Vimy Ridge
In September 1915 the Germans occupied the strategically important Vimy rRidge. Vimy is part of the chalk belt of the Artois which extends over the Somme up to the Champagne southward. And Vimy was the point mastering everything where the hill chain falls to the east to the plain of Douai abruptly, which extends to the strategically important railway track Lille - Metz. Caused by the extremity of the area the Germans were forced to hold this place at all cost.
Vimy was hardly occupied, enormous works at the defence installations started and soon it was one of the strongest fully developed front sector of the entire West Front. This front sector was equipped with a triple trench system, concreted machine-gun-nests and tunnels. The Allies were conscious of this ridge and already quite soon map-reading exercises started for an offensive.
In May 1915 the British attacked the ridge of Aubers, the French a week later, the ridge of Vimy. The British 1. Army was immediately stopped. The French with Petains XXII.Corps at the lead managed to push forward up to the ridge of the height. With use of all their reserves the Germans succeeded in a decisive counterattack which secured the mountain range for them. On Septembers 25 the French repeated their attack against Vimy. They conquered the villages of Carency, Neuville, St. Vaast and Souchez at losses of 150 000 men they did not take the ridge.
In March 1916, the British Corps Commander Sir Henry Wilson took charge of the front sector to relieve the French 10. Army at Verdun. 1916 was the year of the pioneers at Vimy ridge. The British reconnaissance recognized very soon that the Germans had used the peaceful times for an intensive tunnel construction program intending to blow up enemy trenches with mines. From a military point of view the own lines had to be taken back by 3 - 4 000 m, but the political situation had to be respected by the new Commander of the 3. Army Sir Edmund Allenby. One could not simply give up in return for which the French had to take so many losses.
Mine warfare
The mine war was a German invention to put the static positional warfare into movement. The first mine explosion was ignited on December 20, 1914. German sappers had driven ten tunnels under the British lines at Givenchy and put per 50 kg of explosives into them. After the blowing-up the Germans stormed the opposing positions. 800 men of the Indian Corps were killed. Since that day the mine war was the greatest threat for the infantryman.
Already on December 3, the Commander of the IV. Corps, Sir Henry Rawlinson, had demanded in a wise foresight to set up a special mines battalion. Few days after the German explosions on December 28, Major John Norton of Griffith, a former member of the House of Commons and officer of the 2. King Edward`s Horse Regiment suggested to request special workers, the "clay kickers" who built the underground in London. Finally, men from their own rows were ordered to new brigades, the "Mining section". The first British mine was ignited by troops of the 28. Division under the Hill 60 at Passchendaele on February 17, 1915
In the same month it was decided to draw up eight British tunnelling companies. The teams were drafted from available units and civilian miners from the native country. Another 12 companies were put into service in 1915 and another one in 1916. In March 1916, the Canadians drew up her first of three tunnel companies, followed of a New Zealand and three Australian companies in May the same year. Apart from the mine tunnels these units built underground shelters, connection corridors and similar more.
The 3. Army started an intensive tunnel and mine war that the Germans could only meet with an attack to occupy the tunnel entrances. On May 21, after a terrible artillery preparation (70,000 shells in four hours) the Germans attacked and occupied the opposing trenches and mine tunnels. Counterattacks of the British remained unsuccessful. On May 26, the British decided on breaking off the activities and the transfer of their artillery to the Somme. Delusive quiet then took up the battlefield. The British were relieved by four Canadian divisions, commanded by Sir Julian Byng in the winter of 1916.
In December 1916, Robert Nivelle replaced Joseph Joffre as Supreme Commanders of the Allied defence forces at the West Front. Nivelle immediately started with attack planning. For the gunner Nivelle the Vimy mountain range was to be included as the first priority in his general plan. Logically, since the ridge dominated the entire region. Nivelle wanted to attack to the north of and to the south of the "shoulders" of the big German front bow along the Somme since the Somme battlefield had got impassable. The British should take the northern sector, the French the southern one sector at the river Aisne and at the Chemin des Dames. The Canadian Corps got the order to take the Vimy Ridge.
New methods
The weather in April was simply terrible. Snow, sleet and rain alternated and the temperatures were always close to the freezing point. The permanent artillery fire and the wetness had turned the chalk ground to a tough mud mass which made any movement a nightmare. Although the German troops under their Commander-in-Chief General Ludwig von Falkenhausen, had watched the preparations for the Allies, however had not drawn any particular conclusions from it. Von Falkenhausen was convinced that his seven front divisions were strong enough to withstand every rush. This opinion had made him place his reserves 24 km behind the front, a crude error of judgement which should take revenge bitterly.
The Canadians under the command of their British Commander Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng and the Canadian Chief of Staff Major General Arthur Currie did not intend to to share the opinion of most allied general staff officers, that the taking of the Vimy Ridge would be impossible. The Canadians wanted to solve their task with unorthodox methods. Currie and Byng were already a team during the gruesome Second Battle of Ypers. Currie was the commander of the Canadian troops at the gas attack in 1915 at St. Julien and could watch the problems of the French as an observer firsthand during the battle of Verdun. These two commanders wanted to draw their own conclusions from the mistakesof the British and Fren.
Months before the opening of the battle preparations started. Behind the front, a copy of the ridge together with the German positions was reproduced. By this means they could study the trench system, the machine-gun-nests and other defence installations at due leisure. It was just as important to learn for the company and battalion commanders how their unit could solve their task in combination with each other. This assumed a new quality of reconnaissance which the Canadians perfected.
Microphones which surveyed the area were laid in the no man's land between the hostile trenches. Air reconnaissance by aeroplanes and captive balloon contributed to the reconnaissance as well as raids which represented a perfect picture of the German defence measures. Almost every machine-gun-nest could be identified most German battery positions could be located. This reconnaissance contributed at long last that 85% of all German artillery positions could be destroyed before the infantry attack.
Another unusual feature of the Canadian system was the introduction of the Platoon system. This system on squad level differed radically from existing practices in the British army. Instead of sending infantry wave on wave into the fire and exposing it to the machine gun and artillery fire almost bound to lose like till now, special troops were used which adapted to the area, could give each other cover and gave a considerably smaller target to the opponent.
In addition, they were instructed by their officers in every detail and every soldier was equipped with detailed maps. Besides that, the mission the squad was assigned to, was practised so that in the case of casualty of the officer the troop could accomplish its put goal even without him. To improve the communication, a prominent weak point on the two sides, almost 100 km of telephone cable were laid. Various tunnels of altogether five kilometres length and underground day rooms, hospitals and reinforcements camp were set up. In order to transport artillery across the crater landscape, portable bridges were produced.
Another revolutionary innovation of the Canadians was the use of machine-guns during the attack. Until now, machine guns were only used as a defensive weapon. The idea was to compensate for the deficit of missing field artillery with improved fire power. With light Vickers machine guns in the very front line the German trench garrison had to be forced into cover
The Canadian artillery experts also came up with a new invention. 250 heavy and heaviest guns as well as 600 light field guns should hold the German lines under fire three weeks before the beginning of the attack. The fire then should be moved forward to machine-gun-nests and artillery positions. 2 500 tons of shells should rain on the German positions daily. Among those were shells with new igniters which were designed especially for the wire entanglements. One wanted to prevent at all cost that barbed wire would turn out to be a trap as it had happened at the Battle of the Somme. But revolutionary was, however, the new artillery/infantry concept.
After three years of static warfare the Germans had got used to the artillery preparations and spent the time in bombproof dug-outs. Only when it got silent, they occupied the trenches and defended themselves with their machine guns. The Canadians came up with a new idea. A perfectly coordinated concept of rolling barrage and advancing infantry was to deliver the decision. 100 metres each in three minutes should force the defenders into cover and make it possible for the Canadians to make it gradually to the enemy trench.
The blow
On Easter Monday, April 9, 1917 the attack began at 05.30 with. 2 800 guns covered the German lines with shellfire and behind the fire roller working its way slowly forward, 30 000 Canadian soldiers followed. The 1. Division under leadership of Major General A.W Currie took already the “Zwölfer” (dozen) trench after 30 minutes. The Thelus trench system was also an hour later under Canadian control. The 3. Division under Major General L.J Lipsett took the gigantic Swabia tunnel. At the same time some German machine-gun-nests had recovered from the shock and took the attackers under dreadful fire. Particularly the 4. Division suffered from the fire. The 87. Battalion alone lost 50% of their debit strength. The 85. Nova Scotia Highlander Battalion which actually played a building and reinforcement role was sent as reinforcement and took the highest point, Hill 145 at the end of the day.
The conquest of the Vimy Ridge, regarded as impossible, had cost the Canadians 3,598 casualties and 7,104 injured persons. The German 6. Army under von Falkenhausen lost approximately the double number of men. More than 4 000 Germans were taken prisoner. At long last, this overwhelming victory of the Canadians did not use the Allies much since they did not exploit the situation to push open the gate to the vast area of eastern France. The necessary reserves had simply not been provided.
For the Canadians the victory means something quite special at Vimy: the birth of a nation.
It was the first time in Canada`s history that its forces fought in battle as an independent unit. Their methods and will to attack made them them suddenly to the best troop at the West Front.
It was the first time in Canada`s history that its forces fought in battle as an independent unit. Their methods and will to attack made them them suddenly to the best troop at the West Front.