Operation "Judgement"
The origin of the Battle of Verdun is probably located in a memorandum of General Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn who sent it to Emperor Wilhelm II at the Christmas Day, 1915. He explained his Emperor the thesis, that in this it primarily is all about to discourage England since the power of the Alliance would rest almost exclusively on the shoulders of the maritime and industrial power of Great Britain. He therefore pleaded for unrestricted submarine warfare and the destruction of the Allies of England in Europe. From his point of view Russia he divided out as it would have enough problems with itself and would sooner or later expel anyway and Italy would be too insignificant. He did not believe in attacking the British front sector directly, therefore France had to be forced to the knees with an enormous blow. Von Falkenhayn in his memorandum: „ "The string in France has reached breaking point. A mass breakthrough — which in any case is beyond our means — is unnecessary. Within our reach there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death". Von Falkenhayn had one specific town in mind where he wanted to execute his theory of "white bleeding": Verdun.
Verdun indeed was a place of great symbolic power for France. Every child knew the town which was a fortress since the Roman Age. Vauban renewed it within the 17th century, Napeoleon III.in the 19th century and for the last time 1885 when the first ring of forts was doubled by a second one, 8 km remote from the city centre. Verdun was also the last fortress which fell during the war 1870-1871. The Forts were strengthened with concrete and steel around the turn of the century. The French lost faith in fortresses, however, in 1914 when the Germans pulverized the forts of Liège and Namur with extra-heavy guns.
In 1914 the battle for Verdun was short and then fell into oblivion. Only three French divisions were in position in and around Verdun. Among them the 56. and 59. Battalion under the order of Lieutenant-Colonel Emile Driant. Driant was an outstanding theorist who had written numerous books and documents about the war of the future and did forecast a great victory for France over Germany.
In 1914 the battle for Verdun was short and then fell into oblivion. Only three French divisions were in position in and around Verdun. Among them the 56. and 59. Battalion under the order of Lieutenant-Colonel Emile Driant. Driant was an outstanding theorist who had written numerous books and documents about the war of the future and did forecast a great victory for France over Germany.
Verdun offered a favourable opportunity for von Falkenhayn also for other reasons. Verdun was by-passed by the German troops in 1914. A salient resulted from that manoeuvre which could be attacked from three sides. The logistical component was also favourable for the Germans. The next big railroad station was only 20 km away.
The Emperor Wilhelm II accepted von Falkenhayns memorandum, despite certain doubts entailed by an unrestricted submarine warfare. The fear of America joining the war was well defined on the German side. But Wilhelm II trusted von Falkenhayn and his promises to bring about a quick decision
The Emperor Wilhelm II accepted von Falkenhayns memorandum, despite certain doubts entailed by an unrestricted submarine warfare. The fear of America joining the war was well defined on the German side. But Wilhelm II trusted von Falkenhayn and his promises to bring about a quick decision
Mega guns
In the course of January and February 1916 von Falkenhayn had moved the points to "bleed white" France. The German Kronprinz (crown prince) Wilhelm received the task to attack Verdun with his 5. Army. He got another 10 divisions, among them six regular divisions, as reinforcements. Great value was attached to the artillery. Altogether, 1200 guns were available inclusive 542 heavy and heaviest guns. Available for an unheard of artillery war were also thirteen 42 cm of mortars and seventeen 30.5 cm guns, mortars and guns which had made a mess of Liege and Namur. Goods trains were heading towards Verdun non-stop. Twelve railway tracks provided the German 5.Army with goods and ammunition. 1 300 ammunition trains transported 2,5 million artillery projectiles to the front. The French only had a narrow gauge railway line and one road (La Voie Sacrée), both going out of Bar-le-Duc, though. An example of the enormous logistical task of waging this artillery war was the 38 cm railway gun "Long Max" in the woods of Warphemont.
The gun consisted of three components: Bedding, live ring and barrel construction. After the concrete of the bedding was dry, the S.K.L./45 gun got transported via specifically built rail way lines to the site and fixed with the help of a crane on the live ring three weeks later. The semicircular bedding with live ring permitted a range of 45 km. The bedding had a diameter of 20 m and a depth of 4 m. The electrical energy for the directional elevation installation was obtained from a generator driven by a petrol engine on a goods truck. Reinforced observation and ammunition rooms were also part of the firing position. A wooden scaffold with a camouflage netting protected the gun from reconnaissance planes.
Besides the "Lange Max" another two 38 cm railway guns were used in the hinterland of Verdun. All three guns were connected with each other via railroad. During its operational time the "Lange Max" destroyed Verdun for the most part. The bombardment of the fort de Moulainville resulted in the destruction of the 15 cm twin cannon of the fortress. The shrapnel specially developed and used in 1915 at the front of Verdun was used with great physical and moral effect against assembled French troops.
Von Falkenhayn had fixed the beginning of its offensive called "Operation Judgement" for February 10. „No position of the French may be left untouched by artillery, no reinforcement possibility undisturbed, the enemy may feel safe nowhere", von Falkenhayn used to say at the General Staff. Constantly, he wanted to force his opponent to throw reinforcements in the "Battle of Attrition" which seemed to favour the Germans. For von Falkenhayn there was only one alternative that concerned the outcome of the battle. Either the French gave up and lost the town or they carried on the fight and lost their army.
The longest battle
The first date passed without a shot. Heavy rain made every action impossible. The weather did not improve also on February 11. It only began to dry up on February 19. The sun, exceptionally warm for the season, almost made forget the war. And the time nevertheless was used to introduce a new German secret weapon, the flame-thrower. The Battle of Verdun was then started with live rounds of the "Lange Max" on February 21, 1916 at 08.12, however.
On the French side he world disappeared in a wall of smoke and dirt. Field artillery covered the trenches and heavy artillery raked the back connections, the citadel of Verdun, the bridges and the town. Toward noon the trench mortars started to use up their loads out of the trench positions against the French positions which clumsily and staggering took the short way to the opponent.
In the Caures Woods where Driant had prepared for the arrival of the German with his battalions the end of the world dawned. It was noticed in later documentations that within the few hours until the German infantry appeared, 80 000 shells fell on half a square kilometre. It seemed to be a miracle that some of Driants people survived at all. Those who did had another day of grace until they were also cut to pieces by German forces.
On February 21, 22 and 23 the Germans were close to overrun the French along the entire front. They did not do it because their operation was based on the idea that the artillery should destroy the French positions and the German infantry should occupy these in the after-push. A French Second Lieutenant of the 72. Division reported on February 23: "Commander and all company commanders dead. My battalion has a strength of 180 men (of 600). I have neither ammunition nor catering. What shall I do?"
The report out of the Great German headquarters noticed that day: „On February 23 the German attack reached already the line Samogneux-Beaumont Grémilly by a system of trenches and bases improved with all modern aids of field fortification technology. Moreover, they had to force themselves through woods badly shot to pieces by the German artillery“.
The Germans overran the outer trench zone, February 24. Many of the French soldiers left their positions panicking and streamed back on the Forts Vaux and Douaumont. If these forts would have fallen, the Germans would have had the opportunity to take almost all supply routes of the French under devastating fire.
The French were overwhelmed by the impact of the German attack but not surprised. Two German deserters had warned the French leadership before the German attack on January 16 and 25. Civilians, deported also from German authorities, spoke about concentrations of troops. But the French intelligence officers did not take these reports seriously . They could not recognize any "attack trenches" from the few aerial pictures and without them an attack was unthinkable.
The Douaumont saga
The night from February 24 on 25 was the first peaceful night for the "Brandenburgers" of General Lochow. Exhausted however, but not discouraged the soldiers of the 24. Brandenburg Infantry Regiment went to sleep in their shell craters of the Hermitage woods. Lieutenant von Brandis and his 8. Company had the better lot, fully developed shelters, where they could spend the night unlike their sister Companies 6 and 7 which had to stand fast in snow-covered trenches. Von Brandis was inspired by the thought of him storming the Fort Douaumont would be written as a heroic deed into the annals of the Prussian Army.
The artillery drummed the whole morning on February 25. At 14.00 the inferno still increased before the battalion got the order to advance at 16.00. At this time the 24-year Second Lieutenant of the Reserve Eugen Radtke of the 6. Company also got going. They succeeded in taking the first French trench by German machine gunners taking the hostile trenches under fire while the infantry was running through a valley. When the Germans reached the trench, the French let themselves taken prisoners almost already relieved.
This gave them an advantage since von Brandis met a tougher opponent. By the driving snow Radtke and his men ran further in the direction of the Douaumont. They did not hesitate for a long time when they arrived at the trench of the Fort and penetrated into it.
This gave them an advantage since von Brandis met a tougher opponent. By the driving snow Radtke and his men ran further in the direction of the Douaumont. They did not hesitate for a long time when they arrived at the trench of the Fort and penetrated into it.
The frightening impression which the solid giant brought to bear on the Brandenburgers was nothing but an optical deception. This fortress was not valid any more as a corner pillar of the French defence system. It was already provided by general Herr, Fortress Commanding Officer of Verdun like also Fort Vaux, for dispersion.
The moment Radtke and his men dropped to the trench of the fortress, about 65 older members of French Territorial Army, primarily gunners, held the position. The only gun turret that was still firing, a 15.5 cm gun, the Germans had not even identified. Instead, they bombarded a 7.5 cm rapid fire gun with heavy calibres.
The moment Radtke and his men dropped to the trench of the fortress, about 65 older members of French Territorial Army, primarily gunners, held the position. The only gun turret that was still firing, a 15.5 cm gun, the Germans had not even identified. Instead, they bombarded a 7.5 cm rapid fire gun with heavy calibres.
Radkes troop seeped in slowly into the catacombs of the Douaumont. Not a single shot had been fired till now. The neighbouring company, the 5.under Second Lieutenant Klingenberg, also ran towards the Fort now and met Captain Haupt of the 7. Company. Haupt told Klingenberg that he had sent Lieutenant von Brandis to the rear with the order to lift the artillery fire forward. Klingenberg and Haupt then continued the assault and got to the same place where Radtke had jumped into the fortress ditch. It did not last long and the infantrymen piled up in the narrow place. Sapper Second Lieutenant Voigt even still took pictures under fire on the way down. Pretty soon the first made it to an iron door and one of them wrote with chalk: „5. Kp. I.R. 24" (5. Company, Infantry Regiment 24)
While the soldiers were moving a Musketeer of the 24. Regiment managed to get to the highest point of the Fort and swung a yellow-red signal flag to give the artillery observers a sign. Like by a miracle, he was not killed. In the meantime with the help of two of French prisoners they started to search the Fort. Only dim oil lamps illuminated the catacombs and it lasted not long until the 65 men of the garrison together with the adjutant of the commander were under control of the Germans.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant von Brandis lay in front of the village of Douaumont and waited for Captain Walter Bloem of the 12. Battalion to arrive. Bloem got into the flank fire of the French who shot from the village of Douaumont and had had to accept cruel losses. 550 out of 900 men had men fallen. The sacrifice of the 12. Battalion gave von Brandis and his people breathing space. He forgot the order of Captain Haupt and stormed with his people towards the fort, 40 minutes after it was conquered. First he met injured soldiers on the street who went into the opposite direction with the words "the Douaumont has fallen, Captain Haupt is dead". A little later he ran into a communication troop which connected him with the command post of the battalion. It was 17.33, when von Brandis explained to the Battalion Adjutant Kluge that "the Fort is firmly in our hands, Haupt has been killed and the artillery needs to increase its range". He still said to the end: “I now go into the fort".
Since Kluge could not reach his battalion commander, he immediately called the regiment staff and transmitted von Brandis words. He forgot the last sentence "I now go into the fort". The regiment commander now thought that von Brandis was the true conqueror of the Fort. And everybody who was part of the chain of command joined that point. . When von Brandis made it to the the regiment staff by 20.30, he did not mention again that he only arrived at the Douaumont an hour after the fort was taken by Radtke and Haupt. Within the next days and weeks a medal avalanche fell upon the men, with the exception of Radtke and his men and sappers of the 6. Company. This lay primarily in the fact that all officers, also Radtke, had been killed by then and could not submit any claims. Von Brandis received the Pour le Merit, the highest German award of the First World War already two days later. Only eight days later Captain Haupt was awarded the prestigious medal.
