
Hoax and surprise
"Les Sanglots Long of the violons de l ' automne
blessent mon hearts this ' une langeur monotonous."
"So sobbing the violin song of the autumn drags out,
I am dully and sorely before pain."
Paul Verlaines
This verse from Paul Verlaines autumn poem meant the beginning of the invasion. Who knew the background of these words knew the time of the Allied invasion in France. And the German Supreme Command knew this meaning, the value of the information, and did nothing! The Allies made every conceivable effort to cover up their intentions to the Germans. They did everything at the same time to give the impression the invasion would come in the narrowest place of the Channel at the Pas de Calais. They even stationed an imaginary army with rubber tanks and wooden aeroplanes in the south of England with a very real leader, General Patton. And the men of the military counter-intelligence service around Admiral Canaris nevertheless managed to snatch this enormous secret from the Allies. The English who supported the French resistance for years needed these men on day X to execute sabotage of enormous proportion. So it was planned to destroy 571 railway stations and switches as well as to paralyze the 30 main railways.
But Canaris managed to channel a French in the organisation who transmitted via radio the details and verse about the plan of the communication. On June 5 by 22.15 the latest, the OKW (Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht), Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the Marinegruppenstab (navy goup staff) in Paris and the Heeresgruppe (army group) Rommel were informed. Field Marshal von Rundstedt commented on the report of the forthcoming invasion: General Eisenhower does not announce the invasion over the BBC anyway".
But it should still get worse for the Germans. Because of the bad weather forecast which did not make an invasion probable in the eyes of the German general staff, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, in charge of the entire French coastal front, was on his way to Germany. At first congratulating his wife in Herrlingen on her birthday on June 6 and later to give a situation lecture to Hitler in Berchtesgaden. He wanted to convince Hitler to reinforce the armoured divisions and transfer them closer to the coast. Also he wanted another multiple rocket launcher brigade to be transferred to Normandy. And he needed better soldiers. Too many were too old, too ill or too unreliable. East battalions from former Russian prisoners of war could not replace experienced front fighters. Later when these units gave way fast to the Allies General of Schlieben said: It was required well too much to have Russians fight for Germany against the Americans in France".
Rommel also had, however, a fundamental problem. His theory was to beat the enemy on the beach. And to do just that he needed Panzer divisions near the coast. However, Field Marshal von Rundstedt and General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg who wanted to lead the decisive battle in the hinterland of the coast were of a different opinion. In a classic manner they planned to encircle and destroy the intruders with wide range pincer operations Rommels headache, however, was the expected Allied air superiority. He had to learn it mercilessly in North Africa and knew how quickly the opposing air force would bring any traffic to a standstill. Till now, Hitler did not deviate from his compromise which intended to station the tanks not demanded as far as von Rundstedt far from the coast but not to put Rommel in charge of them either.
But not only Rommel was not on the spot within these hours, also the division commanders, as well as two of their regiment commanders were invited to a war game in Rennes by the commander of the 7.Army, General Colonel Dollman. Invasion weather was not on the agenda. And such a landing was not expected in Normandy but at the Pas de Calais.
The Allies had, however, decided in favour of Normandy. The reasons were obvious. Dutch waters were too flat, Belgiums beaches were no possibility because of strong currents and the Pas de Calais on the one hand was fortified too strongly and on the other hand did not show so many broad beaches as the Normandy. Furthermore this coastal sector also was within range of Allied fighters. The planning staff of the Allies in London had provided a combination of parachute and beach landings. In parallel, important fortifications and bridges should be taken already before the real landing by specialized forces.










