Battlefield Travel - Exklusive militär-historische Reisen

Malta 1940 - 1943

Approaching it from the air, Malta first appears like a leaf, green or brown according to the season, floating upon the blue sea. The whole of the island is visible for quite a time with its terraced fields and villages, its churches and small farms all close and compact; then can be seen the port of Valetta and the enclosed waters of the Grand Harbour, where tiers of little houses look down across stone terraces and green palms to the blue beneath. It is a memorable view, but at the same time it all looks so very small, such a simple, rather fragile and easy target—especially for hostile bombers based only seventy miles away on the spacious airfields of Sicily. Yet for well over two years this small island, whose long history had seen it as a military fortress of the Knights of St. John and as Nelson's ‘important outwork to India’, withstood the worst that the enemy could cast upon it and by its persistence played a vital part in Mediterranean strategy.

Malta's indomitable resistance under the enemy attack, the heroism of its defenders and the endurance of its people, won high praise at the time, and rightly so, but a good deal less was said of its achievements as a base for striking at the enemy. Yet this is the true significance of the Malta story. For the island was essentially an aerodrome and its retention meant that air power could be applied in offensive operations over all areas of the Mediterranean within range of its aircraft; it could also serve as an air staging post and a reconnaissance base. Above all, because of its position athwart the enemy's supply routes to North Africa, Malta could, and did, exercise a profound effect on the land campaigns in that area. But for Malta, Rommel might well have pressed on to Alexandria and beyond; without it, the invasion of Sicily and Italy would have been well-nigh impossible.

Benito Mussolini wanted the Mediterranean to be an Italian Lake. When he declared war against a defiant Britain and a defeated France on June 10, 1940, he told his military commanders the war would last four months.

After taking power in 1922, Italy had embarked upon a major building program, especially her Navy. Wanting to restore the glory of Imperial Rome, Mussolini wanted the Italian Navy to be able to take on the world’s greatest naval power, England’s Royal Navy. By the declaration of war, he did not have a numerically superior force to the British, but he had two battleships completed with another four fitting out; seven heavy and fourteen light cruisers; seventy-three destroyers; and 106 submarines. And soon the British would be committed against U-boats in the North Atlantic, and after 1941 in the Pacific. With the French armistice they were the dominant fleet in the Mediterranean.

But the Italian Navy had two critical shortcomings — no radar and little fuel. The strategic plan gave all aircraft to the Italian Air Force, so the Fleet lacked their own aircraft. The fuel situation became critical soon and Germany began to supply the Italians with gas and oil by late 1940.

The battle of Malta began a few hours after Italy's declaration of war with the appearance of the first raiders over the island at dawn on 11 June 1940. From that day until the middle of 1943, by which time the island had been relieved and the Allies were preparing to invade Sicily, the battle was waged continuously. Periods of intensive attack alternated with times of relative quiet but Malta's activity never ceased. As one of its air commanders remarked, ‘We remained open day and night, like Waterloo Station.’ And in those eventful years, during which the RAF both defended the island and demonstrated its special value in the Mediterranean campaigns, its airmen achieved lasting fame. They came from all parts of the Commonwealth, with Canadians, Australians, Rhodesians and New Zealanders playing a conspicuous part alongside their comrades from the British Isles. The New Zealand contingent of some 198 airmen—66 of them fighter pilots—was indeed substantial considering the size of the force engaged in Malta during this period.

”Faith, Hope and Charity”

Two of the three air commanders were New Zealanders—Air Vice-Marshal F. H. M. Maynard and Air Vice-Marshal K. R. Park. Maynard was there at the outset. A fighter pilot of the First World War who had already spent two periods in the Middle East during the intervening years, he had been appointed Air Officer Commanding at Malta six months before Italy declared war. At that time the island's chances of survival were considered slender owing to its close proximity to Italian bomber bases; moreover, although three airfields had been built and a radar station was ready to operate, there were no fighters, only a few reconnaissance machines. Maynard, however, was convinced that the island could be held against the Italians. Casting about for some means of defence he discovered four Gladiator biplane fighters—spares for an aircraft carrier—still in their packing cases. They were soon assembled, volunteers to fly them were at once forthcoming from his staff and by the time the first Italian air raids came, the improvised flight was ready for action. Unfortunately one of the Gladiators was soon damaged beyond repair but the remaining three— now dubbed ‘”Faith, Hope and Charity”—continued to defy the Italian Air Force for some weeks. At the end of June 1940 they were joined by four Hurricanes and for the next month the seven fighters, together with the anti-aircraft guns, were Malta's entire defence against over two hundred Italian aircraft in Sicily.

Almost every day Italian bombers raided the island and every time all the serviceable Hurricanes and Gladiators went up to meet them; some indication of the effect they caused is shown by contemporary Italian estimates of Malta's fighter strength as twenty-five aircraft. And not only did Malta survive but a marked lack of aggressiveness on the part of the enemy led him first into bombing from great height, then into operating under escort and finally, for a while, into attacking by night. Only two fighters were lost in combat and no serious damage was suffered on the ground.

Once Maynard had shown what Malta could do, it was decided to reinforce the fighter defence and to increase the small reconnaissance force of Swordfish aircraft and Sunderland flying-boats that watched the Italian Fleet and sought targets for the Royal Navy. By mid- November sixteen more Hurricanes had arrived, flown off the aircraft carrier Argus. The Royal Navy had to even the balance of power if they hoped to check the Italians in North Africa. On the night of November 11-12, 1940, torpedo bombers from the carrier HMS Illustrious struck the Italian Navy base at Taranto. Using obsolete Fairey Swordfish biplanes nicknamed “stringbags” for the thread used to make repairs in the fabric wings and torpedoes modified to run properly in the shallow harbor waters, three battleships were sunk or damaged. Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto would study this attack closely in planning his attack on Pearl Harbor a year later.

Meanwhile, Wellington bombers en route to Egypt had, at Maynard's instigation, paused at Malta to make a few visits to Italian ports in the neighbourhood; and in December he secured permission to form a whole squadron of Wellingtons for attack on the enemy's supply lines. Thus, at the end of 1940, far from being overwhelmed as had been expected, Malta stood forth to challenge the enemy— shield in one hand, sword in the other.

The Luftwaffe Attacks HMS Illustrious

But now a new danger threatened. For German air units had begun to arrive in Sicily with Ju 87 dive-bombers, twin-engined Messerschmitt fighters Me 110, reconnaissance machines and long-range Heinkel He 111 bombers. They soon made their presence felt. Attacking a Malta-bound convoy (Force B) in the Sicilian Narrows on 10 January 1941, Ju 87 of I./StG.l (Hauptmann, Captain, Hozzel) und II./StG.2 (Major Enneccerus), scored six hits on the carrier Illustrious and another one on the battleship Warspite. On reaching Malta the carrier became a target for further attack and the next fortnight saw what came to be known as the “Illustrious Blitz”; a serious attempt was now made to wreck the island's airfields and above Grand Harbour dive-bombers “came screeching through a sky that was three parts flying steel and drifting smoke and one part spray or falling water” in a determined effort to destroy HMS Illustrious. But Malta and the Illustrious came through. On 11 January Force B left the Grand Harbour en route to Gibraltar and was attacked again by German dive bombers. Ju 87 of II./StG.2 dropped a dud on the cruiser Gloucester and damaged the cruiser Southampton so badly that she had to be given up. Cruiser Orion sent her to the bottom of the sea with two torpedoes.

Twelve aircraft were lost—six of them destroyed on the ground—but the British fighters and guns between them accounted for eleven German machines and an unspecified number of Italian, while Wellington bombers destroyed nine more in raids on Sicily. And after a miracle of effort by the repairers the Illustrious slipped out of harbour under her own steam and reached Alexandria safely. The carrier then had to be sent to Norfolk (USA) for a 12 months repair.

All through February and March German bombers, supported by Me 110 and experienced Me 109E pilots from JG (Jagdgeschwader or Fighter Wing) 26 and JG 27 hit Malta's three airfields and Valetta harbour constantly. Each time a convoy managed to get through, Stukas would hit the harbour with a vengeance, even when under attack from experienced anti-aircraft crews and an increasing number of Hurricanes sent to bolster the air defences.

The departure of the Illustrious, however, brought no respite; for the Germans were determined to neutralise Malta and control the supply routes to Rommel's forces, now active in North Africa. By early March their bombers had wrought such havoc on the island's airfields that the Wellington bombers and Sunderland flying-boats had to be withdrawn to Egypt. Malta's shipping offensive practically ceased. But its small Hurricane force continued to resist, although at times the pilots were too weary and exhausted to climb the stairs to their rooms; the continual night raids were a severe trial; and it was April before reinforcements—including some Hurricanes of a later type—reached them. Eventually, after five months of constant attack, came welcome relief with the transfer of the German squadrons from Sicily to the Balkans; there they replaced other units moving east, for Hitler's attack on Russia was impending.

Operations against Malta were now left to the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) and the island, faced once more only by the Italians, prepared to resume the offensive. The Wellingtons and Sunderlands returned; Blenheims from Bomber Command's No. 2 Group, already experienced in attacking enemy shipping in the North Sea, arrived to continue this task in the Mediterranean; a squadron of Marylands made possible a more ambitious programme of reconnaissance; and more Hurricanes came to defend the airfields.

Triumph Of Ingenuity

At this stage Maynard handed over to his successor, Air Vice-Marshal Hugh Lloyd. His sixteen months at Malta had certainly been a remarkable record of achievement. In the face of formidable enemy superiority and all manner of supply difficulties, he had built up the island's defence and shown it could be held. He had inspired all by his cool judgment and fine leadership; and his handful of fighters had been credited with fifty enemy aircraft destroyed and as many damaged. He had also prepared for the coming offensive, in particular by persisting with the building of a bomber airfield, with a 1200-yard tarmac runway, at Luqa in the centre of the island. Its construction was really a triumph of ingenuity, since the whole area had to be levelled from stony ground, hills and quarries; there were no proper tools for construction, and the work was done by the most primitive Maltese labour methods with horse and cart.

Flight Lieutenant Bloxam did fine work as pilot of one of the first Maryland aircraft based on Malta; these machines, which were fast and reliable, provided the chief means of sea reconnaissance and they ranged far and wide over the waters between Tripoli, Sardinia, Naples and Greece. Even when the Germans maintained standing patrols around Malta to intercept them on their inward and outward flights, they still continued to carry out their missions.

In mid-April 1941, Bloxam found and shadowed a convoy of five merchant ships escorted by three destroyers off the island of Pantellaria, north-west of Malta; as a result of his reports a destroyer force, led by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten, was directed to the target. The German merchant vessels Adana (4205 BRT), Aegina (2447 BRT), Arta (2452 BRT), Iserlohn (3704 BRT) and Italian Sabaudia (1590 BRT) as well as the three Italian destroyers Baleno, Lampo und Tarigo were sunk by British Force K (Capt. Mack) with the destroyers Jervis, Nubian, Mohawk and Janus. A few weeks later he found a convoy near Tripoli which had eluded naval attack; subsequent bombing by Marylands from Malta set at least one 15,000-ton troopship on fire.

With the departure of the Luftwaffe from Sicily in May 1941, enemy air activity against Malta was considerably reduced. There was some night bombing but, by day, only an occasional bomber or low-flying fighter attack and intermittent reconnaissance. The Hurricanes were able to deal with the Macchi 200 fighters which comprised the main Italian force and reinforcement by some Hurricane IIs was a further discouragement to the enemy.

Supply Arrives

Notable developments occurred at Malta during the next few months. In the first place, devoted efforts by the Merchant Navy and the crews of escorting ships and aircraft brought in several convoys from the west, so restocking the island with food, bombs, ammunition, aviation fuel and many other vital commodities. At the same time Air Vice- Marshal Lloyd and his construction teams, helped unsparingly by the Army, pressed on with the development of the island's air facilities; despite an almost complete absence of all those devices which make modern building so fascinating a spectacle, they succeeded in building new airfields, taxi tracks, dispersals, radar stations and operations rooms. The provision of adequate aircraft dispersal space was a major problem since every yard of the island's poor soil was needed for crops, but Malta's stone-walled roads were put to good use in forming the celebrated Safi strip which linked Luqa and Hal Far airfields in a unique dispersal area.

Meanwhile, with the Italian bombers showing a marked disinclination to visit the island, Malta struck out boldly at enemy ports and shipping. And she struck with such effect that Admiral Raeder was soon reporting to Hitler that ‘German shipments to North Africa are suffering heavy losses of ships, material and personnel as a result of enemy air attacks by bombs and torpedoes and through submarine attacks’, while Mussolini bemoaned the loss of nearly three-quarters of Italy's shipping employed on the African supply routes. It is now known that the enemy lost at least 220,000 tons of shipping on his North African convoy routes as a result of our naval and air operations between 1 June and 31 October 1941. Of this total 94,000 tons were sunk by our naval vessels—mainly submarines—and 115,000 by aircraft of the Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm. Ninety per cent of the sinkings were of loaded southbound traffic, and at least three-quarters of those attributed to aircraft were the work of the squadrons at Malta. This destruction of enemy cargoes undoubtedly helped Auchinleck outpace Rommel in the build-up of supplies and so launch the Crusader campaign that took the Allied armies forward to Benghazi at the end of 1941.

Auchinleck Opens Crusader Offensive In North Africa

Wellington bombers—some of them detached from squadrons in Egypt—continued the assault by day and night. Ships and port facilities in places as far apart as Naples, Benghazi, Tripoli and Taranto were their main targets, but when Auchinleck began his Crusader offensive, they also flew over to bomb the main enemy airfields in Cyrenaica at Berka and Benina and the air depot at Castel Benito near Tripoli. In the six months ending December 1941, the Wellingtons at Malta flew well over one thousand sorties.

While the Blenheims and Wellingtons thus maintained their attack on the enemy's supply routes, the Sunderland flying-boats continued to do yeoman service, transporting supplies and personnel to the island as well as providing sea reconnaissance. These were usually uneventful missions but, towards the end of December 1941, New Zealand Flight Lieutenant S. W. R. Hughes and his crew were involved in a remarkable episode. They had taken off from Aboukir in Egypt shortly after midnight, bound for Malta with supplies. On board as passengers were Pilot Officer Easton and his crew, whose Wellington bomber had crashed in North Africa and who were returning to Malta. Here is the story of what happened.

The Sunderland flew on, hugging the friendly coast of North Cyrenaica, but when approximately fifty miles north-east of Benghazi it was attacked by two Messerschmitt 110 fighters. The encounter was brief: one of the Messerschmitts was probably destroyed and the other retired; but two Royal Air Force gunners were wounded, one seriously, and a passenger was killed, while the two starboard engines of the Sunderland were put out of action and the starboard aileron shot away. Land was just in sight, and as the aircraft rapidly lost height, Flight Lieutenant Hughes, exercising all his experience, succeeded in turning it into the wind and made a safe landing on the water. A heavy sea was running and the Sunderland ricochetted twice before it finally came to rest. The starboard wing-tip float was smashed, but the crew kept the flying boat from capsizing by ranging their weight along the port wing and ensuring that the good float remained in the water. In this fashion, behind a strong north-east wind, the Sunderland ‘sailed’ stern first into land. It struck a reef, and two hours later was still firmly lodged and beginning to break up. An attempt had to be made to reach the shore. The wounded man was given morphine, put into the only serviceable dinghy and towed through the surf. In all, there were twenty men on board the aircraft, and two at a time they slid down the wing into the sea. The second-pilot was nearly drowned as a strong undertow carried him away, but Flight Lieutenant Hughes, who was a strong swimmer, eventually dragged him ashore after a struggle lasting nearly half an hour.

By mid-day the party found themselves on a rocky beach, which they estimated, accurately, to be approximately 100 miles east of Benghaz. Italian soldiers suddenly appeared from behind a wall of rocks, and Flight Lieutenant Hughes decided to go forward and surrender as his exhausted party was without arms. To his astonishment the nearest Italian raised his rifle above his head, threw it away ostentatiously, and advanced with outstretched hands. The British party had not quite recovered from seeing the soldiers behave as friends when another group of about eighty Italians arrived. This group was more aggressive and formally declared the British party to be their prisoners. Hughes, however, had one duty to fulfil, and with the pretext of searching for the wounded gunner's flying boots he returned to the wreck and jettisoned into the sea a bag of one hundred pounds' weight of gold sovereigns, which had been destined for the Malta Exchequer. Back on shore, a stretcher made of oars from the dinghy was improvised for the wounded man, and in a long procession the mixed band started off along the coast. It was raining and streaks of lightning lit up a leaden sky. Night came, and with it small comfort. There were no blankets, rations, or water, and no fires were allowed as the Italians feared Arab sharpshooters. The second-pilot and the gunner were both suffering from shock, and the party huddled around them, massaging them constantly in an effort to keep them warm. At dawn another start was made. Suddenly twenty Italian officers ran forward from a cluster of bushes. Highly agitated, they indicated to Flight Lieutenant Hughes that the Germans had taken their vehicles and told them to get to safety as best they could. They offered to help the party in exchange for favoured treatment should they be captured by the British. Again, for the fourth time, the party was increased in number, on this occasion by an Italian major with about one hundred men. The major was a unique personage, middle-aged, with a heavily tanned and deeply lined face. He carried a cat-o'-nine-tails at his belt, presumably as a fly-whisk, but he used it for its original purpose later when one of the British party indignantly announced that an Italian soldier had stolen the wounded man's flying boots. The thief was flogged in front of his comrades. Later that day the wounded air-gunner died and the major conducted a form of military burial.

In due course the party arrived at the Senussi village of El Hania. Here they were given macaroni and coffee; three eggs were bartered for a wrist watch and a two-shilling piece, and a bag of dates cost one Egyptian pound. The major sent for Flight Lieutenant Hughes and told him that he proposed to leave for Benghazi. The question arose as to who actually held the town and finally bets were made on it. The Italian decided that he would leave with his men, allowing the British to remain with the Arabs, and he offered to leave rifles for their protection. Once the Italians had gone, the Senussi freely disclosed an abundance of food and sent a messenger towards the advancing British lines. Hughes and his party decided to follow, hoping to reach an Indian Army unit which the Arabs reported to be some fifteen miles away.

The end of this incident was equally remarkable. After walking for an hour the Royal Air Force party overtook some of the Italian major's men. One of these ran over to the group, drew his bayonet, propped it against a rock, and jumped on it until it snapped. There were some two dozen Italians, each of whom threw away his rifle or handed it over and cheerfully joined the procession. Similar incidents happened on four occasions, and after three hours the company was more than a hundred and fifty strong. The British lines were soon reached, for the Eighth Army was making a bid to take Benghazi by Christmas, and Flight Lieutenant Hughes, who had successfully led his men through the whole grim yet whimsical adventure, added his prisoners to those of the Army.

Hitler Orders Luftflotte 2 To The Mediterranean

Malta's offensive against enemy supplies to North Africa proved so successful that Hitler was compelled to take action against it. Accordingly, in November 1941, he ordered Field Marshal Kesselring to move with the whole of his Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet) to the Mediterranean, where he was to “suppress” Malta, “obtain air and sea supremacy in the area” and “establish safe shipping routes to Libya.” Kesselring wasted no time and by the middle of December the enemy air forces in Sicily had grown to some 250 long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft and nearly two hundred fighters. Against them Air Vice-Marshal Lloyd could muster only sixty serviceable bombers and seventy serviceable fighters, the latter still Hurricanes whose performance was not equal to that of the latest German Messerschmitts. Not until another three months had passed were a first fifteen Spitfires—the best contemporary fighters—to be spared from the many hundreds in Fighter Command.

Malta now faced its longest and sternest test. It began in the last week of December when over two hundred aircraft attacked the island. Kesselring's first objective was plainly the RAF, for the raids were concentrated almost entirely against the fighter grounds of Hal Far and Takali, the bomber airfield at Luqa and the flying-boat base at Kalafrana. At first the Hurricanes, although outclassed by the German fighters, broke up some of their formations and kept the damage within tolerable limits. But with the opening days of January 1942 came heavier attacks and the defence of the island grew increasingly arduous for the small force of Hurricane fighters; then heavy rains turned the battered fighter airfields into quagmires so that for a time all squadrons had to be concentrated on the equally battered but better drained Luqa. Yet Malta still continued to hit back; in an attack on Castelvetrano airfield Blenheims destroyed eleven and damaged twenty-eight of a large force of transport aircraft on the ground; then Wellingtons followed up with a night raid which left another sixteen aircraft ablaze and blew up a petrol dump. But as the enemy bombing of Malta continued with increasing strength and ferocity, our offensive slackened and February saw only sixty sorties by bombers and only one enemy ship sunk.

In March only one day passed without the wail of the air-raid siren and over 2000 tons of bombs fell on Malta. Very heavy damage was caused in the harbour area and at the island's airfields; soldiers and airmen worked day and night clearing the rubble, filling craters, repairing the runways, building protective pens and servicing aircraft; and the guns and fighters succeeded in shooting down sixty of the enemy raiders. Yet under the strain of continual attack, Malta's offensive power and even her capacity for self-defence were now diminishing. The arrival of the first few Spitfires at odd intervals during the month was heartening, but although their pilots took them straight into action and fought gallantly they could not work miracles; moreover, with limited spares and an almost complete lack of the special equipment designed for maintaining Spitfire fighters (they were not just super-Hurricanes but an altogether different machine), it proved exceedingly difficult to keep them repaired and in action. By the end of March Lloyd had only nine Spitfires and four Hurricanes serviceable and the anti-aircraft guns were short of ammunition. Food and other essential supplies were also running out. The February convoy had failed to get through and in March all three of the ships that reached Malta were sunk at their berths before much of their cargo had been unloaded.

April brought the severest ordeal. That month the enemy cast down no less than 6728 tons of bombs on Malta, which may well be compared with the 186 tons dropped on Coventry at the height of the blitz on Britain. Moreover, most of these bombs were directed against the few square miles at the western end of the island, where lay the main airfields and the port of Valetta. Soon the airfields were a wilderness of craters, the docks and their surrounding districts a shambles and Valetta itself a mass of broken limestone. At the height of the assault, on 20 April, forty-seven Spitfires flew in from the United States carrier Wasp; but the hopes they raised were soon crushed for the Germans observed their arrival and, within twenty minutes of the last Spitfire touching down at Takali, they launched a series of violent attacks on the airfield. The following morning only twenty-seven fighters were fit for action and, after the day's fighting, only seventeen. By the end of the month, Lloyd was down to seven serviceable Spitfires and “it was a continual struggle to hold it at that modest figure.” Over a hundred fighters were now awaiting repair. Spares were being used at a far quicker rate than they were being delivered by air. Men would rob parts from every unserviceable Spitfire to make others fly, but there was a limit to that, particularly with engines.

Towards the end of April, reconnaissance aircraft brought back disturbing news from Sicily. Their photographs showed that the enemy was preparing airfields for launching gliders and that railway sidings were being laid alongside them. The Germans and Italians were, in fact, now well advanced with their plans for Operation Hercules—the airborne invasion of Malta.

Operation Herkules

Operation Herkules was the plan for an airborne invasion with General Kurt Student in command of 2 airborne divisions, one being the Italian 2nd Parachute Division. The concept was approved at a meeting between Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini on 29 April - 30 April 1942.

The planning for this attack was extensive. Preparation began on three glider strips 25 miles south of Mount Etna. Over a thousand gliders and other aircraft were to cover the assault and drop one Italian and one German airborne division onto the southern portion of the island. The role of these divisions was to seize the higher ground behind Valletta and from there overrun an airfield and secure it for Axis troop-carrying aircraft to land with heavier weapons. An attack at Marsa Scirocco bay was also planned as a diversion to cover the main assault by the Italian Navy which would land 2-3 assault divisions south of Valletta.

After the initial assault, seventy-thousand Italian troops would land by sea at two points to link up with the paratroops. A number of special operations were to be carried out by Axis commandos to destroy key targets in the hours before the airdrop. The Regia Marina (Italian Navy) would be committed to a fleet action to protect the seaborne troops. This attack was to be over five times as large as the airborne attack on Crete. A date near mid-July 1941 was set for the invasion partly to allow time to bring troops from other frontline positions and partly because Hitler believed the Italian Navy was no match for the Royal Navy. But this date did not materialize because Hitler decided to scrap the idea. With Tobruk taken by Rommel on 21 June, 1942, Hitler forgot about Operation Herkules. General Field Marshal Albert Kesselring urged Hitler to invade Malta but was turned down. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and Hermann Goering supported scrapping Operation Herkules as they believed the casualty rate would be unreasonable, as happened with the Invasion of Crete.

But the prospect of invasion, alarming though it was, was not the only danger that threatened. For with the passing weeks the island's last stocks of fuel and food were ebbing relentlessly away. Both the February and March convoys had succumbed to German aircraft; no convoy had sailed in April and the chances of one sailing in May were remote; Malta was now existing on what could be brought in by submarines, aircraft and fast minelayers like the gallant Welshman. “Conditions had become extremely difficult,” wrote Lloyd. “The poor quality of the food had not been noticed at first then suddenly it began to take effect. In March it had been clear enough but in April most belts had to be taken in by two holes and in May by another hole …. Our diet was a slice and a half of bread with jam for breakfast, bully beef for lunch with one slice of bread, and except for an additional slice of bread it was the same fare for dinner. There was sugar but margarine appeared only every two or three days; even drinking water, lighting and heating were all rationed. And things which had been taken for granted closed down. The making of beer required coal so none had been made for months. Officers and men slept in shelters, in caverns and dugouts in quarries …. Three hundred slept in one underground cabin as tight as sardines in a tin and two hundred slept in a disused tunnel. None had any comfort or warmth. Soon, too, we should want hundreds of tons of fuel and ammunition ….”

Meanwhile the enemy pilots were showing greater determination in their attacks. The RAF fighters were invariably outnumbered, often by as many as ten to one.
“We were fighting a stern, uphill battle, and were coming off second best,” wrote one Spitfire pilot. “We were also feeling the strain, not only of the continuous air fighting but also of the bombing and the general living conditions of Malta. Our barrage was also falling away. The gunners were growing tired and many of the gun barrels were becoming worn. All of us were getting less sleep for the enemy bombers were coming over in greater numbers at night when the moon was favourable. They were pressing home these attacks with more determination than previously and were coming down much lower. We had insufficient night fighters to hold them all back. With the lengthening days, we were doing longer periods of readiness and the night bombing prevented us from obtaining proper sleep. We were becoming irritable and on edge.”

Malta Under Siege

The civilian population were showing the effects of the strain in somewhat similar fashion. The Maltese appeared to have aged and looked more haggard and nervous. Less and less of Valetta was standing, half the streets were blocked with debris and the interiors of the houses were everywhere spewing out of the doorways. Practically every civilian was living in one of the rock shelters. Food distribution was becoming more difficult than ever and the authorities had been forced to set up communal feeding centres.”

As April gave place to May, Malta's plight had thus become extremely serious. Indeed, it seemed that her epic of defiance might well end, not in a last glorious if unavailing fight against the invader, but in the humiliation of surrender, with the guns silent for need of ammunition, the aircraft idle for lack of fuel and the defenders weakened for want of food. But this was the ‘darkest hour before the dawn’ and with the next few weeks there came new hope for Malta's survival.

Strangely enough, it was the enemy who provided the first relief. A new campaign in Russia was making heavy demands on German resources; Hitler was also anxious to take reprisals against Britain for Bomber Command's mounting offensive, and since Malta appeared to have been subdued, with substantial supplies reaching Rommel, he decided to transfer the greater part of Kesselring's bombers to Russia and France; others would go to Cyrenaica where Rommel was about to attack. The German calculation at this stage was that, if the Italians played their part, enough aircraft would still remain in Sicily to keep Malta ‘neutralised’ until Operation Hercules could be launched— somewhere about the end of July. The Italians were not so sure and with good reason. For only a year earlier the departure of a German bomber force from Sicily had been the signal for renewed activity on the part of Malta.

Operation Bowery

Meanwhile Operation Bowery had begun. The British/American Force W (Commodore Daniell) with battle cruiser Renown, US carrier Wasp, British cruiser Charybdis, British destroyers Echo and Intrepidas well as US destroyers Lang und Sterett left port Scapa Flow on May 3. In the night of May 8 the task force united with a British task force from Gibraltar made of the carrier Eagle, destroyers Partridge, Ithuriel, Antelope, Wishart, Wrestler, Westcott, Vidette, Georgetown and Salisbury. On May,9 on two sorties, 47 und 17 Spitfire fighter planes took off. All but three of them reached the island safely.

Eyewitness John W. Birch used to be part of that mission: “In April 1942, I was an ensign on the aircraft carrier USS Wasp off the coast of Great Britain when, at the request of the British government, we received orders to ferry British Spitfires to the island of Malta. At that time during World War II, the British were being dominated in the skies over Europe by the German Luftwaffe and the Spitfires were needed badly in Malta.

When we entered the Firth of Clyde in Scotland to pick up the Spitfires at King George Dock in Glasgow, rousing cheers greeted us from shore. "The Yanks Are Coming . . . The Yanks Are Here!" It was a wonderful sight to behold for all of us.

After loading 47 British Spitfires aboard on 13 April, we took off into the Atlantic at a speed of 25 knots, ringed all the while by destroyers for protection. The Wasp's convoy down to British Gibraltar included both destroyers and cruisers to protect us from possible attack by German U-boats prowling the Atlantic. Just w-h-o-o-s-h we went past the Bay of Biscay which was the "country road," really, for U-boats heading west.

At Gibraltar we picked up a couple of British destroyers (with anti-aircraft guns all over them just like a cruiser) and headed for Malta. About 150 miles away, confident of success, we launched the Spitfires from the deck of the Wasp so they could fly the rest of the way. It would have been far too risky for us to take them all the way to Malta.

Tragically, when the Spitfires reached Malta and had either landed, or were in the process of landing, German and Italian planes were waiting for them. To our dismay, we learned later that Axis intelligence had discovered our plans. They destroyed at least 30-35 of the Spitfires either in the air or on the ground in a devastating attack.

Our mission had been in vain. Or had it? . . . .

During our return trip to Britain, Prime Minister Winston Churchill contacted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to request that the Wasp make a second trip to Malta. President Roosevelt agreed at once. So perhaps we would succeed after all. . . .

The calendar had now turned into May when we returned to Scotland and hoisted aboard another complement of Spitfires. Heading toward Malta on our second attempt, a flash from British Gibraltar came saying that we were lined up to go through Gibraltar – through the pass. But once we were into the throat of it, the Wasp received word that "Five or six unidentified objects have been spotted heading west. (towards our convoy.) Be alert." It was obviously a "wolfpack" of German U-boats.

With that, the senior British officer immediately ordered the convoy to reverse course. Emergency turns, full speed out. We went far out into the Atlantic Ocean and headed south in a big, sweeping arc out of harm’s way – we hoped.

After a very tense night aboard ship, the next day –9 May– we reached British Gibraltar naval base without a bit of trouble. The British had sent their destroyers out to clear a path for us. So we all thought that this time would be it. Primed to rise to the occasion, we were acutely aware of the importance of our mission and what was at stake. We were determined to succeed and knew the very real danger that we had faced the night before from those German U-boats.

Benefiting from our "learning curve" after the Wasp’s first unsuccessful trip to Malta, this time we attached "belly tanks" to the Spitfires so they could fly on to Malta using that fuel and have a full tank in reserve just in case they encountered German and Italian fighter planes again, which is precisely what happened.

But this time the Spitfires were ready. Turning the tables, they released the belly tanks and engaged the enemy with a full complement of fuel. Utilizing all their skill, the brave Royal Air Force pilots won the air war as they blew the Axis planes out of the sky!

With the Spitfires now safely on the ground in Malta, the Wasp turned and headed north back to Britain. The entire ship felt a great sense of pride – not only for a job well done but because we had done our duty and accomplished our mission. The successful delivery of the Spitfires proved to be a deciding factor in the interception and termination of the supply line to the Axis forces in Africa.

En route to Britain, as the Wasp exited the Mediterranean, the ship received a personal message from Winston Churchill on 11 May that read:

"Who said a Wasp couldn't sting twice? Many thanks
to you all for the timely help." – Churchill

Needless to say, that message was so typically "Churchillian" in tone –short, elegant, and eloquent– that its effect on the Wasp's morale and esprit de corps was incredible, unbelievable. The entire ship went into an uproar!

I have always admired Winston Churchill as a great leader and a great man, and my admiration for him at that moment knew no bounds. Churchill's personal message, which I considered a message of commendation for the two trips that the Wasp made to Malta, remains my most unforgettable memory during my service aboard the USS Wasp. It inspires me still”.
(Note: In April 1942, John W. (Jack) Birch was an Ensign aboard the USS Wasp, a state-of-the-art aircraft carrier that took eight years to design and build, and whose top speed was 30 knots. He served on the Wasp from Labour Day 1941, until it was sunk in the Pacific Ocean by the Japanese on 15 September 1942. He retired from the U.S. Naval Reserve with the rank of Commander on 1 September 1974.)

Operation Style

In early June Operation Style was put together. The British Force H with carrier Eagle, cruiser Charybdis and the destroyers Ithuriel, Antelope, Wishart, Wrestler and Westcott left Gibraltar on June 2. The next day 31 Spitfires took off the carrier, 27 of them made it to Malta. On June 4., Force H returned to Gibraltar. The Italian submarines Brin and Malachite, which operated off the coast of Algiers, could not establish contact.

On June 9, Force H sailed again with carrier Eagle, cruiser Cairo and Charybdis and the destroyers Partridge, Ithuriel, Antelope, Wishart, Wrestler and Westcott south of the Balearic Island. 32 Spitfires took off and reached Malta safely.

With the arrival of the Spitfires and these dearly bought supplies, the task of the defenders was, for the time being, greatly eased. Enemy fighters and bombers continued to come over regularly but their assault was on a reduced scale and, under cover of stronger fighter defence, Malta began to renew her offensive. Wellington bombers struck out again to good effect and they were soon joined by some torpedo-carrying Beauforts; the faithful Marylands increased their reconnaissance sorties, a duty they had never ceased to carry out even at the height of the enemy attack.

Invasion Of Malta Imminent

Thus did Malta continue to exist and, as far as her impoverished state allowed, to hit back at the enemy. But her position was still precarious and, with Rommel now sweeping forward towards Egypt, it might well be only a matter of weeks before she was isolated and invaded. Such indeed was still the enemy intention.

In the high summer of 1942 Malta daily expected invasion. But enemy operations against the island were always strongly influenced by events in North Africa, and towards the end of June, following Rommel's rapid advance and swift capture of Tobruk, the enemy decided to change his plans—with far-reaching results.

The original design had been for Rommel to pause on the Egyptian frontier while Malta was invaded and captured; but Rommel was now eager to press on to Alexandria. Hitler supported him and Mussolini, although somewhat concerned at ‘Malta's active revival’, agreed that ‘the historic moment to conquer Egypt had now come and must be exploited.’ Accordingly, the invasion of Malta was postponed and, instead, Kesselring was ordered to keep her subdued so that Rommel's supply lines would be safeguarded. Kesselring was alarmed at the change of plan and pointed out the dangers of Rommel's ‘foolhardy enterprise’, but Rommel had his way.

So it came about that, in the opening days of July 1942, Malta was spared from invasion only to come once more under very heavy air attack. Kesselring now had some five hundred fighters and bombers at his disposal and in the first fortnight of July they flew about one thousand sorties against the island. Many times the attacks struck home against the airfields which were their main objective, but the Luftwaffe planes were given a hot reception by anti-aircraft batteries, while the Spitfires by day and the Beaufighters by night shot down an increasing number. At the height of the attack six raiders were destroyed and nine damaged within an hour. That day the enemy control in Sicily was heard calling: ‘Look after that bomber in the sea.’ ‘Which one?’ answered one of their fighter pilots.

By 14 July the new assault on Malta had cost Kesselring forty-four aircraft, of which thirty-three were bombers. Malta's fighter losses for the same period were thirty-nine from which, thanks in large part to the fine work of the Air-Sea Rescue Service, twenty-six pilots survived to fight again. By mid-July the German attack had begun to weaken.

Air Vice-Marshal Park Takes Over Air Command

At this stage Air Vice-Marshal Park took over the air command at Malta. Thoroughly experienced in leading a vigorous fighter defence, he at once introduced a system of forward interception similar to that which he had employed so successfully in the Battle of Britain. Previously, because of the Hurricane's slow rate of climb, pilots had been compelled, when warned of the enemy's approach from the north, to gain height to the south of the island and then return to engage the attackers as they swept in across the coast. But Park felt that with the advent of the latest Spitfires in considerable numbers ‘the time had come to put an end to the bombing of our airfields in daylight.’ Accordingly he ordered his pilots to gain height while approaching the enemy and to intercept not over the island but as far north as possible. This scheme was an instant success, and in addition to continued slaughter of the enemy, there was a most welcome reduction in the proportion of bombs falling on Malta. Indeed, it was not long before the enemy was driven to adopt the same tactics as in the closing stages of the Battle of Britain—high-level fighter and fighter-bomber sweeps which kept the defences at full stretch but accomplished little else.

But to sustain this offensive and, at the same time, maintain Malta's hard-won air superiority, petrol was urgently needed. Indeed, despite deliveries by aircraft and submarine, the island was again in desperate need of supplies; food was still very scarce and bread strictly rationed. Accordingly, another convoy began to fight its way through from Gibraltar early in August. This time Malta's aircraft were able to make a larger contribution to its passage, but before the convoy came within their range it suffered severely at the hands of enemy bombers and torpedo-bombers from Sardinia and Sicily.

Operation Pedestal

The Axis high command was aware of Operation Pedestal and had made provisions to destroy the convoy. Between Algiers and the Balearic Islands „Supermarine“ had positioned the Italian U-Boats Brin, Dagabur, Giada, Uarsciek, Volframio and the German U 73 und U 331. In the area north of Tunesia and off Cap Bon another U-Boat group with the Italian vessels Granito, Emo, Otaria, Dandolo, Avorio, Cobalto, Alagi, Ascianghi, Axum, Bronzo, Dessié and west of Malta Asteria had been deployed. The British convoy WS.21 with13 freighters and one tanker, protected by Rear Admiral Burrough with the cruisers Nigeria, Kenya, Manchester, Cairo, and the destroyers Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight, Fury, Pathfinder, Penn, Derwent, Bramham, Bicester and Ledbury passed the Straits of Gibraltar together with the covering group (VAdm. Syfret) with the battleships Nelson, Rodney, the carriers Victorious (Rear Admiral Lyster), Indomitable, Eagle, Furious, the cruisers Phoebe, Sirius, Charybdis and the destroyers Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin, Eskimo, Tartar, Ithuriel, Antelope, Wishart, Vansittart, Westcott, Wrestler, Zetland and Wilton.

On August 8, the German-Italian air reconnaissance discovered these units. 37 Spitfires took off to Malta from the carrier Furious south of the Balearic Islands. The carrier was then met by reserve destroyers Keppel, Malcolm, Venomous, Wolverine and Wrestler and returned to Gibraltar safely. U 73 (Lieutenant Commander Rosenbaum) sank with four torpedoes the carrier Eagle (Captain L.D. Mackintosh). With the ship, 260 of her crew died.

The next day the Italian submarine Dagabur (Lieutenant Commander Pecori) attacked the carrier Furious but gets rammed by destroyer Wolverine (Lieutenant Commander Gretton) and sank. The Italian sub Giada (Kptlt. Cavallina) got bombed and damaged by the Sunderlands “TK7R” and “TK7C”. A little later, 19 Ju 88 of II. Fliegerkorps attacked but lost eight aircraft by Sea-Hurricanes taken off from the British carrier. Around noon 51 Italian bombers and 10 torpedo aircraft attacked, followed by 37 German Ju 88 covered by Italian fighters. Two Italian Reggiane 2001 dive bombers attacked carrier Victorious with armour piercing bombs that bounced off the carrier´s flight deck. In the afternoon Italian sub Emo fired four torpedoes at the destroyer Lookout and sub Cobalto was rammed by the destroyer Ithuriel. On the very late afternoon 29 Ju 87 of I./StG.3 (Hauptmann Mossdorf) attacked the carrier Indomitable and scored three hits that stopped all flight activities of the carrier. Four of the German aircraft did not return to their base. In the evening submarines attacked the ships and the Italian U-Boats Dessié und Axum scored one hit each on the cruisers Nigeria and Cairo as well as on the tanker Ohio. Cruiser Cairo had to be abandoned, Nigeria returned with the help of destroyers Bicester, Wilton and Derwent. Not much later 30 Ju 88 managed to sink the Empire Hope (12.688 BRT) and Glenorchy (8982 BRT). Italian sub Alagi (Lieutenant Commander Puccini) fired torpedoes at the cruiser Kenya and transporter Clan Ferguson that crippled both ships. Shortly before midnight, U-Boat Bronzo (Lieutenant Commander Buldrini) downs the wreck of the Empire Hope.

Within four hours the next day, Italian speed boats Ms 16 (Lieutenant Commander Manuti) and Ms 22 (Lieutenant Mezzadra) hit cruiser Manchester, which had to be abandoned, sank Ms 31 (Lieutenant Commander Calvani) the Glenorchy, MAS 554 (Lieutenant Calcagno) und MAS 557 (Lieutenant Cafiero) and German S 30 (1st Lieutenant Weber), S 36 (1st Lieutenant Brauns) the freighters Rochester Castle, Santa Elisa (8379 BRT), Almeria Lykes (7773 BRT) und Wairangi (12.436 BRT). But his was not the end of the ordeal yet. 12 Ju 88 send the transporter Waimarama (12.843 BRT) to the bottom of the sea, eight Italian Ju 87 scored hits on the freighters Dorset, Port Chalmers and the tanker Ohio. 20 Ju 88 and Ju 87 of X. Fliegerkorps hit Ohio, Rochester Castle und Dorset again with bombs, five torpedo aircraft SM 79 had no effect on any of the ships. In the evening, 14 Ju 87 sank the damaged Dorset (10.624 BRT). The minesweepers Hebe, Speedy, Hythe und Rye from Malta picked up the remaining ships Port Chalmers, Melbourne Star und Rochester Castle and escorted them to the island. With the help of the destroyers Penn, Ledbury und Bramham the crippled tanker Ohio limped into the Grand Harbour.

Of fourteen merchant ships only five, including the crippled tanker Ohio, which was towed in with decks awash, finally reached Malta. Forty-one enemy aircraft were shot down but, in addition to the cargo ships sunk, the Allies lost the aircraft carrier Eagle, two cruisers, a destroyer and eighteen aircraft. At this high cost, Malta received a new lease of life.

Rommel's Armies Threaten Egypt At El Alamein

With some three months' petrol now in hand, Park at once stepped up the attack on the enemy's ports and airfields and, more particularly, against his shipping; for with Rommel's armies now threatening Egypt at El Alamein, it was essential to do everything possible to disrupt their long and vulnerable supply lines.

The torpedo-carrying Beauforts had remarkable success with their gallant low-level attacks. In three weeks they hit four large cargo ships, two of which were sunk, one left a blazing wreck and the fourth later beached; they also torpedoed two tankers, one of which blew up, throwing the superstructure high in the air, and the other was afterwards found beached and the surrounding sea covered with oil. In September over 120 sorties were flown from Malta against enemy ships, and these, in conjunction with others flown from Egypt and the patrols of our submarines, took increasing toll of the supply convoys.

The enemy soon began to feel the effect of this onslaught. ‘Rommel is halted in Egypt because of lack of fuel,’ Ciano wrote in his diary. ‘Three of our tankers have been sunk in two days.’ And Admiral Weichold records: ‘The situation was becoming serious …. at the front the soldiers of the Afrika Korps fought and conquered but far from the decisive areas of the land fighting, the British were systematically throttling the supplies of the German-Italian Panzer Army. In September shipping losses were again very high, with 23,000 tons sunk and over 9,000 tons damaged.’ In October ‘practically every one of our convoys was spotted by the British air reconnaissance from Malta and successfully attacked. Of shipping proceeding to North Africa, 24,000 tons were lost and over 14,000 tons damaged—an enormous blow to the Italian Transport Fleet. Of the 32,000 tons of German cargo and 940 vehicles, only 19,000 tons and 580 vehicles reached North Africa. The loss of fuel was even greater; of almost 10,000 tons, only 3,300 tons reached Cyrenaica.’

All this was undoubtedly a major contribution to Rommel's defeat at El Alamein.

Meanwhile, vigorous fighter action from Malta had led to a further decrease in enemy air activity. In September the number of alerts fell to thirty-eight and on ten days no enemy aircraft at all approached the island; at night few bombers got close enough to attack, the rest being forced to drop their bombs in the sea. But as Malta's renewed striking power made itself felt, Hitler was compelled to order another blitz against the obstinate island and once again Kesselring assembled a large force of fighters and bombers in Sicily.

The new and, as it proved, final assault on Malta began on 10 October 1942. It met with little success. Time and again the enemy formations which, significantly enough, now consisted of a few bombers heavily escorted by fighters, were met and broken up well to the north of the island. After ten days of constant attacks, during which forty-six German aircraft were shot down, Kesselring withdrew his Ju88 bombers from the battle and thereafter the attacks gradually fell away. By the end of October, they had practically ceased.

At the height of the assault some bombs fell on Malta's airfields every day, but they were never put out of action for long. Reconnaissance aircraft continued their sorties without interruption and there was only one night when the bombers failed to take off against enemy shipping; and that was a night on which there were no targets within range of Malta. Such was the measure of the enemy's failure. Far from knocking Malta out, he had suffered damaging losses and between five hundred and six hundred aircraft had been kept tied down in Sicily at a time when they might have helped him more on other fronts.

Who Is The Prisoner?

An amazing experience, unique in the air war, was shared by Sergeants A. R. Brown and Wilkinson towards the end of July 1942. The Beaufort in which they were wireless operator-air gunners was hit during an attack on a convoy off the west coast of Greece and forced to land on the sea. It sank quickly but the crew managed to climb into their dinghy and began paddling towards the coast. Presently an Italian Cant float plane alighted on the sea near them. The Beaufort pilot, South African Lieutenant E. T. Strever, swam over to it and was received with brandy and cigarettes; shortly afterwards the rest of his crew were picked up and treated likewise, then the Cant taxied slowly to a harbour in the island of Corfu. Here the prisoners were taken to a camp, where the Italians again showed them every consideration, and an excellent dinner was followed by a lively party in the evening and comfortable beds in rooms vacated by Italian officers.

The next morning their captors informed them they would be taken to Italy by air. At this their hearts sank for this mode of transport offered no chance of escape. The only possibility, they decided, was to capture the plane; but how this was to be done no one knew.

Down at the harbour, their aircraft proved to be the same Cant with its crew of four, together with a corporal escort carrying a revolver. The plane took off and set course westwards; and for a while the flight proceeded uneventfully. Then suddenly Wilkinson saw an opportunity. Attracting the observer's attention, he hit him heavily on the jaw, jumped over his falling body and seized the astonished escort's revolver. Passing this to Strever he moved towards the pilot, using the corporal as shield. Strever followed close behind brandishing the revolver at the pilot, who attempted to draw his own gun and put the aircraft down on the water but, threatened again, he levelled out the aircraft and submitted to capture. Meanwhile Brown and his English navigator had disarmed and tied up the other Italians with their own belts; Strever now took over the controls.

The next problem was how to fly a strange aircraft without knowledge of its instruments, so they put the Italian second-pilot at the controls and set a rough course for Malta. At length they recognised the toe of Italy and, taking a chance in the matter of petrol, ordered the pilot to turn south for Malta. Eventually the island was sighted, but as the float plane came in low, three Spitfires swept down upon it. All efforts to explain the situation, including the waving of the navigator's singlet, proved unavailing, and when a stream of bullets poured through the wing Strever decided that the time had come to put down on the water. As the Cant landed, its engines spluttered and stopped from lack of petrol. It remained only for the captives, now turned captors, to climb out and signal frantically to the Spitfires, and before long a launch appeared to tow them in.

The British crew, feeling a little conscience-stricken at the way they had repaid the Italians' hospitality, could only offer their apologies and do all they could for the comfort of their captives. The latter cheerfully accepted the situation although they had, in fact, been proceeding on leave to the mainland—one of them even produced a bottle of wine which he insisted on sharing with the men who had so neatly turned the tables on him and his comrades.

Axis Forces Face Simultaneous Attacks

Malta now emerged triumphant from her long ordeal. For the victory of Park and his men in the October fighting had been decisive and the Germans, faced with a heavy Allied offensive from Egypt and a simultaneous attack from Algeria, could no longer spare forces to launch another assault. On 16 November 1942, a convoy sailed from Egypt to relieve the island. It was covered by aircraft of the Desert Air Force operating from their newly captured bases in Cyrenaica, and although attacked by torpedo-bombers during the passage across, it reached the approaches to Malta intact. Beaufighters and Spitfires flew out to cover the last 135 miles of the convoy's voyage and Wellingtons bombed the Sicilian airfields during its approach. The long line of ships entering Grand Harbour presented an easy target for enemy bombers; but none came. On every vantage point and amid the debris of their bombed buildings, the people and garrison stood to watch and cheer these ships. Naval bands played on the escort vessels. And during the following days the unloading proceeded uninterrupted, save for the sound of the Spitfires patrolling above. The relief had arrived none too soon for Park's squadrons were reduced to about a week's supply of aviation petrol; apart from this, near-starvation, disease, infantile paralysis and all the after-effects of undernourishment were to be found in Malta in the autumn of 1942.

The advent of fresh supplies enabled Park to intensify the air offensive and give full support to the campaigns in Cyrenaica and in Algeria. More Wellingtons and Beaufighters arrived and Spitfires, adapted by local ingenuity to carry two 250 Ib. bombs beneath their wings, were now employed as fighter-bombers. On the night of 7 November, the Wellingtons struck at Cagliari airfield as a diversion for the initial landings in Algeria; thereafter they operated on every night except four in November and every night except seven in December, in spite of a good deal of bad weather towards the end of the year. Their principal targets were the enemy's ports and airfields in Tunisia and his air bases in Sicily and Sardinia, most of which were near enough for the bombers to make two sorties each on many nights. Substantial damage was done to port installations, railways, stores, petrol dumps and airfields—and photographic reconnaissance revealed that on several days in November the chief German air base at El Aouina in Tunisia was out of action because of the many craters in the landing area.

The Beaufighters operated with increasing success. Sweeping over the area bounded by Tunis, Sirte and Tripoli, they attacked shipping with bomb, cannon and machine gun; they also strafed aerodromes, shot up trains and transport columns and, in company with Spitfires, intercepted enemy air convoys on their way to and from Africa. One day early in December six Beaufighters and eight Spitfires on a sweep off Pantellaria sighted two large formations of Ju 52 transports escorted by Ju 88s and Me 110s. The Spitfires took on the escort and, having shot down four of them, overtook the transports and destroyed two, probably destroyed another and damaged two more. Meanwhile the Beaufighters had shot down no fewer than six Ju52s and damaged four more. An Me110 which came up to see what was happening was promptly shot down by the Spitfires; only one Beaufighter was lost, with two others and a Spitfire damaged. Altogether, during November and December, the Beaufighters and Spitfires destroyed over fifty transport aircraft in the air and many others on the ground.

Spitfire bombers, which had been prevented from operating by the shortage of fuel, began harassing attacks on Sicilian aerodromes towards the end of November; by the end of the following month they had flown a total of 133 sorties, bombing and strafing airfield buildings and grounded aircraft at Comiso, Gela and Lampedusa. And along with this mounting offensive both by bombers and fighters, the reconnaissance aircraft kept up their valuable sorties over enemy airfields, ports and naval bases, while the torpedo-bombers—Beauforts by day and Wellingtons by night—continued their highly effective attacks on enemy ships.

Malta's efforts to help others did not pass unnoticed. During November, Eisenhower was “most grateful for splendid support afforded by air operations from Malta”, and Montgomery later paid high tribute to Park and his men for ‘the great assistance rendered to the Eighth Army during the advance along the African Desert.’

More Convoys Arrive

With the early months of 1943, Malta swung more and more over to the attack. Convoys were now arriving steadily with war material and enemy air activity had fallen away so much that it was quite an event when a few Messerschmitts flew high over the coast. Fighters, bombers and fighter-bombers ranged out in greater strength to strike at the enemy over a wide area; they bombed and machine-gunned his ports and airfields; they attacked his ships both in harbour and at sea; they strafed his columns on the coast road between Tripoli and Tunis; and they shot up railways in Sicily and Italy.

This last activity grew in importance as the months passed for the enemy relied largely on the railways to run material down to Sicily, where it could be loaded on small craft bound for Tunisia. The railways which follow the coast southward from Naples and Taranto to meet opposite the Messina train ferry, and the railway leading westward along the north coast of Sicily to Palermo, became a happy hunting ground for Mosquitos, Beaufighters and Spitfires. And the results of their attacks were quite spectacular. In January, fourteen locomotives were reported destroyed or severely damaged; in February there were thirty; and in March the figure rose to seventy-four, permanently or temporarily out of action. Reconnaissance aircraft also maintained a high level of activity, keeping watch on all enemy movements, on his embarkation ports and the routes by which he attempted to run supplies to North Africa. For it was on the information brought back by the photographic Spitfires and Baltimores that the striking forces were briefed.