August 1914
The European states did not simply "slide” into war. All the Great Powers contributed to the escalation of the crisis as they aimed to increase the size of their empires. However, Germany was primarily responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. The German military, in particular, appeared convinced that with the Schlieffen Plan they could achieve a quick victory. Most people in each country initially believed that war was being forced upon their nation. This was one reason for the “August experience”, a mixture of pro-war sentiment and patriotic fervour seen in August 1914. There was also a good deal of scepticism, panic and fear. The daily press, however, expressed nothing but complete confidence of victory. The stages of the “Burgfrieden” or the “Union Sacrée” were supposed to do away with all existing social divisions. This “closing the ranks” would, however, soon be placed in question by the further political development.
The early battles of World War I are known as the Battle of the Frontiers. It was a series of battles fought along the eastern frontier of France and in southern Belgium shortly after the outbreak of the First World War. The battles represented a collision between the military strategies of the French Plan XVII and the German Schlieffen Plan. Plan XVII, whose objective was to recapture the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine lost in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, pinning the German forces on the Rhine, and to attack the German centre through the southern Ardennes. In opposition to Plan XVII, the German Schlieffen Plan anticipated the target of the French assault and determined to remain there on the defensive, holding the Alsace-Lorraine front with the minimal possible force needed to keep the bulk of the French engaged there. The main German force would be on the right wing, sweeping through neutral Belgium and then into France, descending on Paris and executing a massive envelopment manoeuvre which would trap the French army between the two German forces and lead to its rapid annihilation. The German divisions would then rapidly turn about to face France's ally, Russia, on the Eastern Front. The German plan falsely assumed Britain, not formally allied with either side, would remain neutral in the conflict, and deemed the relatively small British regular army too small to be of any impact even if it did get involved.
France's frontier defences were based on a fortified zone from Verdun to Toul and isolated fortresses such as Épinal and Belfort. To the north, France relied on the impassable terrain of the central Ardennes forest and the promise of Belgian neutrality. Thus Plan XVII called for a two-pronged offensive, north and south of the Verdun-Toul line. In the south, the First and Second Armies would attack into Lorraine. In the north the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies would attack through the southern Ardennes towards Luxembourg. On the left flank of the Fifth Army, facing the Belgian frontier, was the BEF which concentrated near the fortress town of Maubeuge.
On the French frontier, the German forces roughly matched the French in numbers and disposition, even to the point of being divided north and south of a fortified zone between Metz and Thionville. However, in Belgium to the north, opposing the French Fifth Army and BEF, were the German First Second and Third Armies forming the mass of Schlieffen's right wing.
Under Plan XVII, the French offensive against the German centre through the lower Ardennes was to involve the Third, Fourth and Fifth French armies, but by the time the offensive was due to start Plan XVII was beginning to crumble. General Charles Lanrezac, commander of the northern-most Fifth Army, alarmed by German progress in Belgium, sought permission to realign his forces away from the Ardennes and towards Belgium, shifting west into the angle between the Sambre and Meuse rivers. Joffre remained dismissive of the threat but on 12 August he allowed Lanrezac to move I Corps west to Dinant on the Meuse. When on 15 August Lanzrezac reported German forces attacking Dinant, Joffre finally acquiesced, ordering the bulk of the Fifth Army to move north-west and take up positions behind the Sambre. In addition to the loss of most of the Fifth Army from the Ardennes offensive, Joffre also withdrew divisions to reinforce the Lorraine front following Rupprecht's counter-offensive.
The Battle of the Ardennes commenced on 21 August with the attack of General Pierre Ruffey's Third Army towards Briey while the Fourth Army of General Fernand de Langle de Cary advanced on Neufchâteau. The German Fourth Army (Albrecht, Duke of Württemberg) had been ordered to cross the river Meuse at Sedan and leaning at the flank of the 5. Army continue its thrust south into the rear of the fortress ring of Verdun.
On August 25 the spearhead of the 4. Army arrived at Sedan and took the town on the right bank of the river. During the night of August 26 the 15. Infantery Division built a bridge at St. Albert, near St. Menegs, across the Meuse and advanced south. One day later, VIII. and VIII. Reserve Corps crossed the river took the Meuse ridges and advanced to the Bois de la Marfée (Marfée Wood). The location where the bridges were built are almost identical with the site of 1940 when Guderians sappers built their bridges.
The 16. Division built a bridge east of Donchery and the 16. Reserve Division could use two bridges in Sedan that had not been destroyed by the French. All theses units pushed onto direction Noyers but were attacked by the French 21, and 22, Infantry Division and bombarded with artillery. The most advanced units had to be taken back from Hill 301, the former lookout point of Helmuth von Moltke during the Franco-German War of 1870, to Frénois.
On August 27, the Noyers ridge were the scene of heavy battle. Three times the ground changed owners until finally the French had the upper hand. The next morning, the Germans had planned a massive attack but soon realized, that the enemy had cleared the ridge during the night. The Germans already felt like victors but had to retreat – again- due to intense artillery barrage. Only when the left wing of 4. Army gained a decisive breakthrough further south, the French had to retreat from the Noyers area for good. The battle of Sedan was over.
Sedan was occupied by the Germans by the end of August, as other towns in the north and east of France were to be Indeed, the harshness of the German occupation between 1914 and 1918 explains the mass exodus of May and June 1940.
The German occupation was the continuous flood of public notices announcing prohibitions, restrictions and requisitioning. Occupation meant that Sedan's population was confined to the town, with no possibility of going outside the walls or communicating with the rest of France by letters.
Registration meant that the inhabitants found their names written on the front of their houses.
Exploitation meant that the population was requisitioned for harsh tasks, with forced labour facing every person over 14 years of age.
Registration meant that the inhabitants found their names written on the front of their houses.
Exploitation meant that the population was requisitioned for harsh tasks, with forced labour facing every person over 14 years of age.
Starvation meant that the people of Sedan experienced the privations of autumn 1914. White bread and milk were the first to disappear, followed by meat and most vegetables. The requisitions--furniture (1916), bedding (1916), metals (1917), mattresses (1918)--were seen as theft by the inhabitants. Finding food became the daily preoccupation for all Sedan residents, including the most privileged ones, while the arrival of supplies became a cause for celebration.
Another major danger for the inhabitants of Sedan was the taking of hostages, which physically menaced the population. Introduced during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the taking hostage of local notables guaranteed the occupier that the population would not engage in sabotage or other resistance activities.
By the beginning of 1918, both the Allied and German powers were on their last mile of endurance. When Russia fell into a revolution, Germany was freed from the strain of a two front war. The German High Commander, Erich Ludendorff, shifted the relieved forces to the Western Front. Germany now had some thirty-five divisions poised for one grand offensive pointed toward Paris.
Using new tactics, and the experience afforded to veterans of a long war, the German Army made massive gains that had not been achieved since 1914. The French Armies were now in full retreat across the Allied lines and headed toward Paris and away from the German juggernaut.
The only thing that stood in Germany’s way was the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) at Belleau Wood. The German advanced was checked by the Marines and soldiers at Belleau Wood, allowing time for the French forces to reform. The Americans sounded the bugle call that would bring the French Army back on its feet.
During the summer of 1918, the Allies were back on their game as the French and British Forces quickly patched up their wounds and remade a new line that was now getting dangerously close to Paris. The first order of business was to snub out the St. Mihiel salient that was poking out like an angry thorn into the side of the Allied line.
This fell squarely into the Americans sandbox as they went into their first real front line action. By September of 1918, the Allied line finally regained some of its territory that it had lost to the German advance earlier in the year.
Though the Allies didn’t know it, Germany was now in the corner. Everything was much the same as it was a year ago, with one vital exception. There was a whole new Army on the southern flank of the Western Front. The American 1st Army was under General Pershing and now the Allies felt it was time to make good on its new numerical superiority.
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Using several ruses to deceive the Germans into thinking the offensive would head toward Metz in the north, the US 1st Army began to form in the area between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest. The commander of the AEF, General Pershing, wrote about the preparations: "The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization, and while the mass of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions, and notably its machine-gun defense, were exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible, and was undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do."
Another famous American officer, George S. Patton, was involved in the Meuse-Argonne Operation. Patton, while assigned to the 13th Cavalry Regiment in Fort Bliss, Texas, accompanied then-Brigadier General John J. Pershing as his aide during the American Punitive Expedition to Mexico in his pursuit of Pancho Villa in 1916. During his service, Patton, accompanied by ten soldiers of the 6th Infantry Regiment, killed "General" Julio Cardenas, commander of Villa's personal bodyguard. For this action, as well as Patton's affinity for the Colt Peacemaker, Pershing titled Patton his "Bandito". Patton's success in this regard gained him a level of notoriety back in the United States. In April, 1917, two months after Patton's return, the United States declared war on Germany. Pershing, appointed commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.), promoted Patton to captain and asked Patton to accompany him to France. Here, Patton began taking an interest in tanks, which were then new and largely untried weapons. He was promoted to Major and, in November, 1917, became one of the first men detailed in the newly established United States Army Tank Corps. He was ordered to direct a new tank school at Langres, France, where he would organize and train the 304th (1st) Tank Brigade. He was soon promoted to lieutenant colonel. Patton led the 1st Tank Brigade into battle at St. Mihiel in mid-September, 1918.
It was a very complex operation involving a majority of the AEF ground forces fighting through rough, hilly terrain the German Army had spent four years fortifying. Its objective was the capture of the railroad hub at Sedan, which would break the rail net supporting the German Army in France and Flanders and force the enemy's withdrawal from the occupied territories.
The bulk of the forces engaged in the initial onslaught had to be transferred from the St. Mihiel Salient to a new jump off line north and northwest of Verdun. This new section of the front extended thirty miles east to west. The re-shifting of forces in such a short period of time was one of the great accomplishments of the Great War. These logistics were planned and directed by Col. George C. Marshall establishing his reputation and preparing him to lead American forces to victory in the Second World War.
The German forces that opposed the AEF consisted of approximately forty divisions from the Army Groups of the Crown Prince and General Max Carl von Gallwitz, with the largest force the Fifth Army of Group Gallwitz commanded by General Georg von der Marwitz.
On 25 September, at 2330 the initial barrage by 2700 guns began. Ten American divisions of 26,000 men each were poised to attack. They were organized in three corps, arrayed facing north from the edge of the Champagne in the west to the River Meuse in the East. On 27 September, Montfaucon was captured, but the day and one-half delay allowed German forces to escape and regroup avoiding a rout. This proved to be the most expensive missed opportunity of the AEF.
On September 29, six new German divisions were deployed to oppose the American attack, and in the words of General Pershing, "We were no longer engaged in a manoeuvre for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily committed, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy."
On October 3, the 308. Battalion, famous as the “Lost Battalion” of the 77. Division was surrounded. Things were bogged down along the line. Pershing shuffled his divisions for a renewed assault. But only on 7 October, I Corps re-enforced by the 82. Division, managed to relieve the “Lost Battalion” in a flanking attack.
The Argonne produced many actions more important than the rescue of the Lost Battalion but hardly any as dramatic. The incident could have happened only in the Argonne, where communications with co-operating units was always difficult, and sometimes impossible. Major Whittlesey's battalion, in making an attack through the forest, gained their objectives, only to find that they were out of touch with the American and French units with which they were co-operating. It is not true, as sometimes reported, that Whittlesey pushed ahead beyond the objectives which had been set for him. Nevertheless, he was so far away from help as to make his chances of rescue small. German machine guns were behind him. His men were raked by fire from all sides. Yet their position was a strong one and they hung on. Soon their rations were gone.
For more than twenty-four hours even their position was unknown to the American Army. Eventually they were located by aeroplanes and an attempt was made to supply them with food and ammunition. Even yet rescue seemed a long chance. The Germans though the battalion was at their mercy and sent a messenger asking Whittlesey to surrender. He refused, and the "Go to Hell" which has been put into his mouth as a fitting expression for the occasion will probably go down in American history in spite of the fact that Whittlesey has done his best to convince people that he never said it. Several attacks were made in an effort to rescue the Americans but without success until a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Gene Houghton broke through and brought the exhausted men back to safety.Without food, water or reserve ammunition and cut off from supply and communication lines, and subjected to constant assaults and bombardments, they managed to hold the enemy until they were finally rescued after five days of desperate action. Exploits of the US Army's 77th Division, 308th Battallion from October 2 1918 in the Argonne Forest are immortalized in the movie "The Lost Battalion" (2001).
Between October 9 and October 21, a see-saw battle on the east bank of the Meuse developed as the Germans continually resist and counterattack the US units of the French XVII Corps. On October 21 Cunel was captured and the third German defensive position, the Kriemhilde Stellung of the Hindenburg Line was broken. On November 1, after a major road construction program during October improved the logistical situation, the reorganized First Army, now under the command of Lt. General Hunter Liggett, began the final pursuit to Sedan. The first days advance by V Corps in the centre was six miles. The Germans were shocked and ordered a withdrawal. On November 5, leading US units reached the hills overlooking Sedan. The First Army boundary was ordered to be shifted to the east to allow the French 4. Army the honour of capturing Sedan site of the defeat in 1870 and redirected 1. Army´s route of advance. Between 7 – 11 November, units already east of the Meuse continued advancing northward and the First Army Headquarters layed plans for taking the old fortress of Montmedy, the next logical objective. Marshall Foch's armistice instructions arrived on 11 November at 0600 hours.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive was the greatest American battle of the First World War. In six weeks the AEF lost 26,277 killed and 95,786 wounded. The German army lost 126.000 men.
