Omaha Beach
Omaha Beach almost would have become a fiasco of the U.S. troops. A heavy bomb raid of the Air Force caused damage only in the terrain as the bombers got order to release their load a few seconds later than planned as the beach got invisible by clouds. This mistake should be responsible for the death of thousand of GIs, because the attack did not destroy the three German resistance nests W 59, 61 and 62 as planned. Hein Severloh, maschine gunner in resistance nest no 62, writes in his memoirs "WN 62 - Memoirs of Omaha Beach":„My MG was so red-hot by then that the dry grass caught fire from its muzzle. I had fired more than 12,000 rounds and the gun barrel had no grooves anymore. My two carbines were also completely overheated; I had fired roughly 400 shots out of them. I knew that the time had come now that everything was lost. I took the MG along but I wanted to kill nobody anymore -- it was enough. "
Few kilometres away from WN 62, the steep coast rose to the highest point, Point du Hoc, where the Germans had set up a battery which the Americans granted the highest priority. The 2. Ranger Battalion under the command of Colonel Rudder was ordered to take it. 200 men should storm the area within the first few minutes with leaders of the London fire brigade, rocket driven rope hooks and other exotic equipment.
The Americans failed to notice that the Germans had reinforced the Omaha sector within the last weeks. The carrier-pigeon of the French agent, which was sent with the message in the last minute towards England, was shot down by a German soldier. This had a devastating effect on the first hours of the battle. The 352. Infantry division of General Kraiss almost had driven the Americans back into the ships. Only the merciless use of heaviest battleship artillery aiming on beach and dunes, without consideration for their own men made the success of the Americans possible. In the end more than 3,000 dead and casualties were due to the 6 km long sector after the first storm, a dreadful toll of lives.
At the British landing sectors substantially lower resistance was offered by the Germans. The 716. Infantry division under General Richter had to defend a 34 km wide stripe which had already been ploughed up by bombers and artillery repeatedly. The Regiment 736 and the 2. Battalion 726 were particularly hard hit. The East battalion had taken to its heels already early. Through this gaps opened up that were taken advantage of immediately by tanks and infantry, Caen and Bayeux were the next targets.
Only at 14.30 a decisive German resistance started. The commanding General Marcks of 84. Korps put two departments of the Panzer Regiment 22 into march. The coast and the splitting of the British bridgehead were the tactical objectives. Marcks in conversation with the Regiment Commander Colonel von Opole-Bronikowski: "Throw the English back into the sea Opole, if you do not succeed, we will have lost the war". Apart from the Panzers General Marcks set the I. Battalion of Panzergrenadier Regiment 192 in march. But it was already too late. The grenadiers managed to reach the beach between Lion and Luc and to split the British and Canadian defence forces but without tank support they could not hold on for a long time. And the tanks did not come. Strong English anti-tank gun positions made it impossible. Another infantry position which waited for tank support is the Luftwaffe radar base Douvres. Lieutenant Igle and his 230 Luftwaffe soldiers, equipped with some anti-tank and infantry guns as well as machine guns and flame-throwers, defied the English for ten long days. But relief is not in sight.
When the sun set on the first day of the invasion the fights diminished. The Allies were exhausted the Germans lacked the means for the nightly counter-attack. 75 215 English and 57 500 Americans as well as 15 500 American and 7 900 English air borne soldiers were on French soil at the end of this day. And the second wave went ashore only then.
But none of the tactical aims was accomplished. Neither Caen nor Bayeux or Carentan were taken. Nothing could be seen by the Luftwaffe the whole day, except for three Focke Wulf Fw 190. The navy sent three destroyers in the direction of the landing beaches which were immediately cut to pieces. The German hopes did lie primarily on the Panzer-Lehr Division of General Bayerlein who had been on the march from Le Mans to Normandy since noon. But destroyed bridges, burning towns and non-stop low-level air attack delayed the arrival.
June 7 saw further fights for St Mere Eglise and the attempt of the Americans to unite their two bridgeheads at Carentan. At these fights some German units did not redound to their glory. The old reservists of the Infantry Regiment R 1058 took flight ahead of 60 U.S. tanks and only by the personal effort of General von Schlieben it was possible to stop them. The 759. East Troop Battalion surrendered unanimously to the US Army. Of the 1.Battalion of the 6. Paratrooper Regiment, 25 men reported at the command post in Carentan. The others of the 700 strong unit were dead, wounded or taken prisoner. Carentan fell definitely on June 11. Major von der Heydte ignored Hitler's order to fight up to the last cartridge and led his men to a reception position.
Montgomery planned the definite seizure of Caen now and wanted to achieve this with an out-flanking movement. From the right shores of the river Orne, the1.Corps should push forward to Cagny in the southeast of the town of Caen. At the same time, the XXX Corps with the 7.armoured division had the task to take Tilly sur Seulles, Villers and Noyers-Bocage and then in a counter-clockwise rotation occupy the important heights at Evrecy in the southeast of Caen . Among others the attack is supported by the heavy artillery of the battle cruiser "Nelson". The battle cruiser was manipulated by shift of burden into a list to be able to extend the range of 30 km by the steeper shot angle.
The Germans planned just an attack in the same sector which was, however, beaten back by the English. In a counter-move the 7. Armoured Division turned in the direction of Villers Bocage on June 13 and occupied Hill 213. Now, the Panzer-Lehr was threatened in its rear and a collapse of the front emerged. The vanguard of the English, a whole brigade, was already driven by the place with its vehicles and moved further direction Caen. They did not notice the lonely Tiger which watched its advance.
