Where it All Started
Technical Intelligence for the U.S. Army during WW II probably had its origins in the reports sent back from Germany by Captain Rene Studler and the military attaché in Berlin, Col. Truman Smith. They were, for the most part, filed and forgotten until the war started. The United States intelligence effort was almost non-existent. The new Secretary of War had been Secretary of State and had done away with the State Department’s financing of radio intercept and decoding operations.
There were no funds to finance military attaches overseas so only officers with independent means could serve in these assignments. Usually they had no training in intelligence work. With in the General Staff all the principle officers were Generals, except the intelligence officer who was a colonel. Military procurement was the responsibility of the technical service. Ordnance got tanks, guns, ammunition, etc, the Signal Corps contracted for radios and telephones, and so on. There was no centralized procurement system and no real connection with any form of intelligence. In short, we were woefully unprepared for the coming war.
While Major Smith was sending back reports on the build up of the Luftwaffe and even arranged for Charles Lindberg. an Army Reserve colonel, to tour the German aircraft industry, the Bolivians and the Paraguayans became engaged in the Chaco War. Most European nations sent observers to see how their weapons were performing. The United States sent a Navy Captain for one year to observe a jungle war. The Germans were no exception and sent observers. Based upon observations made in the Chaco the Germans refined their weapons just in time for the Spanish Civil War.
At the same time, an unknown person delivered a document to the British Embassy in Norway which became known as the "Oslo Letter". This document outlined the status of German scientific research with an emphasis on military weapons. Originally discounted as a plant, it became the basis for much of the British Scientific Intelligence efforts. A young Ph.D., Reginald V. Jones was working for the British Air Ministry and was privileged to be on the list for receipt of the Enigma messages. He began to compare Enigma reports and air photographs with the Oslo Letter and began to un-ravel the mysteries of German weapons.
On 1 September 1939, the Germans invaded Poland. Within hours, Britain and France declared war on Germany. The code breaking operations which were being done by the Poles was moved to two chateaus in France. The next few months were referred to as the "Sitzkrieg" as both sides faced each other across the Maginot Line and the Siegfried Line. In May 1940, the Germans began to roll into the low countries and eventually the British were forced to withdraw from the continent. Codebreaking operations were also moved to England and set up at a Mansion in Bletchley Park.
Within weeks, the Germans launched an air offensive against England in preparation for a cross channel invasion. Britain had to rely on it’s air forces to defend the homeland during the period known as the "Battle of Britain" The saving factor in the battle was the use of the Chain Home Radar stations which provided advanced warning of German air raids. Key to stopping these bombing raids would the detailed knowledge of the German tactics and equipment.
The first major coup that the British achieved was the so called "Battle of the Beams". Several German bombers crashed and the radios were recovered. Upon analysis, the radios were found to be more sensitive than was needed. Jones began to think about something he had read, years earlier and in the Oslo Letter.. To make a long story short, the British put Hallicrafters S 27 radios on obsolete Anson bombers and flew them up and down the channel. They located radio beams coming from stations on the coast. It turned out that the Germans were sending a lorenz type of radio beam and the Luftwaffe pilots flew along the beams. Cross beams indicated the approach to the target. Jones was instrumental in having the British inject overriding signals into the beams causing a false signal. This caused the bomber pilots to deviate off course and drop their bombs in cow pastures rather than down town London.
Again as a result of Jones efforts, British commandos launched a raid on the coastal facility at Bruneval and captured and brought back to England a complete German radar. The complete story of R.V. Jones and British Scientific intelligence is contained in his book "The Wizard War". At the same time that this was going on, the British sent Sir Henry Tizard to America with many of the secret items that the British were working on developing. The best known item was the cavity magnetron tube which became the basis for all allied radar sets.
The United States leadership could see that war was coming but when the U.S. would enter it and how was unknown. The main contribution of the United States was supplying equipment under the Lend Lease program. Part of this Lend Lease program was sending tanks and tank ammunition to the British forces in North Africa. Along with the tanks and ammunition, the U.S. sent Captain George Burling Jarrett as an ammunition advisor. Jarrett, a reserve Captain, had long been a collector of militaria, starting with Civil War items and progressing to the battlefields of WW I. He even set up a Military Museum at the Steel Pier in Atlantic City. Once in Africa, Jarrett took all the captured enemy material and photographed it, wrote reports on what was good and what was weak with German and Italian war material. He sent the weapons, photographs and report back to Aberdeen Proving Ground, the home of Army Ordnance. Predictably, there was no one there who knew what do do with the material.
The U.S. Army’s intelligence division wasn’t much to brag about at the time. It was almost non-existent by comparison to the British efforts. The story of army intelligence in the pre war time period has been summed up in numerous books on Pearl Harbor. Signal intelligence was a badly fragmented operation, there was no military intelligence service, officers assigned to intelligence duties were looked down upon and there was no such thing as a centralized intelligence effort.
The President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, sought to rectify this by the creation of the "Co-ordinator of Information" under General William Donovan, a Wall Street Lawyer and WW I veteran. This would evolve into the Office of Strategic Services and in the post war period, the Central Intelligence Agency. Working closely with the British Secret Intelligence Service and the Special Operations Executive, Donovan was able to set up an effective intelligence operation and thus was born the start of the United States' wartime intelligence efforts.
The reports by Smith and Studler were supplemented by reports on captured material sent back to the states by then Captain George Jarrett. Many of the items that he sent back were also filed and forgotten until the establishment, in 1943, of the Foreign Material Branch.
As the war progressed, the need for technical information on enemy weapons increased. Special teams were formed, first by the Ordnance Corps and then the other technical service branches to evacuate captured enemy material. In North Africa, the Ordnance recovery teams, under LTC Medaris, often found themselves in fire fights with the German recovery crews. By the end of 1942 the need for a centralized facility in the United States was recognized and George Jarrett, now promoted to LTC was brought back and established the Foreign Material Branch.
Probably the most significant items captured in North Africa were the new Tiger tank and the recoilless rifle that the Germans fielded. The Germans also captured samples of the United States new 2.36 inch rocket launcher, which with modifications became their RP 43 rocket launcher. The captured German recoilless rifle became the basis for the U.S.’s later 57mm and 75 mm recoilless rifles. The Tiger tank was evacuated to Bovington, England where the Royal Armor School went over it with a fine tooth comb and issued a detailed technical report. Referred to as the Bovington Tiger, it can be seen on a web site if you can’t get there in person.
Probably the most significant items captured in North Africa were the new Tiger tank and the recoilless rifle that the Germans fielded. The Germans also captured samples of the United States new 2.36 inch rocket launcher, which with modifications became their RP 43 rocket launcher. The captured German recoilless rifle became the basis for the U.S.’s later 57mm and 75 mm recoilless rifles. The Tiger tank was evacuated to Bovington, England where the Royal Armor School went over it with a fine tooth comb and issued a detailed technical report. Referred to as the Bovington Tiger, it can be seen on a web site if you can’t get there in person.
Scientific intelligence, which is a part of scientific research is oriented on newly emerging scientific concepts which may have an application to weapons research. Perhaps the most famous example of this was Albert Einstein’s letter to President Roosevelt stating that it may now be possible to make a bomb using the power of the atom which can destroy an entire city. The result of this was the creation of the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb.
Scientific research in all areas in the United States was progressing under the auspices of the Office of Scientific Research and it’s predecessor the NDRC, National Defense Research Council. All research projects were classified SECRET but the most highly secret project was the Manhattan Project, the development of the Atomic Bomb. They too needed intelligence on the status of the German atomic research. As a result, they fielded the ALSOS MISSION, under LTC Boris Pash, the head of counter intelligence for the Manhattan Project. Travelling first to North Africa and then on to Italy after its capitulation, they interviewed Italian scientists, engineers and weapons people. Most of the Italians knew little about what the Germans were doing as the German’s didn’t really trust their Italian allies. The first report of the ALSOS Mission provided a lot of information on low level weapons but little of value regarding German atomic research.
By September 1942 the Signal Corps had also established a technical intelligence effort. At first they were called Enemy Equipment Identification Service and they had many teams for deployment overseas. They established a captured material depot at Camp Holabird in Baltimore Maryland. The equipment was gone over by the teams in the field to see if any changes in design or manufacture had occurred. Information of immediate value was sent to the fighting forces. The equipment was then sent back to Fort Monmouth via the depot in Baltimore, Md. The fly in the ointment, however was the JAPLATE program. Conceived in Washington , D.C. by economic intelligence analysts, this program required that all data plates be removed from Japanese equipment and sent to Washington. Usually done by the capturing forces, these data plates went to Washington, and also into soldiers pockets as they were "neat souvenirs" and could even be sent home in a letter. The equipment, to include the radios arrived at the technical intelligence company with no data plate.
There was no way for them to determine if there was a design change and if there was, whether or not they were looking at an older model which had been improved or a newer model with manufacturing shortcuts due to supply. Fortunately this was not employed with captured German equipment. By 1943 these teams had been redesignated as the Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service and remained in service until September 1945.
The U.S. Navy also had a technical intelligence operation called the M.E.I.U. for Mobile Explosive Investigation Unit. Composed mostly of frogmen and bomb disposal people, they were more concerned with ordnance. Three M.E.I.Us existed in the European theater and one in the Pacific. Only the one in the Pacific wrote a detailed after action report/unit history. The U.S. Army Air Corps/Air Forces also had a technical intelligence effort which was located at Wright Patterson Field in Ohio. In the Pacific the Army Air Force T.I. unit was called the T.A.I.U. for Technical Air Intelligence Unit. As you might suspect, their primary interest was the aircraft.
As the Italian campaign was ending, all efforts turned to the Normandy Invasion. At the higher levels in Washington and the Department of the Army, the Chief of Ordnance, in September 1943 established the Rocket Branch under Col G.W. Trichel. The main effort was the ORDCIT Project. In May 1944, the Army's Ordnance Department began a collaboration with a group of researchers at Caltech interested in high altitude research. The collaboration was finalized with a contract on Jun 22, 1947, and became known as the ORDCIT Project. The first vehicle constructed was the 8 foot long Private A. In parallel with the ORDCIT project, the US Army's Ordnance Department signed a contract with General Electric to develop surface-to-surface and surface-to-air projectiles in November 1944. This research project was termed Hermes, and produced technology later used in the Redstone. Robert Staver, now a Major was part of this early effort. He was later sent to England to serve as a liaison officer to the CIOS. (Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub committee).
Here he began to develop the black and gray target lists which outlined what facilities and people were to be questioned/examined/exploited when captured. General Eisenhower was returned to England where planning began for the Normandy Invasion. SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) was created. The chief Ordnance officer was Maj. Gen. Henry Saylor. Within his staff was the Technical Division and it had two sections. Research and Development under Col Horace Quinn and the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Section under Col. Holger Toftoy. Col Quinn’s section was concerned with weapons that might be fielded by the Germans and Col. Toftoy’s section was concerned with the weapons that were fielded. Under his staff supervision would be the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Teams.
The Ordnance Intelligence division of the First U.S. Army was organized during January 1944. Arrangements were made for four teams consisting of an officer and experienced NCOs. These teams spent the pre invasion time in an extensive lecture tour of all Ordnance troops. An attempt was made to educate as many troops as possible on the rudiments of enemy equipment.. At the same time, the importance of prompt reporting of new items and information was stressed. This training and the pamphlets that were written previous to combat were later to prove of great value.
Back in the United States, a book titled "How to load, assemble and disassemble Foreign Weapons" was prepared. Sold over the counter in many stores, the forward was written by Lt.Col George Jarrett, now head of the Foreign Material Branch at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. This book provided valuable information to the average person on enemy weaponry. The Military Intelligence Service began publishing documents on enemy weapons and equipment. Among them was the "Intelligence Bulletin" and a document titled "Technical and Tactical Trends".
Handbooks on the German Army were prepared, the latest being dated Sept 1943. In addition to these, the Signal Corps produced numerous identification guides and handbooks on how to use captured German radios. The Army Air corps, relying on the staff of LIFE Magazine published a series of documents titled IMPACT which were for aircraft crews. Originally Classified CONFIDENTIAL, they have been declassified and can now be purchased as reprints. The Military Intelligence Service also prepared Special Studies on various enemy weapons systems.
On D-Day, 6 June 1944, the allies launched a cross channel invasion onto the beaches of Normandy. The Ordnance Intelligence Division arrived on D + 6. Material for examination came in regularly from ordnance and other units., proving the effectiveness of previous instruction. New and unusual items were selected, preliminary reports were made immediately and the material was made available for shipment to the United States and the United Kingdom. Between 6 June and 31 July 1944, 175 sample items were evacuated for a total of 110 tons of material.
As the allied forces moved across Europe, tons of material was captured resulting in the establishment of captured material depots in France. Eventually the U.S. had four Numbered Field Armies and each had an Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team. Returning in time somewhat to England, the British "Y" service, responsible for monitoring German radio transmissions had begun picking up bits and fragments of reports on new weapons. In addition to radio intercepts, air photos and material exploitation reports were added the interrogation reports of some high ranking German officers, captured in North Africa. Sent to the air ministry, all this information was analyzed and there was confusion over what was under development. Some thought it was a rocket, some thought it was a new torpedo. Air photos revealed the existence of what were called ski slopes which would be used for launching rockets.
First seen at Peenemunde, they were later spotted on the French coastline. Continued research , intelligence intercepts and air photos kept coming in. Eventually R.V. Jones and others became convinced that there were two weapons. A V 1 and a V 2 rocket. Plans were made for bombing Peenemunde and in late 1943 the RAF and U.S. air forces bombed the facility. As a result, the Germans moved their testing site to Blizna Poland. Their factory for manufacturing these rockets as well as the new ME 262 jet airplanes was established in an underground mine in the Hartz Mountains, near the town of Nordhausen.
A rocket launched from the test site in Poland went astray and landed in the Bug river. Polish partisans were able to keep the Germans from recovering the rocket and were able to get the major parts of the rocket disassembled and flown out of Poland and back to England. Once there it was gone over by technical experts. By the time these rockets were actually launched, the allies knew almost all there was to know about them.
Brochures were issued to the citizenry and a mass panic was averted. Within a week of the allied landings in Normandy, the V 1 rockets began to fall on London and within a few months the V 2 rockets began to fall on England. As the allies advanced, the rocket firing sites were captured and eventually the weapons proved to be useless.
In the area of atomic weapons research, the ALSOS Mission had arrived on the continent and in many cases were ahead of the combat infantry. They were the first to reach the French nuclear research facility at Strousburg and were among the first people to reach the German experimental reactor in Haigerloch, Germany. Their reports went back to the Manhattan Project in the United States. Uranium blocks recovered from Haigerloch were also sent back to the United States.
By 7 March 1945, the U.S. 3rd Armored division occupied Koln, Germany. Bonn, some thirty miles south remained under German control for another two days and at the University there, the destruction of paper relating to scientific research on weapons was ordered. Secret papers were burned or shredded and flushed down the toilet. In a toilet that had not flushed properly, a Polish laboratory technician found shredded pieces of paper which turned out to be a list with the names and responsibilities of personnel engaged in rocket development.
Based on this and other information. Major Robert Staver, now in London was able to compile the black list of targets to be exploited. The allies had developed the concept of the "T - Forces", a team of soldiers with varied technical and language skills who would follow the combat forces and secure and guard targets judged to be of scientific intelligence value. They would be followed by CAFT teams, (Combined Advance Field Teams) who would evaluate the secured targets. If the latter proved to be of more than average importance the CAFT Assessors would recommend that American civilian scientists be called in to conduct an investigation in depth.
Spearheading the First U.S. Army’s drive across Germany was the 3rd Armored division. Combat Command B, commanded by General Burton Budinot was the element that over ran the underground factory at Nordhausen. The intelligence officer, Major William Castille, went inside the tunnel and described it as a "Magician’s Cave". Word was sent back through intelligence channels to SHAEF Headquarters. Col Holger Toftoy then began to plan "Special Mission V 2". This was the evacuation of 100 V 2 rockets back to the states for test and evaluation. It had been decided at the highest levels that Nordhausen was to be in the Russian Zone of Occupation, however Col. Toftoy was not informed of this fact. He sent Major James Hamil to evacuate the rockets. Numerous delays and problems almost caused the mission to fail. Major Hamil did however get 100 rockets out, hours before the Russians arrived.
The Russians, thinking there was a cement plant they were to evacuate, were amazed to find the underground rocket factory. They could not believe that the Americans had left all this for them. Within weeks, the principle rocket scientists, Werhner von Braun and his brother Magnus surrendered to the American 44th Infantry Division in Bavaria. Shortly after that, the major documents on rocket development were recovered from an Iron Mine in the vicinity of Dornton, Germany. The rockets, documents, and German scientists were brought to America and formed the basis of the United States Army’s post war rocket program.
On a more mundane level, all the new captured weapons were tested and evaluated by Ordnance Technical Intelligence Teams. Reports were prepared and the weapons were turned over to the Ordnance Museum and/or scrap metal programs. By the end of the war, all of Germany had been overrun by the allies and there were over 4,000 people involved in the detailed exploitation of the German economy and their industrial facilities. There were some 6,000 reports prepared on every conceivable topic of the German economy.
The Russians also evaluated these weapons and they became the basis for many of their post war weapons, a fact that became evident during the 1960s when many of these were captured in Vietnam and the Mid East. The United States efforts at this time turned to the defeat of Japan which followed by weeks the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The technical intelligence effort in the Pacific was covered in another article. You may access it here.
Each major group of items, artillery, radios, tanks, small arms, etc. have been written about in great detail and each item is almost a complete story in itself, far beyond the scope of this short history. I do think that it is necessary to make a few comments on the weapons that were developed in the post war years based on the technical intelligence work done during WWII.
The U.S. M 60 light Machine gun was developed from the MG 34, MG 42, Fg 42 German weapons; The Russian AK 47 evolved from the MP 44 Assault Rifle, the main gun ammunition for the M 48 tanks was based on German developments in sabot ammunition; the Russian RKG 3M anti tank grenade evolved from the Panzerwurf mine grenade: the RPG 2 and RPG 7 anti tank rockets evolved from the Panzerfaust anti tank grenades: The Cruise missile evolved from the V 1 rockets and the SCUD rockets evolved from the V 2 rockets. There are many books on these weapons and web sites on the internet which show examples of these weapons.
Source: THE WILLIAM L. HOWARD ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
Source: THE WILLIAM L. HOWARD ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM