillery firing massive Roechling concrete-penetrating shells would break up major fortifications. The most powerful of the heavy guns included the 60 cm (24 inch) "Karl" mortar; the comparable "Gamma" mortar; and the monster 80 cm (31.5 inch) "Dora" railroad gun. Overall, the attacking forces had 208 batteries (not including AA) concentrated over a 22 mile front.
Most of the troops available to Eleventh Army were used for this operation. The only Germans left to guard the Kerch peninsula and the south coast of the Crimea were 42 Corps Headquarters counting on the 46th Infantry Division. The German forces were supplemented by 7th Rumanian Corp, counting with the 10th and 19th Rumanian infantry divisions, 4th mountain division and 8th Calvary brigade.
The main thrust of the attack on Sevastopol, to come from the north/north east, was to be carried out by 54 Corps compromised of Infantry Divisions 22 (commanded by General Wolff), 24 (General Baron v. Tettau), 50 (General Schmidt) and 132 (General Lendemann). The attack in the south was to be carried out by 30 Corps, with 72nd and 170th Infantry Divisions and 28th Light Division under command. In the center, the Rumanian Mountain Corps was to pin down the enemy and protect the flanks of the charging German formations.
On 7 June 1942, the bombardment began and continued for five days, with the Luftwaffe contributing bombing raids to the storm. On 12 June, seven German and two Rumanian divisions went forward. Many of the attackers believed that the defenders had been pulverized, but they encountered fierce resistance. The Russian defenders put a bitter defense spurt on by fanatical political commissars, very often fighting until the last man and the last round. The bitter resistance was only overcome by the courage and heroic determination of the German infantry soldier, who through his sacrifice and solid fighting spirit continued to advance in spite of all that was thrown against him. To make matters worse, temperatures reached upwards of 106 degrees, even in the morning. It took the Germans two days to break the first line of Soviet defences, and then they focused on the strong-points of the second defence line.
On the 13th of June, the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 22nd Division commanded by Colonel von Choltiz took one of the heaviest ramparts, Fort Stalin. One enemy defence ring after another fell to the advancing troops, though only through heavy fighting for every pillbox and machine gun nest. Eleventh Army found itself on the outer ring of the city on June 16th, though this by no means marked the end of the battle, as the Soviets were ready to resist within the city. Isolated in the final strongpoint of the second line of defence, a set of caves built into the Sapun Heights, the Soviets detonated their ammunition dump, killing themselves and the thousands of civilians hiding in the caves rather than giving up.
Now the Soviets were ready to resist within the city. This was adverted only by a bold move ordered by von Manstein, who directed an amphibious assault through Severnaya Bay on the night of the 28th-29th of June. This unhinged the fortification ring, and the final assault was a success. Though decided, the battle went on until July 4th, when 30,000 Soviets surrendered. In all, over 90,000 men of the Red Army were taken prisoner.
After that, it was only a matter of time. The Soviets fell back towards the Khersones Peninsula, land's end at the southwest corner of the city, fighting stubborn rearguard actions. Some officers and wounded were removed at night by submarine, but the troops stayed and fought with no hope of rescue. Von Manstein wrote later: "Whole masses of them rushed at our lines, their arms linked to prevent anyone from hanging back. At their head, urging them on, there were often women and girls of the Komsomol, themselves bearing arms." They were torn to shreds. Coming from the Soviet media, such stories might have been dismissed as the usual overblown propaganda; coming from von Manstein there was little doubt that he was telling the complete truth.
After that, it was only a matter of time. The Soviets fell back towards the Khersones Peninsula, land's end at the southwest corner of the city, fighting stubborn rearguard actions. Some officers and wounded were removed at night by submarine, but the troops stayed and fought with no hope of rescue. Von Manstein wrote later: "Whole masses of them rushed at our lines, their arms linked to prevent anyone from hanging back. At their head, urging them on, there were often women and girls of the Komsomol, themselves bearing arms." They were torn to shreds. Coming from the Soviet media, such stories might have been dismissed as the usual overblown propaganda; coming from von Manstein there was little doubt that he was telling the complete truth.
On July first, a telegram was sent from Hitler’s headquarters:
To the Commander in Chief of the Crimean Army
Colonel General von Manstein
In grateful appreciation of your exceptionally meritorious services in the victorious battles of the Crimea, culminating in the fortress of Sevastopol, I hereby promote you to Field Marshal. By your promotion and the creation of a commemorative shield to be worn by all ranks who took part in the Crimean campaign, I pay tribute before the whole German people to the heroic achievements of the troops fighting under your command.
Adolf Hitler
To the Commander in Chief of the Crimean Army
Colonel General von Manstein
In grateful appreciation of your exceptionally meritorious services in the victorious battles of the Crimea, culminating in the fortress of Sevastopol, I hereby promote you to Field Marshal. By your promotion and the creation of a commemorative shield to be worn by all ranks who took part in the Crimean campaign, I pay tribute before the whole German people to the heroic achievements of the troops fighting under your command.
Adolf Hitler
A few of the gifts Fieldmarshal von Manstein received as thanks for the victorious operation:
1. The reconnaissance commander major Eisman went to Simteropol, woke a local Tatarian silver smith, gave the man his own silver watch. The man made a couple of marshall rods, and the next morning on 2.7. von Manstein had those on his shoulders.
2. The Crown Prince of Germany sent him a golden cigarette case. On the front there was a layout of Sevastopol fortress. The Prince also sent a message saying how " He was refused the fortress of Verdun, and the how much happier he was that von Manstein had conqured the Sevastopol fortress."
3. A Russian priest who had escaped the communists to France, and lived now in Vichy, sent a stick that was made with skill from a grape vine that had entwined together. In the handle piece it had a topaz stone. The grandfather of the priest was a regiment commander in the Crimea war defending Sevastopol. He was wounded seriously to his leg and his soldiers had carved this beautiful stick for him.
4. A leather covered memoir by General v. Manstein...He had served during Queen Anna´s time in the Russian army in the area of the Black Sea. They were linked by name and not by blood.
1. The reconnaissance commander major Eisman went to Simteropol, woke a local Tatarian silver smith, gave the man his own silver watch. The man made a couple of marshall rods, and the next morning on 2.7. von Manstein had those on his shoulders.
2. The Crown Prince of Germany sent him a golden cigarette case. On the front there was a layout of Sevastopol fortress. The Prince also sent a message saying how " He was refused the fortress of Verdun, and the how much happier he was that von Manstein had conqured the Sevastopol fortress."
3. A Russian priest who had escaped the communists to France, and lived now in Vichy, sent a stick that was made with skill from a grape vine that had entwined together. In the handle piece it had a topaz stone. The grandfather of the priest was a regiment commander in the Crimea war defending Sevastopol. He was wounded seriously to his leg and his soldiers had carved this beautiful stick for him.
4. A leather covered memoir by General v. Manstein...He had served during Queen Anna´s time in the Russian army in the area of the Black Sea. They were linked by name and not by blood.